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Introductionz The Imperial Presidency
in the History of Spaae Empl6ration
by
Roger D. Launius
and
Howard E. McCurdy
The aggrandizement of the American presidency during the
administrations of John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson, and
Richard M. Nixon prompted a number of commentators to criticize
the ease with which the chief executive could overwhelm other
centers of power in the United States. Responding to the growth
of presidential power culminating in the Watergate affair,
commentators argued that the expansion and abuse of presidential
power relative to the Congress and courts had created a
governmental crisis. Because of these episodes historian Arthur
M. Schlesinger, Jr., decried the creation of what he called "the
imperial presidency. "I Like other commentators in the mid-1970s,
Schleslnger feared the effect of presidential exaltation on the
traditional system of checks and balances.
This book deals with people who found relief rather than
anxiety in the imperial presidency. Persons who worked to
promote the U.S. space program saw in the powerful presidency a
solution to their most pressing problem--how to achieve the
unfettered political support necessary to carry out projects like
the voyage to the Moon in a political system that typically
resisted long-range commitments. For them, an emphasis on
presidential leadership made possible that type of support. For
people advancing science and technology policy, the imperial
presidency was a godsend rather than a loss.
Concern over the imperial presidency did not last long in
academic circles. Presidential power was in full decline by the
administrations of Gerald R. Ford and Jimmy Carter in the latter
part of the 1970s. Historians and political scientists like
Thomas Cronln issued tracts lamenting the gap between public
expectations and presidential power. 2
People promoting space policy generally ignored these
developments. Bewitched by the example of President John F.
Kennedy's 1961 commitment to send Americans to the Moon, they
continued to profess their belief that strong presidential
leadership would overcome the difficulties created by political
checks and balances. Their faith in the ability of presidents to
dominate the political system persisted long after outside
commentators had concluded, in the words of Hugh Heclo, that
presidential government was an illusion.
Presidential government is the idea that the president,
backed by the people, is or can be in charge of governing
the country .... This is an "illusion" in the fullest
sense of the word, for it is based on appearances that
mislead or deceive. 3
By examining the history of presidential leadership in the
U.S. space program, this book reveals how the illusion of
2
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presidential government affected the development of public
policy. Not unexpectedly, the illusion created expectations that
could not be satisfied. Well into the period of presidential
decline, supporters of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) waited for the return of the omnipotent
executive. They continued to press for the salvation that
presidential leadership would provide. Their faith in the
ability of presidents to free them from the political thicket
prevented them from adopting a more realistic view of the forces
affecting space policy. Not until the 1990s did this faith wane.
The ability of NASA supporters to find salvation in a potent
president drew its inspiration from John F. Kennedy. President
Kennedy, certainly, had few illusions about the extent of
presidential power when he delivered his speech challenging
Americans to commit themselves "to achieving the goal, before
this decade is out, of banding a man on the moon and returning
him safely to earth." He delivered those words on May 25, 1961,
as part of a speech before a joint session of Congress dealing
with a number of what he called urgent national needs brought on
by the rigors of the Cold War rivalry with the Soviet Union.
Kennedy departed extensively from his prepared text, pleading
with leaders of congressional committees to "consider this matter
carefully . . . as it is a heavy burden." Among the words
delivered to Congress that do not appear in the prepared text
appears the following demur.
There is no sense in agreeing, or desiring, that the United
_ 3
States take an affirmative position in outer space unless we
are prepared to do the work and bear the burdens to make it
successful. 4
Kennedy knew that Congress could undercut his legislative
initiatives by refusing to authorize them or, worse still,
authorizing his initiatives without appropriating the funds
necessary to carry them out. He had a very clear grasp of
reality.
When Kennedy entered the White House in early 1961, many
persons hoped that his inauguration would end years of political
deadlock most recently perpetuated by conflict between the
Democratic congress and the Republican president, Dwight D.
Eisenhower. This did not occur. Kennedy's effort to break up
the conservative coalition on the House Rules Committee succeeded
by a mere five votes, and only with the help of Republicans. 5 In
the Senate, his own party refused to modify the filibuster rule,
essentially scuttling any hope Kennedy might have had for civil
rights legislation in that session. Republicans provided the
margin necessary to squeak Kennedy's emergency feed grains bill
through the House, while conservatives rallied to shoot down
Kennedy's minimum wage bill by substituting a watered-down
measure. 6 Kennedy's experience confirmed the words of political
scientist Clinton Rossiter, who had written during the mid-point
of the Eisenhower administration that the president's tools for
influencing Congress were "not one bit sharper than they were
forty years ago. "7
4
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Kennedy could rely upon neither party loyalty nor
presidential prestige to secure congressional support for his
measures. As Richard E. Neustadt had warned in 1960, the powers
of the presidency seemed to amount to little more than the power
to persuade, s Kennedy was obliged to use his powers of
persuasion to forge individual coalitions for each new
legislative initiative that he sent to Capitol Hill. Frustration
over the lack of presidential power led political scientist James
McGregor Burns to publish The Deadlock of Democracy in 1967, in
which he argued that congressional committee leaders constituted
a separate political party independent of that which presidents
employed to win election. 9
On the way back from Capitol Hill after his speech, Kennedy
worried aloud about the lack of enthusiasm for his space
exploration proposals. I° Based on the experience of the previous
four months, he had good reason to be concerned about
congressional support. Proposals far more modest than the space
initiative had encountered opposition from various sectors of the
political spectrum. He had not yet discovered at that time a
reliable method for overcoming resistance. The May 25 speech
seemed to change that. Kennedy's space proposals sped through
the Congress. The bill authorizing the lunar buildup passed the
Senate one month later on June 28. There was so little
opposition that the Senators did not even bother to take a
recorded vote. The debate in the House was perfunctory, and the
bill passed by a lop-sided vote of 354 to 59. Kennedy noted the
"overwhelming support by members of both parties" as he signed
the bill authorizing his space initiatives on July 21. 11
For many years, space boosters had searched for the key that
would unlock the public treasury and provide them with the
largess necessary to explore space. They had promoted space
exploration through science fiction and popular astronautics.
They had tied their dreams to the ballistic missile development
movement, to the International Geophysical Year, and to public
fears about the Cold War. They had received for this effort
during the Eisenhower administration sufficient political
approval for a modest program of satellite research and a single-
seat Mercury capsule that only once spent more than a day in
space.
With a single public declaration, Kennedy created a crash
program to send humans to the Moon, as well as a supporting
satellite and rocket program. Without a challenge, and somewhat
amazingly, other politicians deferred to the Kennedy goal.
Congress did not undercut the initiative. NASA received the
rarest of polltical commitments--eight years of uninterrupted
support for a long-range science and technology endeavor. The
speech in which Kennedy set the lunar goal remains one of the
most memorable moments of that generation, in part because the
results departed so dramatically from past politlcal norms. With
such results, how could space boosters not wish for an encore?
Pundits applauded Kennedy's lunar commitment as well as his
deft handling of other Cold War emergencies such as the 1961
6
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Berlin crisis and the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, as examples of
the president's ability to act alone. Most other observers did
not treat the future expansion of presidential power with as much
favor. In 1970 George Reedy, who had served as a special
assistant to President Lyndon Johnson, wrote a book in which he
argued that the ability of presidents to rise above external
dissent and criticism was isolating them from the very forces
designed to hold them in check. "There is built into the
presidency," Reedy argued, "a series of devices that tend to
remove the occupant of the Oval Room from all of the forces which
require most [people] to rub up against the hard facts of life on
a daily basis. "12
Reedy was responding to the actions of Presidents Johnson
and Nixon, who behaved more like monarchs than constitutional
executives. Occasionally they and their aides also behaved like
criminals. The growth of presidential power, historian Arthur
Schlesinger wrote in 1973, produced "an unprecedented exclusion
of the rest of the executive branch, of Congress, of the press
and of public opinion" from decisions involving war and peace and
the economy. Accordingly, the imperial presidency grew at the
expense of other centers of power in the American polity. "Like
the cowbird, it hatched its own eggs and pushed the others out of
the nest," Schlesinger observed.
If this transformation were carried through, the President,
instead of being accountable every day to Congress and
public opinion, would be accountable every four years to the
electorate. Between elections, the President would be
accountable only through impeachment and would govern, as
much as he could, by decree. 13
People in the business of space exploration neither lamented
this rise of presidential power nor did they deplore the ability
of presidents to rule by decree. Instead, they asked for it to
be done again in their requests for presidential endorsements for
aggressive space activities. They concluded that the seeming
ability of President Kennedy to issue a clear national commitment
on space in 1961 could be repeated later, and in so doing it
would give NASA and its programs they political protection they
needed to turn general visions into engineering accomplishments.
Especially within the science and technology bureaucracy, strong
presidential leadership was viewed as the essentlal ingredient
necessary to allow the United States to compete successfully with
the Soviet Union in the realm of high technology.
The rise of the power of the presidency in space endeavors
had been noted as early as the 1950s. For example, when
President Dwight Eisenhower had proposed an exploration program
that space boosters viewed as excessively timid, the boosters
appealed to both the Congress and the White House. The House
Space Committee attacked Eisenhower's agenda as a "beginner"
program that lacked "proper imagination and drive. "14 In spite
of congressional pressure for a more ambitious effort, led by
personalities no less powerful than Senate Majority Leader Lyndon
Johnson, the Congress was unable to shake the administration from
8
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its plan. An advisory committee report prompted Eisenhower to
revisit his position just before he left office. After
Eisenhower refused to change his mind, James E. Webb, appointed
by President Kennedy as the second NASA Administrator, appealed
Eisenhower's depressed space funding to Kennedy. 15 What others,
including Congress, could not do in bending the president in
nearly three years, Kennedy did with one speech, thereby creating
the belief that the future of the U.S. space program ultimately
depended upon the willingness of the president to set long-range
objectives.
This turning toward the executive has guided subsequent
virtually all subsequent efforts to establish long-range goals in
space that went beyond the landings on the Moon. All of those
efforts were geared toward obtaining an executive decision, with
Congress seeming to play a secondary role. In 1969 President
Richard Nixon established a special Space Task Group to advise
him "on the direction which the U.S. space program should take in
the post-Apollo perlod. "16 Eleven years later a special
transition team urged incoming President Ronald Reagan to make a
"definitive statement on space policy" at the earliest possible
time. "A viable space program," the transition team members
wrote, "must have purpose and direction." Without strong
presidentlal leadership, they warned, the space program would
"waste away. "17
When Congress joined the clamor for "future policies for the
United States civilian space program," they too turned to the
president. In 1984 the Congress required the president to
establish a special National Commission on Space. 18 In 1990
another special advisory committee was formed to "consider the
future long-term direction of the space program." This one
reported its recommendations to Vice President Dan Quayle. 19
As the White House became increasingly important as both the
maker and executor of space policy during the 1960s, the process
for reviewing initiatives within the Executive Office of the
President became more elaborate. As his first major act, for
example, President Kennedy's executive assistant for space
revived the White House Space Council by drafting legislation
making then Vice President Lyndon Johnson its chair. The vice
president acted as intermediary to resolve disputes involving two
or more agencies, especially NASA and the Department of
Defense. _ He also consolidated space policy functions within
the White House, to the extent that by the end of the 1960s there
was little real SPaCe policy-making anywhere else in the
government despite the very real interests that resided outside.
Taking an approach that differed in form and not substance,
Richard Nixon relied upon his Office of Management and Budget to
analyze space issues and resolve interdepartmental issues while
the president retained sole control of space policy
formulation. 21 In 1973, Nixon abolished the office of Science
Advisor to the President, in part to remove the scientists' power
base and make them more dependent upon him. u
As if in an effort to perpetuate the myth of executive
i0
leadership the space policy apparatus within the White House
continued to grow even as presidential power declined. In the
wake of the Watergate debacle that led to Nixon's resignation in
1974, Congress and the judicial branch began to restrict the
prerogatives that had flowed to the U.S. presidency during its
"imperial" years. This was the case not only in such obvious
areas as the War Powers Act of 1973 and the 1974 judicial rulings
on executive privilege, but also in such matters as the direction
of the U.S. civil space program. By the time that President
Ronald Reagan established the Senior Interagency Group for Space
in 1982, a sub-cabinet council chaired by the Assistant for
National Security Affairs and empowered "to provide for orderly
and rapid referral of space policy issues to the President for
decisions," other executive branch organizations and Congress had
reclaimed much of the initiative in defining and promulgating
space policy. _ Not since that time has any president been able
to announce an Apollo-like program without having to deal with
powerful opposition. Even so, in 1989 the machinery for making
presidential space decisions grew more complex. President George
Bush recreated the National Space Council to "oversee the
implementation . . . of the president's space policy "24 among
seven executive agencies then participating in the executive
policy process for space, including NASA.
As the machinery for making executive decisions became more
elaborate, the language of presidential politics in space became
more definitive. Early in his career, in his May 1961 speech
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before the Congress, Kennedy practically begged the law-makers to
approve his initiatives in space. Eleven years later, President
Nixon's statement endorsing the space shuttle as America's next
major initiative did not even mention the legislative branch. "I
have decided today," Nixon announced from his presidential
retreat in California, "that the United States should proceed at
once with the development of an entirely new type of space
transportation system. "_ Not understanding that the star of the
Imperial presidency had fallen, Ronald Reagan was even less
deferential when, like President Kennedy, he appeared before a
joint session of Congress in 1984 to launch the next major human
space flight initiative. He told the lawmakers that "Tonight I
am _ NASA to develop a permanently manned space station
and to do it within a decade. "_ Only when George Bush proposed
in 1989 that the United States undertake a massive effort to
return to the Moon and go onto Mars did the president acknowledge
the growth in congressional power. Speaking from the steps of
the Smithsonian's Air and Space Museum on the national mall, Bush
noted that our future as a spacefaring nation would be decided
just up the street at the United States Congress. 27
While the laudation of presidential power captivated space
buffs, scholars of the American executive observed its slow
decline. These scholarly efforts were practically unrecognized
by space buffs. "Few if any of our presidents have been the
giants American mythology makes them out to be," Thomas Cronin
explained in a book first published in 1975. _ By overestimating
12
the powers of the office, Cronin warned, people set up
unrealistic expectations that would inevitably be disappointed.
The ink was hardly dry on Arthur Schlesinger's
_ when the Congress repossessed the president's war
making powers, established a congressional budget process, and
drove Richard Nixon from office. _ Textbooks took note of these
developments, but space buffs did not. _ "As soon as the clamor
over the 'imperial presidency' of Vietnam and Watergate subsided,
the presidency appeared less conquering than conquered,"
political scientist Aaron Wildavsky observed in The Beleaauered
_I_L_I_X. Even the sanctimonious "two presidencies" theory,
which presumed that executives could escape the constraints of
domestic politics by engaging in foreign affairs, seemed dead.
Space buffs had hoped to elevate executive prerogatives by tying
space policy to foreign affairs. This was nonsense, Wildavsky
argued. Ideological and partisan divisions now affected foreign
affairs as much as domestic policy and "the presidency of John F.
Kennedy proved to be the dividing line." The experience that
caused space buffs to worship at the alter of presidential power
was to political scientists the top of the mountain. It had been
all downhill since. 31
This illumination dawned slowly on the people who had tied
their hopes to presidential prerogatives. NASA officials and
their allies greeted Ronald Reagan's 1984 directive as a
political mandate to take the "next logical step" in space. They
established a work schedule to produce a space station, as Reagan
13
had directed, by 1994. 32 Nothing happened. Eight years after
President Kennedy offered his challenge, Americans stood on the
Moon. Ten years after President Reagan issued his directive,
NASA and its political overseers were still debating space
station design.
The inevitable confrontation with reality for advocates of
the space program occurred with the debate over the Space
Exploration Initiative (SEI). In 1989, President George Bush
endorsed the ultimate space-faring objective: human
interplanetary travel. He proposed that the United States
establish a lunar base and organize a human expedition to Mars, a
decision on which he elaborated one year later.
Leadership in space takes more than just dollars: It also
takes a decision. And so, I'm announcing one today .... I
believe that before Apollo celebrates the 50th anniversary
of its landing on the Moon the American flag should be
planted on Mars. _
NASA had already established an Office of Exploration in
anticipation of the mandate and the Bush administration asked
Congress for a down payment on the mission funds.
Outside the executive office the presidential proposal was
met with disbelief. In spite of a flurry of executive branch
activity, Congress refused to appropriate even the modest funds
necessary to study expedition technology. Bush complained that
Congress "voted to pull the plug, completely gutting the seed
money we proposed for the Moon/Mars mission." Recognizing at
14
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last the limits of presidential power, he observed: "Space used
to be a bipartisan effort: an American effort . . .
Unfortunately, not everyone on Capitol Hill shares this
commitment to investing in America's future. "_
The demise of the Space Exploration Initiative, concurrent
with the continuing troubles of the earth-orbiting space station,
forced NASA officials and their allies to question their long-
held assumptions about presidential omnipotence. Their faith in
the ability of presidential commitments to free them from the
constraints of Washington politics declined, albeit belatedly.
For example, Thomas O. Paine, NASA administrator 1968-1970, put
relentless pressure on President Nixon to make a commitment to
NASA's post-Apollo goals, telling Nixon a month after he took
office that he had to take affirmative leadership to initiate a
"general directive to define the future goals of manned space
flight in the next few months, prior to your final decisions on
the plans that will be recommended to you on September 1 by the
members of the Task Group you have established. "35
Nixon was more realistic, and suggested as early as 1970
that space buffs stop thinking about space activities "as a
series of separate leaps, each requiring a massive concentration
of energy." He added:
Space expenditures must take their proper place within a
rigorous system of national priorities. What we do in space
from here on in must become a normal and regular part of our
national life. _
Space had ceased to be special by the time the first Americans
reached the Moon, although it took twenty years for space buffs
to realize it. Kennedy's decision excited the expectation that
presidential leadership could carry public policy above petty
politics.
The symbolism of Kennedy's Apollo commitment held special
appeal for the true believers of space exploration. To them, the
lunar decision suggested that space exploration deserved special
treatment within the American political system. The decision to
go to the Moon suggested that a president could overcome partisan
divisions and lead the nation to great accomplishments, if only
the objective was properly framed. Many argued that the
subsequent il!s of the space program could be traced to the
unwillingness of more recent presidents to make "Apollo-like"
public commitments. 37
The Apollo Program, while an enormous achievement, left a
divided legacy for NASA. The "golden age" of Apollo created for
the agency an expectation that the issuance of a major space goal
by the president would always bring NASA a broad consensus of
support and provide it with resources as well as the license to
dispense them as agency leaders saw fit. Most NASA officials did
not understood how truly exceptional the Apollo mandate was.
After the glamor of Kennedy's moment dimmed, space policy came to
rest alongside all of the other priorities of government for
which presidential leadership played a diminishing role. This
eventually disappointed the people who believed in the power of
16
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presidents to make space exploration special. The Apollo
decision was an anomaly in the history of the U.S. space
program. _
Indeed, in reality the larger questions of space policy and
the programs that have developed from it are a microcosm of
larger trends present in the U.S. government. The rise and fall
of the presidential power is a key component in American politics
in general just as it is in the U.S. space program. To explore
these themes in the conduct of U.S. space policy since the 1950s
the NASA History office and the Center for Congressional and
Presidential Studies organized a two-day symposium in the spring
of 1993 that brought together senior scholars of the American
presidency, government executives, and interested students.
Seven major essays on presidential space policy and foreign
affairs cooperation in space were produced. They analyzed
presidential leadership and the relationship of the president
with the many agencies of the Executive Branch, the Congress and
its staff, special groups outside of the government, and the
larger American public. Each presentation recognized that the
U.S. space program was a policy issue as well as a scientific,
technical, and engineering effort. Recent discussions about the
role of the President in charting the course the space program
raise the larger issue of the influence of the office overall.
The symposium sought to bring together some of the most
thoughtful scholars and senior government officials in an
atmosphere conducive to an honest review of the U.S. space
program. Some of the leading scholars of the American presidency
participating in the symposium. None of them, and this was an
important aspect of their desirability, had written specifically
about the space program before and they were therefore able to
comment on it from the larger perspective of public policy and
presidential leadership. Because of this fresh perspective, the
presentations contributed to an overall reassessment of the role
of the president in defining and directing the space program.
Five of the essays in this volume deal with specific
presidencies, their approach to the development of space policy,
and their leadership role in framing NASA's mission. Fred I.
Greenstein and David Callahan continue the revision of Dwight D.
Eisenhower as president that has been underway for more than a
decade by looking at his space program. They argue that the
image of Eisenhower as an amiable "do-nothlng" president who
smiled and played golf while crises threatened to destroy the
nation is incorrect. Eisenhower worked hard behind the scenes
while giving the appearance of inaction, and in most instances
his indirect approach to leadership was highly effective. He
used the power of the emergent "imperial presidency" to establish
a modest effort that took a measured approach toward space, while
doing so in an inconspicuous way.
Michael R. Beschloss' essay on John F. Kennedy and the
decision to go to the Moon suggests that the early 1960s were the
high point of the presidential power in formulating space policy.
Using a wealth of documentary information, Beschloss notes that
18
Kennedy's 1961 announcement came at a crucial time in the history
of the United States when the president could exert himself in
Cold War activities with a relatively free hand. The Apollo
decision, furthermore, became a model for space promoters for a
generation, as the best means of continuing their far-reaching
and assertive space exploration agenda.
Robert Dallek's essay on Lyndon B. Johnson and the politlcs
of the space program comments on how Johnson used both his
presidential office and his unparalleled knowledge of Congress as
a tool to ensure that Apollo was completed within the time
constraints imposed by the fallen Kennedy. At the same time,
Johnson refused to endorse any other expensive long-term space
endeavors. Both Johnson's protection of Apollo from assault by
political opponents and his refusal to endorse additional big
space projects reinforced the belief of the proponents of an
aggressive space program in the invincibility of their agenda
provided the president supported it. By the time that Johnson
left office, space exploration advocates were firmly committed to
the idea of the "imperial presidency" as the only sure means of
preserving the future of a large space program. They did not
understand, Dallek makes clear, the difficulty Johnson had in
maintaining a coalition of interests in support of Apollo and how
he used divergent selling points for it among members of
Congress.
Joan Hoff's scintillating essay on the space program under
Richard Nixon and his successors in the 1970s attacks head-on the
_ 19
faith of space program advocates in the power of the presidency.
Nixon refused to endorse a strenuous follow-on effort to Apollo
but did so without convincing space program leaders that his
support would mean little in the social and political environment
near the end of the 1960s and at the beginning of the 1970s.
This further reinforced the belief among space enthusiasts that
the president was strong enough to make their goals a reality
provided he could be convinced of their legitimacy. Rather than
accommodate themselves to the new realities of policy
formulation, space supporters placed the blame on the personality
of the president and his unwillingness to step up to the kind of
"greatness" that Kennedy had exhibited.
Lyn Ragsdale's chapter describes how two Republican
presidents of the 1980s, Ronald Reagan and George Bush, did
invoke the rhetoric of Kennedy and whole-heartedly endorsed an
exceptionally aggressive space program. At the same time, their
policies never received strong political support from Congress,
other sectors of the federal government, and the public at large.
Only during the Bush administration did space exploration
advocates begin to see that the idea of an "imperial presidency"
mandating strong space efforts was a myth. As Ragsdale shows,
the twin politlcal failures of the space station and the space
exploration initiative prompted space policy analysts to alter
their perspectives on the role of presidential leadership in
favor of one more attuned to the issues of representative
government.
20
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Only in the realm of international cooperation and
competition in space, the areas where the presidency has
traditionally exerted the most significant influence, did the
idea of an "imperial presidency" really have merit. Robert H.
Ferrell surveys this subject, noting the broad foreign policy
objectives that the president has emphasized and how these have
been carried out, often without great fanfare and opposition, by
appointed officials of the executive branch.
John M. Logsdon explores the relationship between the
desire for presidential leadership and the use of the space
program to assist in achieving a position of national supremacy.
Finally, the editors of the volume conclude with a basic
commentary on NASA's search for another paradigm to shape their
space policy agenda. Since Kennedyesque leadership statements
have been a chimera in the agency's history, what forces do
political coalitions respond to in supporting the space program?
The editors examine the role of political partisanship, basic
ideology, and "pork barrel" politics in shaping the national
space agenda.
Taken altogether, this collection of essays provides an
analysis of the interrelationships of the president and other
branches of government in formulating and conducting space
policy. Each contribution emphasizes the myth of the "imperial
presidency" and the reliance of leaders of the U.S. civil space
program on presidential edicts to forward their exploration
agenda. In many respects this was an honest mistake on the part
_ 21
of NASA leaders. The Apollo decision and its accomplishment
under Kennedy and Johnson blinded NASA to reality and made it
hard for the agency's leaders to adjust to a different
environment. Since that brief moment in the 1960s, the agency
has had to wrestle with policy questions in the presidential
arena in a far different manner. That it has failed to do so
successfully in every instance is the central theme of this
volume.
The symposium that led to the preparation of this book took
place at the American University on March 25-26, 1993. James A.
Thurber, director of the Center for Congressional and
Presidential Studies at American University, was an early
supporter of the project and deserves our thanks. Without his
assistance this book could not have been completed. We also wish
to acknowledge the help of the staff of the NASA History Office:
Patricla Shephard, who provided administrative support; Lee D.
Saegesser, who helped track down illustrations and sources for
footnotes; and J.D. Hunley, who besides doing most of the
editing, read and edited various drafts of the collection and
provided valuable advice. In addition to these indivlduals, we
wish to acknowledge and thank the following people who aided us
in a variety of ways to complete this book: Mark J. Albrecht,
Giles Alston, Donald R. Baucom, Roger L. Bilstein, Rip Bulkeley,
Tom D. Crouch, Philip Culbertson, Virginia P. Dawson, Duane Day,
Henry C. Dethloff, Andrew J. Dunar, Tim Evanson, Linda Neumann
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vEzell, Aaron K. Gillette, Michael R. Gorn, Adam L. Gruen, R.
Cargill Hall, Richard P. Hallion, James J. Harford, Ken Hechler,
Gregg Herken, Jennifer M. Hopkins, Karl Hufbauer, Sylvia K.
Kraemer, W. Henry Lambright, Pamela E. Mack, John E. Naugle,
Allan A. Needell, Candice Nelson, Michael J. Neufeld, Arthur L.
Norberg, John E. Pike, Willis H. Shapley, William S. Skerrett,
Marcia Smith, Lawrence Suld, Joseph N. Tatarewicz, Stephen
Warlng, Glen P. Wilson, and Ray A. Williamson. All of these
people would disagree with some of the areas chosen for emphasis,
with many of the concluslons offered, and with a few of the
documents themselves, but such is both the boon and the bane of
historlcal inquiry. Needless to say, since we have not always
followed all of the advice these people have kindly offered, the
editors retain responsibility for any errors of fact and
judgement in the book.
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Chapter 1
The Reluctant Racerz Dwight D. Eisenhower
and United States Bpaae Policy
by
Fred I. Greenstein
and
David Callahan
QUESTION. Mr. President, the burden of some
recent statements on Capitol Hill, primarily by
generals, has been that we are well behind the Russians
in missile development, with little or no prospect of
catching up with them in the near future. I'd like to
ask you, sir, as far as man's effort to enter space, as
well as the development of military missiles, do you
feel any sense of urgency in catching up with the
Russians?
THE PRESIDENT. I am always a little bit amazed
about this business of catching up. What you want is
enough, a thing that is adequate. A deterrent has no
added power, once it has become completely adequate,
for compelling the respect of any potential opponent
for your deterrent and, therefore, to make him act
prudently. I
The story of Dwight D. Eisenhower and United States space
policy is that of a reluctant participant in a highly public
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program of research and development which had all of the earmarks
of a race, but which the participant himself resolutely defined
as a non-race. It is in part a story of technological
competition, but in larger part it is a story of political
competition--partisan national competition between a popular
president and a congresslonally-based coalition of members of the
opposite party and cold war international competition between the
United States and the Soviet Union. It is also a story of the
reluctance of a president to invoke the presidential office to
mandate an aggressive space program. In that sense, Eisenhower
used the power of the emergent "imperial presidency" to hold back
what he considered reckless actions in the face of a cold war
crisis.
During the 1950s, Dwight D. Eisenhower was widely seen as a
presidential figure-head who depended on his staff for policy
direction and day-to-day decision making. Today, it is scarcely
news to scholars that Eisenhower was in fact very much the
architect and principal constructor of the policies and actions
of his administration. 2 In Dwight Eisenhower the United States
had a president who was far more politically shrewd and able than
was evident to most of his contemporaries. And he was as much a
geopolitical strategist as a politician. As a two-term cold war
president, Eisenhower brought a remarkably unified, and, in the
judgment of latter-day analysts, coherent strategic stance to his
conduct of national security. 3
Space policy during the 1950s provides an ideal case study
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of the strengths and weaknesses of Eisenhower's leadership style
as it has come to be known in the years since reexamination of
his presidency became an intellectual growth stock. It is an
excellent example of how initial negative assessments of
Eisenhower's actions have been modified or abandoned with the
passage of time and the declassificatlon of new information. It
provides, also, a fascinating contrast with the direction space
policy was to take under Eisenhower's successors.
The hallmark of Eisenhower's handling of space policy was
his stolid resistance to demands that the United States embark on
crash programs to compete with the Soviet Union. To understand
this measured approach, it is instructive to consider certain of
the individual qualities of the man, as well as the broad
strategic stance of his administration and the state of U.S.
space policy prior to Sputnik. This sets the stage for a
detailed examination of the policies and actions of the
Eisenhower administration following the Soviet space launching of
4 October 1957. That event was Pearl Harbor-like in the extent
to which it galvanized the American people and their leaders,
leading to a fundamental redirection of the nation's policies and
priorities.
This chapter will focus on Eisenhower himself and the
distinct imprint his own vision of national security issues
placed on space policy in the 1950s. In so focussing it is
necessarily selective, building on the work of other scholars who
have shown the complex interplay of political and military
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considerations and the intense bureaucratic and partisan
maneuvering that characterized space policy ln the Eisenhower
years. As the statement by Eisenhower that serves as the epigraph
of this chapter suggests, the politics of space in the 1950s was
in many ways subordinate to the politics of military missile
development. The concern here, however, is not malnly with
missile policy and the missile-gap controversy, but with space
policy and the space-gap controversy that parallel the
missile-gap controversy. 4
Although the story of Eisenhower and space policy unfolds
for the most part in the 1950s, Eisenhower lived on through the
first months of the Nixon presidency, remaining alert and
preoccupied with contemporary affairs almost to his dying day.
His views from the side-lines, which we consider in our
conclusion, are of interest not only for their own sake but also
for the insight they shed on counter-factual questions about how
space policy might have unfolded had Eisenhower's policies been
continued into the 1960s.
Space Policy Before Sputnik
A starting point for any discussion of space policy in the
1950s must be a recognition of how intimately linked this issue
was with broader national security concerns. Both before and
after Sputnik, the prevalent view among U.S. government officials
was that space represented a challenglng new forum for cold war
competition. Eisenhower, more than any public figure of the
time, resisted this notion. To understand from whence this
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resistance sprang, it is necessary to understand Eisenhower's
views on national security.
Eisenhowe;'s National Security Philosophy
Dwight Eisenhower entered the White House with a more fully
articulated view of national security policy than any president
before or since. His interest in the broad questions of security
and strategy went back to his tutelage under the legendary
military intellectual General Fox Conner in the early 1920s. Ike
had served as supreme commander in Europe during World War II and
Army chief of staff and supreme allied commander (SAUCER) of NATO
forces in the post-war period. Eisenhower had more than just a
professional's factual knowledge in the defense area; his firm
convictions about domestic as well as foreign policy, and the
relationship between them, comprised a full-fledged philosophy of
national security. "Spiritual force, multiplied by economic
force, is roughly equal to security," Eisenhower wrote to Lucius
Clay in 1952. "If one of these factors falls to zero, or near
zero, the resulting product does likewise. "5
On domestic policy, Eisenhower was a free-market
conservative. He believed that big government and high taxes
were the great enemies of prosperity. As he constantly reminded
those around him, one of his chief missions at the White House
was to contain the growth of government expenditures. Eisenhower
fervently believed that budgets should be balanced and frequently
warned about the perilous consequences of not achieving this
goal. 6 He adamantly resisted the view of economists like the
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former chairman of President Truman's Council of Economic
Advisers, Leon Keyserling, who held that higher government
spending could stimulate the economy and thus generate new
revenues that made up for any deficits. During a 1955 press
conference Eisenhower commented that he had read that "Mr.
Keyserling has a plan for spending a good many more billion
dollars, for reducing taxes, and balancing the budget at the same
time. That, I would doubt, was a good economic plan. 'J
This conservatism, along with a strategic doctrine that
rejected the need for overkill, would have a direct impact on
Eisenhower's thinking about the defense budget. "How to balance
essential security needs with maximum economic strength was the
great equation that Eisenhower strove to solve," Ivan Morgan has
written, s In his first message to Congress, Eisenhower warned
that boosting military strength "without regard to our economic
capacity would be to defend ourselves against one kind of
disaster by inviting another." On April 30,. 1953, Eisenhower was
told that the National Security Council (NSC) that the United
States faced two fundamental threats: the external Soviet menace
and the internal danger that the costs of defending the free
world "may seriously weaken the economy of the United States and
thus destroy the very freedom, values and institutions which we
are seeking to maintain. ''9
This message would be a centerpiece of Eisenhower's national
security thinking, preached to both the public and his own
advisors. "Again and again I reiterated my philosophy on the
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defense budget: Excessive spending causes deficits, which causes
inflation," Eisenhower wrote in his memoirs. "Every addition to
defense spending does not automatically increase military
security. Because security is based upon moral and economic, as
well as purely military strength, a point can be reached at which
additional funds for arms, far from bolstering security, weaken
it.,, I°
Beyond his fear of the economic consequences of excessive
federal spending, Eisenhower had a Republican distrust of
government. He worried that larger government could undermine
democracy by producing a bureaucratic monolith which was
accountable to no one. As time passed, Eisenhower became
particularly concerned about the growing influence of military
and scientific elites. He would voice this concern most
strongly, of course, in his farewell address when he warned
against the "acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought
or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. "11 But there is
evidence that Eisenhower harbored these concerns from early on in
his White House tenure.
In assembling his cabinet, Eisenhower turned to people who
shared his concern about the overall damage to America's position
that could be wrought by high government spending. Eisenhower's
closest economic advisor, Secretary of the Treasury George M.
Humphrey, was a strong believer in restrained government
spending, lower taxes, and balanced budgets. "Humphrey's fiscal
views reflected his conviction that many government activities
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were wasteful, unnecessary and the harbinger of socialistic
collectivism," Morgan observed. Humphrey was an especially harsh
critic of defense spending, saying at one point, in 1957, that
"we're throwing away forty billion in capital every year--on the
dump heap." It "serves only our security for that year, then on
the dump heap. 12 Eisenhower's Secretary of State, John Foster
Dulles, was apprehensive about overly zealous attempts to save
money at the Pentagon, but generally adhered to the
administration line. "If economic security goes down the drain,
" Dulles warned 13everything goes down the drain,
While Eisenhower saw economic peril in every budget
increase, and worried about democracy's future in a technocratic
world, he was less concerned than many of his contemporaries
about the Soviet threat. As supreme commander of NATO forces,
Eisenhower had pondered the Soviet threat on a daily basis. The
experience seems to have left him less, not more, concerned about
the prospect of bold Soviet aggression. In the White House,
Eisenhower never put credence in the idea that the Soviets would
mount an attack at the first sign of western weakness. On one
occasion in 1953 he complained to his special assistant for
national security affairs, Robert Cutler, that members of the
National Security Council "worry so damn much about what we'll do
when the Russians attack .... Well, I don't believe for a
second they will ever attack. "14 On another occasion, in 1956,
Eisenhower commented in a letter to Field Marshal Bernard Law
Montgomery about Soviet intentions: "These Communists are not
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early Christian martyrs. The men in the Kremlin are avid for
power and are ruthlessly ambitious. I cannot see them starting a
war merely for the opportunity that such a conflict might offer
their successors to spread their doctrine. "15
During the late 1950s, a time that some strategic thinkers
like Albert Wohlstetter and Paul H. Nitze advertised as a period
of "maximum danger," Eisenhower remained confident about the U.S.
security position. James P. Killian, Jr., Eisenhower's first
science advisor, remembers the President getting up from the
chair in his office, looking out the window, and talking about
his own experience as a general. Eisenhower said that he hoped
his advisors recognized that he had some measure of judgment in
this field, and that he didn't see any possibility of hostilities
with the Soviet Union. Killian also recalls Eisenhower telling
him he was not himself "anticipating or expecting any shooting
war with the Soviet Union for the next five years. "16
Beyond his conviction that the Soviets would not risk
initiating war in the nuclear age, Eisenhower firmly believed
that the West as a whole was distinctly stronger than the
communist world and would remain so given its superior economic
performance. In 1951, when top Truman administration officials
were warning of the West's disintegrating position vis-a-vis the
Soviet Union, Eisenhower stated: "We must not forget that in
total wealth, material strength, technical scientific
achievement, productive capacity, and in rapid access to most of
the raw materials of the world, we, the free nations, are vastly
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superior to the communist bloc. "17 Eisenhower repeated this idea
often during his presidency, and would relterate it with
particular frequency following the Soviet launch of Sputnik. His
clear message was that quantitative analyses of military hardware
conveyed only part of the story--and a very small part at
that--about America's security situation.
The "New Look" and Early Space Policy
The Eisenhower administration's economizing approach to
national security was exemplified by its "New Look" defense
policy. The "New Look" rejected the highly ambitious approach to
defense that had been embraced by the Truman administration and
articulated in the 1950 cold war planning document, NSC 68. In a
speech before the Council on Foreign Relations in January 1954,
John Foster Dulles enunciated the Eisenhower administration's
objections to the Truman strategy, saying it could not have been
sustained for long "without grave budgetary, economic, and social
consequences. "18
In concrete terms, the "New Look" translated into a greater
emphasis on nuclear weapons for defense and reduced spending for
conventional forces. The overall effect of the policy was to
rein in the growth of defense spending. In fiscal year (FY)
1954, defense expenditures constituted 65.7 percent of the
federal budget and 12.8 percent of the Gross National Product
(GNP.) By FY 1961, such expenditures had dropped to 48.5 percent
of the budget and 9.1 percent of the GNP. 19
In the crisis following Sputnik, critics of the Eisenhower
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administration would charge that his "New Look" program of
austerity had served to undermine both ballistic missile research
and the development of a U.S. satellite. Through unimaginative
i
leadership and penurious policies, it was charged, Eisenhower had
left the United States at a distinct disadvantage in the opening
round of the space race.
The notion that space was a sphere for international
competition pre-dated the Eisenhower presidency. As early as
1946, some experts had warned about the negative consequences of
falling behind in the space race. A RAND report written in that
year suggested that the nation which first put a satellite into
space would be seen as militarily and scientifically superior.
It predicted massive consternation if the U.S. found that another
nation had beat it out in putting up a satellite. A report
commissioned by the Truman administration in 1952 echoed this
finding, arguing that a Soviet advantage in satellites would be a
serious blow to U.S. scientific prestige and would be milked by
Soviet propagandists for all it was worth. 2°
Eisenhower Was ambivalent about the issue of prestige in the
cold war. Prestige was a relatively minor factor in his
broad-based conception of western strength and the nature of cold
war competition, but he was intensely interested in propaganda
and psychological warfare. Believing that psychological warfare
was a cost-effective way to score cold war gains, Eisenhower
placed an emphasis on it from the earliest days of his
administration, devoting both personal attention and budgetary
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resources to bolstering America's propaganda activities abroad.
Psychological warfare was discussed at Eisenhower's first cabinet
meeting on January 23, 1953. Within his first year in office,
Eisenhower had reorganized the U.S. propaganda apparatus,
creating a new Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) which had
psychological warfare as one of its missions and which would
eventually involve itself heavily in U.S. space activities. 21
In 1954, U.S. space policy began to take shape with planning
for the International Geophysical Year, which was scheduled to go
from July 1, 1957 to December 31, 1958. During that year,
Wernher yon Braun of the Army Ballistlc Missile Agency wrote a
report in which he argued that putting a satellite into space was
eminently feasible. Braun argued that since this goal could be
realized by the U.S. in only a few years with available
technology "it is only loglcal to assume that other countries
could do the same. It would be a blow to U.S. prestige if we did
not do it first. "22
Von Braun's view was echoed the following year in NSC 5520,
a government directive on space policy that was approved on May
20, 1955. The document recognized the feasibility of orbiting a
civilian satellite and stated that "Considerable prestige and
psychological benefits will accrue to the nation which first is
successful in launching a satellite. The inference of such a
demonstration of advanced technology and its unmistakable
relationship to intercontinental ballistic missile technology
might have important repercussions on the political determination
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of free world countries to resist communist threats, especially
if the USSR were to be the first to establish a satellite. "_
Nelson A. Rockefeller, at this time the Special Assistant to
the President on Government Operations and vice chairman of the
OCB, circulated NSC 5520 through the government with a cover memo
of his own. The successful launching of a satellite, he wrote,
will "symbolize scientific and technological advancement to
peoples everywhere. The stake of prestige that is involved makes
this a race that we cannot afford to lose. "24
With the approval of NSC 5520, the U.S. civilian satellite
program, Project Vanguard, was officially born. However, this
enterprise was not conducted with the urgency that Rockefeller's
warning might have warranted. Prestige had been only one of four
main reasons listed in NSC 5520 for developing a civilian
satellite; it was not put forth as the chief motivating factor.
Just as important were military research considerations and the
desire to establish a legal precedent during, the IGY for
satellite overflight of foreign countries, along with a drive
toward scientific achievement.
In short, during this initial, pre-Sputnik stage of the U.S.
space program, there was no consensus in the United States
government for waging an outright competition with the Soviet
Union to reap the psychological dividends of being first into
space with a civilian satellite launch. Eisenhower himself seems
have been unconcerned with winning such a competition in 1955 and
1956. At an NSC meeting on May 3, 1956, where the escalating
42
T'I I i_
cost of Vanguard was discussed, Eisenhower acknowledged that he
had never been very enthusiastic about the satellite program. He
rejected suggestions by Treasury Secretary Humphrey that the
program be cancelled on economy grounds but said that the
priority assigned to Vanguard should be below that of more urgent
Pentagon programs. Eisenhower's stance, as summarized in the
minutes of the May 3 meeting, was that the U.S. should continue
its program to launch a satellite with the understanding that the
program "will not be allowed to interfere with the ICBM and IRBM
programs but will be given sufficient priority by the Department
of Defense in relation to other weapons systems to achieve the
objectives of NSC 5520. "25 In January 1957, Eisenhower was told
that the first attempt at a satellite launch was scheduled for
October 31, 1957. He did not object to this timetable. As
Eisenhower later wrote in his memoirs: "Since no obvious
requirement for a crash satellite program was apparent, there was
no reason for interfering with the scientists and their projected
time schedule. _
If Eisenhower was relatively unconcerned about losing a
prestige race in space, he was by no means complacent when it
came to the military applications of missile technology and the
intelligence potentiality of satellites. In the summer of 1954,
Eisenhower asked MIT President James Killian to head a commission
to examine current trends in the military competition with the
Soviet Union and to evaluate the threat of surprise attack. The
recommendations of Killian's Technological Capabilities Panel
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(TCP), put forth in February 1955, would have an important impact
on U.S. space policy over the next several years. First, and
most importantly, the TCP recommended that the Air Force program
for ICBM development be given the highest priority. Eisenhower
approved this recommendation, and as Killian would later write,
this was the "first time such a priority had been given in
peacetime. ''27 With a special "missile czar," assistant secretary
of defense Donald Quarles who coordinated the effort in the
Pentagon, the U.S. missile program was essentially run on a crash
basis through the rest of the decade. As Eisenhower would later
recall in his memoir, "To these programs we devoted all the
resources that they could usefully absorb at any given time. "2a
The effect of this priority status for military missiles,
however, was to delay the U.S. civilian satellite project. As
Killian would observe, Vanguard's development was "handicapped by
the National Security Council Directive that gave the development
of our military missiles top priority with the result that many
able engineers working on Vanguard were diverted to ICBM
programs. "_ In the wake of Sputnik, the Eisenhower
Administration would defend itself by observing that the U.S.
could have put a satellite in orbit before the Soviets, but such
an effort would have hurt top priority missiles programs.
Vanguard has "not had equal priority with that accorded our
ballistic missile work," said a White House statement released
shortly after the Soviet launch. "Speed of progress in the
satellite project cannot be taken as an index of our progress in
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ballistic missile work. "_
Another result of the Technological Capabilities Panel was
to draw attention to the need for better U.S. intelligence
capabilities. "We must find ways to increase the number of hard
facts upon which our intelligence estimates are based, to provide
better strategic warning, to minimize surprise in the kind of '
attack, and to reduce the danger of gross overestimation or gross
underestimation of the threat," said the report. 31 This
recommendation echoed a 1954 RAND Corporation report which argued
that developing a satellite reconnaissance vehicle was of vital
importance. On March 16, 1955, the Air Force took an initial
step toward this goal when it called for proposals from industry
to create a U.S. spy satellite. This project, too, would take
precedence over the clvilian science satellite.
The first U.S. reconnaissance satellite would not be
operational until 1960. In the meantime, starting in June 1956,
the United States relied on the U-2 spy plane program to gather
intelligence on Soviet military capabilities. _ Over the next
several years, U-2 flights would reveal that the Soviet missile
program was proceeding extremely slowly. In part, it was
Eisenhower's access to this information that explained his
confident outlook during the furor which followed the Soviet
Sputnik launch.
In his classic history of the space age, Walter McDougall
succinctly summarized the complicated history of U.S. space
policy during the first half of the 1950s:
Occupied by the need to keep abreast of the USSR in
long-range rocketry, the Eisenhower administration put the
ICBM on a crash basis. Absorbed by the need to monitor
Soviet R & D and deployment whether arms race or arms
control obtained, it also gave priority to the USAF spy
satellite program, two and one-half years before the Space
Age opened. Worried about the legal and political delicacy
of satellite overflight, it seized the IGY opportunity to
initiate an unobtrusive scientific satellite program under
civilian auspices. Finally, the administration was advised
of the propagandistic value of being first into space. Of
all these critical areas, however, the last had the lowest
priority. 33
With more generous funding there is no reason why the United
States could not have pursued all three of its main space
programs on a top priority basis. However, to accept a case for
such funding Eisenhower would not only have had to suspend his
perpetual resistance to higher defense spending, but also to have
become convinced that the warnings about the danger to U.S.
prestige by a Soviet first in space had sufficient merit to
warrant a more costly American space program.
Such warnings never resonated strongly with Eisenhower.
Still, it would be wrong to conclude that he never worried about
losing the race to put a clvilian satellite into space. Slightly
under five months before the launching of Sputnik, at a May i0,
1957 meeting of the NSC, Eisenhower expressed concern that
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efforts to make the Vanguard satellite more scientifically
sophisticated would delay the program, such costly
instrumentation had not been envisaged when NSC 5520 had
originally been approved, Eisenhower said. He stressed that "the
element of national prestige, so strongly emphasized in NSC 5520,
depended on getting a satellite into orbit, and not on the
instrumentation of the scientific satellite. "_
These concerns were expressed too late to change the course
of the program. And in June, after statements by Soviet
scientists that the Soviet Union would soon launch a satellite,
the OCB began preparing the Eisenhower administration's response
to losing the first round of the space race. Central to that
response, agreed members of an OCB working group, should be a
disclaimer by the United States that it ever had any intention of
engaging in a race with the Soviets to launch the first civilian
satellite. 35
Sputnik; Its Impact and Immediate Aftermath
The Soviet launch of Sputnik touched off one of the most
serious crises of Eisenhower's presidency. Like no other
previous event, it cast doubt on his capacity for decisive
presidential leadership and undermined his strongest asset: a
reputation for sound judgment in the national security field. _
Eisenhower responded to the Soviet challenge with confidence and
steadiness, but these personal characteristics were at once an
asset and a handicap. On the one hand, a more insecure president
could have overreacted to the Sputnik crisis, authorizing
unproductive crash programs to counter the Soviet move or making
belligerent pronouncements about America's determination to win
the space race. Responses like these could have heightened cold
war tensions. On the other hand, Eisenhower appears not to have
appreciated just how panicked Americans were or to have
recognized the degree to which space could become politicized.
To some extent, this seeming complacency reflected Eisenhower's
mistrust of rhetoric and his insufficient appreciation for the
symbolic importance of policy. To a greater extent, it reflected
his confidence in America's security position.
In the aftermath of the Soviet launch, Eisenhower sought to
contain a number of consequences which he found distressing: the
perception among both the public and certain elites of a new
sense of military vulnerability, which contrasted sharply with
Eisenhower's own outlook; the widespread tendency to see space as
a new arena of cold war competition, which Eisenhower believed
was misguided; and the rapid manner in which space policy became
politicized by Democrats who found the alleged space and missile
gaps perfect issues for attacking the Eisenhower administration
without personally attacking the popular president.
The Immediate Impact of Sputnik
News of the Soviet launch of Sputnik on October 4, 1957,
stunned Washington and the nation. In the tense climate of cold
war competition even minor jolts to the politico-military
equilibrium could be nerve wracking. But Sputnik was a decidedly
major jolt. It appeared to signal both a broad Soviet
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technological superiority, and, more ominously, a specific Soviet
advantage in ballistlc missiles. Sputnik was the greatest
propaganda coup of the cold war and it triggered a torrent of
alarmed comment. Senator Henry Jackson called Sputnik "a
devastating blow to the prestige of the United States as the
leader of the free world. 'J7 Senator Lyndon Johnson and others
compared the Soviet satellite launch to Pearl Harbor. _
Newspaper editorials around the country warned of America's
eroding position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.
In the next few months, with the Soviet launch of a second,
far more impressive Sputnik satellite in early November, and the
highly publicized explosion on the launching pad of America's
VanguaEd satellite in December, Eisenhower would face unrelenting
criticism on the space issue. Even though the United States
succeeded in launching its own satellite in January 1958 and
rapidly organized an impressive space program, the perception of
a lagging U.S. space effort would dog Eisenhower for the rest of
his time in office. The space-gap issue, moreover, would remain
hopelessly intertwined with fears of U.S. military vulnerability,
fueled in 1958-60 by increasingly strident allegations that the
United States was yielding the advantage in the cold war.
While Eisenhower and his top advisors were caught unprepared
for the extraordinary national and international uproar that
followed Sputnik, they were not altogether surprised that the
Soviets had managed to launch a satellite. The U-2 spy plane had
taken photos of the SS-6 missile on which Sputnik would be
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launched, and U.S. intelligence had told Eisenhower in November
1956 that the Soviets would be able to launch a satellite within
a year. As William Burrows observed: "by the time Sputnik went
into orbit on October 4, the United States knew quite a bit about
the missile that carried it there. 'J9 Apparently U.S.
intelligence was not entirely comprehensive, for in his memoirs
Eisenhower writes that he and others were taken back by the
weight of the Soviet satellite, 184 pounds. "The size of the
thrust required to propel a satellite of this weight came as a
distinct surprise to us. "4°
What startled Eisenhower far more than the advance in Soviet
rocketry was the intensity of public concern. 41 Sputnik was not
true proof of a Soviet advantage in ICBM development, but it
appeared to be, and this idea was terrifying to many in the
United States. Killian, who would be appointed White House
science advisor in November 1957, captured the furor of the
moment in his memoir: "As it beeped in the sky, Sputnik I
created a crisis of confidence that swept the country like a
windblown forest fire. Overnight there developed a widespread
fear that the country lay at the mercy of the Russian military
machine and that our government and its military arm had abruptly
lost the power to defend the homeland Itself, much less to
maintain U.S. prestige and leadership in the international arena.
Confidence in American science, technology, and education
suddenly evaporated. "42
If Eisenhower was indeed out of touch with this national
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panic, part of the reason undoubtedly was his own lack of alarm.
As James Killian would write: "With his full knowledge of our
military programs, especially our progress in missile and
military satellite technology, and our national intelligence
estimates, he found it hard to understand the national dismay and
fear. He was startled that the American people were so
psychologically vulnerable. "_ Because he believed America
remained secure, Eisenhower did not think that Sputnik
necessitated sweeping changes in national policy. He
acknowledged the need, as he recalled later, for the United
States to "take all feasible measures to accelerate missile and
satellite programs. "_ Yet for the most part he felt his chief
problem was a political one--that of convincing the American
people that all was well and that their nation remained not only
secure, but actually superior to the Soviet Union in overall
strength.
Eisenhower's way of tackling this challenge was to seek to
educate the public about the facts of national security as he saw
them. Although Eisenhower has been criticized by historians for
his failure to appreciate the power of the bully pulpit, his
public relations effort following Sputnik was quite vigorous. It
was sustained over time and hewed to a consistent message. In
his October 9 press conference, Eisenhower said that the Sputnik
launch did not raise his apprehension "one iota. I see nothing
at this moment, at this stage of development, that is significant
in that development as far as security is concerned. "4s
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Eisenhower observed that the Soviet Union had still not
substantiated its claim that it possessed an accurate,
operational ICBM. Other administration officials echoed this
reassuring theme. In a speech in San Francisco on October 15,
Vice President Richard Nixon said that "militarily, the Soviet
Union is not one bit stronger today than it was before Sputnik
was launched." He said that the free world "remains stronger
than the Communist world" and could "meet and defeat any
potential enemy. "_ In remarks to the press, John Foster Dulles
made the same point a day later.
But the administration was fighting an uphill battle in the
face of the all-too-visible evidence of Soviet achievements,
including the more impressive Sputnik II, which was launched on
November 3, 1957 with a 1,121-pound payload, including a dog.
Sputnik II not only underscored the power of Soviet missile
boosters, but also provided evidence that the Soviets were
already striving toward manned spaceflight.
Eisenhower's most substantial effort to quell the
near-hysteria which followed the Sputnik launches came in a major
television and radio address on November 7. Again, Eisenhower
assured the public that America's nuclear arsenal was adequate to
deter any threat from the Soviet Union. He could not, of course,
reveal to the public the intelligence he was receiving from U-2
flights over the Soviet Union--data which showed the Soviet
missile program to still be in a state of infancy. But there
were many other reassuring points he could and did convey.
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Eisenhower explained the elaborate warning system the United
States had to protect against any surprise attack and talked
about how dispersal of the U.S. strategic arsenal made it
invulnerable to a Soviet first strike. He acknowledged that the
Soviets were likely ahead in some missile areas and in satellite
technology but he assured his listeners that, overall,"We are
well ahead of the Soviets in the nuclear field both in quantity
and in quality. We intend to stay ahead. "47
Paralleling Eisenhower's message that America was winning
the arms race was his emphatic insistence that the United States
was not engaged in a space race. Eisenhower had already made
this point in his October 9 statement when he said that "The
United States satellite program has been designed from its
inception for maximum results in scientific research .... Our
satellite program has never been conducted as a race with other
nations. ''48 During his November 7 speech, he stressed this point
again. Over the next three years, he would continue to emphasize
the non-competitive nature of the U.S. space program.
Eisenhower's effort to avoid a highly publicized space race
was motivated not only by cost considerations and fear that the
U.S. might lose such a race because of its late start, but more
fundamentally by geopolitical considerations. Since the
beginning of his administration, Eisenhower had sought to contain
the competition with the Soviet Union. He believed that the cold
war struggle represented a colossal waste of human resources. He
also believed, as noted earlier, that the more intense that
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struggle became, the more America's democratic institutions and
way of life would be threatened.
To Race or Not to Race: Eisenhower Deliberates
Even as he publicly dismissed the notion of a space race,
Eisenhower privately expressed concerns about the prestige and
propaganda dimensions of space policy. At a meeting on October
8, 1957, with scientific and military advisors, he agreed with a
suggestion that the Defense Department consider using the
Jupiter-C missile as a back-up to Vanguard to insure that U.S.
efforts to get a satellite into space as soon as possible did not
fail. Later in October the Pentagon officially began planning
for a Jupiter launch in early 1958. 49
At a National Security Council Meeting on October i0,
Eisenhower was briefed on the Vanguard project and told that the
U.S. satellite would orbit at a lower height than Sputnik.
Eisenhower's response was to question whether such a lower orbit
might affect U.S. prestige. Later at the same meeting, according
to the minutes, "the President stressed once again the great
political and psychological advantage of the first achievement of
an IRBM and an ICBM. He noted that from the inception of the
ballistic missile program the Council had agreed that these
political and psychological considerations were perhaps even more
important than the strictly military considerations. "s°
The tension between Eisenhower's conviction that space
exploration should not be the subject of international
competition and his realization that it inevitably was marked his
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thinking throughout his presidency and on into retirement. He
mused in a January 1958 meeting with his party's congressional
leaders on the irony that "we should undertake something in good
faith only to get behind the eight-ball in a contest which we
never considered a contest. "sl In 1965, he explained to a letter
writer that "Under no circumstances did we want to make the thing
a competition, because a race always implies urgency and
spectacular progress regardless of cost .... Neither then nor
since have I ever agreed that it was wise to base any of these
projects on an openly and announced competition with any other
country. This kind of thing is unnecessary, wasteful and
violates the basic tenets of common sense." Yet in the same
letter Eisenhower commented that "manifestly we did not want to
be second in the field. "52
Eisenhower's concern about prevailing in the ostenslble
non-space race would grow greater over time, but he would
continue to confine expressions of such concern to private
meetings. By 1959, Eisenhower was dwelling frequently on the
need for the United States to speed up its development of a large
booster missile, or super-booster, which he saw as having
tremendous psychological slgnificance. 53 And while publicly
Eisenhower continued to emphasize that increased scientific
knowledge was the main goal of the U.S. space program, privately
he began to rank that goal last--behlnd the goals of national
security and prestige. At a meeting with top advisors on October
21, 1959, for example, Eisenhower said that the space program
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could be broken down into three goals. "The first is that we
must get what Defense really needs in space; this is mandatory.
The second is that we should make a real advance in space so that
the United States does not have to be ashamed no matter what
other countries do; this is where the super-booster is needed.
The third is that we should have an orderly, progressive
scientific program, well balanced with other scientific
endeavors. "_
By 1960, the aim of avoiding shame loomed large in
Eisenhower's mind. Thus, at a January 12, 1960 NSC meeting he
declared that the U.S. should seek to "achieve a psychological
advantage for ourselves," adding that "we would have to
eliminate" whatever discrepancy existed between the U.S. and the
U.S.S.R. and "in certain instances would have to exceed Soviet
accomplishments. ,,ss
Eisenhower continued to believe personally and stress
publicly that American prestige was rooted most firmly in U.S.
economic success, and that a crash space program to bolster
America's image was neither necessary nor desirable. But
clearly, between late 1957 and 1960 his views underwent an
evolution. Two factors appear to have changed Eisenhower's
thinking: first, the clear concern with prestige on the part of
the Soviet leadership and second, the emergence of a strong
consensus within the United States that success or failure in
space policy was integral to the nation's world standing.
Khrushchev's frequent emphasis on the psychological
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°component of the cold war was impossible to ignore. Whatever
Eisenhower's doubts, the Soviet leader manifestly believed that
prestige mattered in the superpower rivalry, and he sought to
gain maximum political leverage from Soviet gains in space. Even
before the Sputnik launches, Khrushchev had exaggerated Soviet
progress in developing ballistic missiles and touted Soviet
science generally. His aim was to intimidate U.S. allles, to woo
newly de-colonized developing countries by advertising the
superiority of the communist economic system and (it is now
known) to obscure major Soviet militaryweakness.
After the Sputnik launchings, Khrushchev stepped up his
propaganda effort, boasting about the devastation that could be
wrought in Western Europe by Soviet nuclear strikes and citing
the Soviet satellites as proof of the Soviet Union's scientific
prowess. Eisenhower may not have been easily shaken by such
posturing, but from the first days of the Sputnik crisis many of
his advisors showed intense concern about the propaganda
implications of space exploration. At the NSC meeting on October
i0, 1957, CIA Director Allen Dulles commented that Khrushchev
"had moved all of his propaganda guns in place. The launching of
an earth satellite was one of a trilogy of propaganda moves, the
other two being the announcement of a successful testing of an
ICBM and the recent test of a large-scale hydrogen bomb at Novaya
Zemlya." Dulles claimed that the Soviet propaganda offensive was
aimed at creating maximum leverage in the Middle East and, more
generally, at demonstrating the effectiveness of the Communist
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system to the underdeveloped countries. In Dulles' view, the
campaign was "exerting a very wide and deep impact. "_
Other U.S. officials shared this view. At the same meeting,
Under Secretary of State Christian Herter described the overseas
reactions to Sputnik as "pretty somber," and argued that the
United States "will have to do a great deal to counteract them
and, particularly, to confirm the existence of our own real
military and scientific strength." Arthur Larson, head of the
United States Information Agency, echoed this point, saying that
"If we lose repeatedly to the Russians as we have lost with the
earth satellite, the accumulated damage would be tremendous."
Larson insisted that the United States must be first in achieving
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the next big breakthrough in space.
In the immediate aftermath of the Sputnik launches, U.S.
officials were unsure about the international ramifications of
the Soviet achievements in space. The State Department and CIA
received a flood of reports of reactions from around the world,
and sorting through this information took time. On November 14,
Gordon Arneson, the Deputy Director of Intelligence and Research
at the State Department, summed up the preliminary view of some
U.S. analysts regarding these reactions in a memorandum to
Secretary Dulles. "The USSR's prestige has risen substantially
and the U.S. has suffered a serious, although not decisive,
setback," Arneson wrote. "World opinion tends to hold that the
sputniks per se have not altered the strategic balance of forces
in the short run, since Soviet ICBMs are not yet thought to be in
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mass production. Nevertheless, some new weight has been lent to
Soviet foreign policy pronouncements and increased credibility
may attach to Soviet claims in other fields." Arneson saw few
immediate consequences of this new credibility, but went on to
express a view that was quickly becoming conventlonal wisdom
within the Eisenhower administration: "Delayed or insufficient
demonstration of United States success in the ballistic field
would produce political and psychological effects of
substantially more serious nature--for example, on attitudes
toward neutralism and on the cohesion of alliances. 5s
Outside of the Eisenhower administration there was a
widespread belief that the Sputnik launches had pushed the cold
war rivalry into a new arena. In hearings held in Congress in
late 1957, a parade of expert witnesses echoed the judgment of
Dr. Vannevar Bush, who commented that "In the scientific fleld we
must recognize that we are in a tough competitive race with the
Russians and have a lot of good tough work to do. "59 Even at
this early stage, there was talk of which superpower would get to
the Moon first.
In February 1958, the RAND Corporation produced a report
which analyzed the political implications of the space age. The
report argued that the developments in space could have
far-reaching implications. It would "be folly to deny that the
allies' estimates of the balance of power in the future are based
in part on the expectation that Western science and technology
will maintain a decisive lead over the Soviet bloc." Such
_ 59
perceptions were closely linked to space exploration and
competition in this field had to be managed with an eye to
propaganda gains. "From now on, the U.S. should recognize the
need for restoring credibility in U.S. superiority, stress our
peaceful intentions and their aggressive ones, and disclose and
publicize U.S. outer space activities according, first and
foremost, to the effect on the U.S. international position. "_
Also in February, Eisenhower's science advisory committee
produced a paper on space policy which said that "The
psychological impact of the Russian satellites suggests that the
U.S. cannot afford to have a dangerous rival outdo it in a field
which has so firmly caught, and is likely to hold, the
imagination of the world. "61 This conclusion was reflected in a
document approved by Eisenhower in August, NSC 5814/1,
"Preliminary U.S. Policy on Outer Space. "_ Less than two years
later, another official space policy document, NSC 5918, "U.S.
Policy on Outer Space," would call for an unequivocal U.S.
victory in space. It would say that failure to catch up with the
Soviets might give rise to the idea that the U.S. was now "second
best." A chief U.S. objective, therefore, should be "to achieve
and demonstrate an overall superiority in outer space without
necessarily requiring U.S. superiority in every phase of space
activity. -_
Still, the public face of U.S. space policy would remain
non-competitive. A widely disseminated 1958 White House
statement on space, "Introduction to Outer Space," did state that
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to be strong in space technology "will enhance the prestige of
the United States among the peoples of the world and create added
confidence in our scientific, technological, industrial, and
military strength." But the statement as a whole paid almost no
attention to the competitive aspects of space exploration,
dwelling instead on the scientific wonders of venturing beyond
the earth's atmosphere. _
In the final analysis, while Eisenhower did come to worry
more about the connection between prestige and space policy as
time passed, he and his closest advisors on space would remain
ambivalent on this point. T. Keith Glennan recalls, for example,
that during the private meeting in which Eisenhower offered him
the top NASA job in August 1958, he "made no mention of any great
concern over the accomplishments of the Soviet Union although it
was clear that he was concerned about the nature and quality of
scientific and technological progress in this country. "6S In a
1959 memorandum to Eisenhower, Glennan wrote: "Personally, I do
not believe we can avoid competition in this field .... But I
do believe that we can and should establish the terms on which we
are competing. We could thus place the 'space race' in proper
perspective with all the other activities in the competition
between the US and USSR. ''_
James Killian, probably Eisenhower's most influential
advisor on space policy, also believed the U.S. should walk this
fine line. As he said shortly after leaving the White House: "I
believe that in space exploration, as in all other fields that we
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choose to go into, we must never be content to be second best,
but I do not believe that this requires us to engage in a
prestige race with the Soviets. We should choose our own
objectives in space science and exploration and not let the
Soviets choose them for us by copying what they do .... In the
long run we can weaken our science and technology and lower our
international prestige by frantically Indulglng in unnecessary
competition and prestige-motivated projects. -_ As longtime
Eisenhower aide General Andrew Goodpaster would recall,
Eisenhower shared such views. "The President's approach was if
we're doing the right thing in about the right way we'll let the
prestige work itself out. "_
The Domestic Politics o_ SPac_
Besides trying to head off an outright race, Eisenhower
sought to quell the partisan bickering which surrounded space
policy after Sputnik. This, too, would prove difficult and
Eisenhower would be subject to more criticism on missile and
space policy than in nearly any other area during the course of
his presidency. Leading the attack were Democrats in Congress
who hoped to improve their party's prospects in the 1960
presidential election. The Democrats suggested that American
inferiority vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in missile and space
policy underscored a broader failure by Eisenhower and other
Republican leaders to provide sound national leadership. _
Indeed, the putative space and missile gaps became part and
parcel of the larger Democratic stance in the 1960 presidential
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campaign, and the urgency of revising such deficiencies was
central to much of Kennedy's more inspirational rhetoric.
It is testimony to Eisenhower's discomfort about
politlclzlng national security policy that he refused to try to
exculpate himself by blaming the Truman Administration for its
slow pace in missile development. While Eisenhower hinted in
some of his speeches that Truman was to blame for Amerlcats late
start in space, and would make this point explicitly during the
1958 Congressional campaign, he did not fully express his true
feelings on this point until he published his memoirs in the
early 1960s. In Wauina Peace, Eisenhower quoted his 1947 remark
as Army chief of staff that a neglect of research on guided
missiles "could bring our country to ruin and defeat in an
appallingly few hours." He then noted that in the seven years
between fiscal years 1947 and 1953, the United States programmed
less than seven million dollars for long-range ballistic
missiles. On two separate occasions the executive branch failed
to spend money which Congress had appropriated to the Air Force
for this purpose. Eisenhower recalled that once in the White
House he immediately set out to reverse this pattern of neglect.
Another point that Eisenhower made in his memoirs but did
not stress while president was his view that the Democratically
controlled Congress shared much of the blame for deficiencies in
U.S. space policy. He argued that Congress had slowed down
Vanguard in the first half of 1957 by interfering with Pentagon
efforts to use emergency funds for the project. In addition,
Eisenhower expressed annoyance at members of Congress who had
threatened to reduce the Defense Department budget by $2
billion, m All of these arguments could have been made by
Eisenhower while he was in office in response to the criticism
that was heaped on him after Sputnik, but only at the cost of
further politicizing space policy and undercutting his own
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opposition to a crash space program.
The Sputnik crisis, along with the recession that had begun
in August 1957, ushered in a period in which Eisenhower was no
longer invulnerable to criticism. Between January and November
1957 his popularity plummeted from 79 percent approval to 57
percent approval in the Gallup poll. _ Eisenhower's mild stroke
in late November did not help matters. "The long honeymoon was
over," wrote Robert Divine. "For five years Eisenhower had
presided over a period of peace and prosperity, basking in public
gratitude for ending the Korean war and letting the nation enjoy
a great material abundance. Now he suddenly had to convince a
skeptical nation that he understood the new problems facing the
country but that he possessed the energy and vision needed to
restore the United States to its accustomed position of world
primacy. _
The Unfoldinq of SDace Policy: 19_8-1961
Following the Sputnik launches, there was little question
that the United States would pursue a stepped up program for
space exploration. Space was a frontier that could not be
ignored, and perhaps more widespread than the feeling of fear
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among the American public in the wake of Sputnik, was an intense
curiosity about space. The sale of books and magazines that
dealt with space and rockets soared, as did membership in clubs
and associations in these areas. Eisenhower himself was
intrigued. He may have been against a space race, but he was not
against space exploration in principle. Even as a general, well
before the missile age, Eisenhower had expressed his belief in
the likelihood of future space travel. In 1955, Eisenhower had
been so fascinated by a Walt Disney television feature on man in
space that he had called Disney personally to borrow a film of
the show so he could run it for top officials in the Pentagon. _
Eisenhower was no space buff, but his science advisor James
Killian, for one, felt that the president definitely had a strong
personal interest in space exploration. _ Killian saw this
interest as rooted in a broader appreciation that Eisenhower had
for the importance of science. Killian went so far as to compare
Eisenhower to Thomas Jefferson, suggesting that there was "an
interesting parallel between Jefferson's scientific interests and
Eisenhower's intellectual hospitality to those he called 'my
scientists,' and to scientific and technological matters. "_
Beyond the basic certainty that America would have a larger
space program after Sputnik, there was substantial uncertainty in
late 1957 and early 1958 about exactly what the goals of this
program would be, how it would be organized, and the amount of
money it would cost. Eisenhower resolved this uncertainty by
seeing to it that the early space program was relatively modest,
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that it would be clearly separated from the military drive to
develop ballistic missiles and reconnaissance satellites, and
that the organizational set-up for space exploration would be an
independent civilian agency able to resist vested interests and
military domination. Finally, Eisenhower's inevitable aim was to
restrain spending on space, in keeping with his overall desire to
check the growth of the federal budget.
Cartoonists of the time depicted Eisenhower as napping or
golfing while the Soviets gained the advantage in space. But in
truth, he was closely involved in mapping out a carefully
circumscribed American agenda for space exploration.
Spa_ _n_ N_tional security Policy
After Sputnik's launch, the issues of space exploration and
national security would be inextricably linked in the minds of
many. Eisenhower faced pressures to increase defense spending in
the wake of Sputnik from within the government as well as from
the Democrats. The most intense pressure of this kind came from
a body of national security experts that Eisenhower himself had
convened, the Security Resources Panel--or Gaither Committee, so
named for its chairman H. Rowan Gaither. The Gaither Committee
had been set up in mid-1957 to analyze U.S. civil defense needs.
It had soon broadened its mandate to include the entire gamut of
strategic issues. Sputnik was launched as the committee was
completing its work and helped to solidify the view of top
members that the United States was fast falling behind in the
arms race. _ In particular, the Soviet launch seemed to add
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weight to predictions made by such defense analysts as Albert
Wohlstetter that the United States would soon be vulnerable to a
preemptive Soviet nuclear strike. In its final form, presented
to Eisenhower on November 7, 1957, the Gaither Report advocated a
drastic step-up of U.S. military preparations, m
Eisenhower would reject most of the report's recommendations
for new military spending; he believed that the committee's
assessment of U.S. strategic vulnerability was greatly
exaggerated. But politically, the timing of the report--the
essence of which soon leaked to the press--could hardly have been
worse. At precisely the moment that Eisenhower was seeking to
reassure the American public that Sputnik had little
significance, a group of respected experts had raised the specter
of a widening missile gap. To many observers, the connection
between the Soviet Union's new preeminence in space and America's
endangered security appeared self-evident. And nowhere was the
zeal for stressing this link greater than on Capital Hill, where
Democratic members of Congress repeatedly invoked Soviet gains in
space in calling for a major step-up of U.S. defense efforts.
The successful launch of U.S. satellites by early 1958 did
nothing to quiet administration critics.
Despite such pressures, Eisenhower held the line, rejecting
the allegation that Soviet successes in space meant impending
superiority in arms. Between F¥ 1958 and FY 1960, defense
expenditures actually declined as a percentage of both the GNP
and the federal budget. _
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The Origins of NASA
At the same time that Eisenhower was determined tokeep the
issues of space and security politically separated, he was also
committed to separating the areas organizationally. Initially,
Eisenhower did not see the need for a separate agency for space
exploration. At a February 4, 1958 meeting, James Killian told
Eisenhower that many in Congress were pressing for some space
work to be done outside of the Department of Defense. Eisenhower
responded that he did not think that large operating activities
should be put in another organization because of the duplication.
He also worried that putting talent into crash programs outside
of defense would undermine the higher priority missile programs.
Eisenhower indicated that his condition for allowing the
Department of Defense to continue handling space was that it
"gets its own organization correct, i.e., that there is a central
organization to handle this in Defense. "_
Eisenhower's initial inclination to keep the space program
as part of the Defense Department was consistent with his general
desire to restrain the growth of government. Taking space out of
the military's hands would mean creating a new bureaucracy, a
prospect Eisenhower could not have relished. Eisenhower may also
have hoped to avoid a fight with the Pentagon, which opposed the
creation a separate agency for space exploration and had big
plans for space-related undertakings. Whatever his initial
reasoning, Eisenhower soon changed his mind and came to favor
civilian control of space exploration. Explaining this shift in
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his memoirs, he said that "Information acquired by purely
scientific exploration could and should, I thought, be made
available to all the world. But military research would naturally
demand secrecy. "al In effect, Eisenhower came to see that two
space programs would be better than one: a vigorous military
space program would receive top priority and spearhead America's
missile and spy satellite programs; a civilian program would be
the public face of American space exploration, undertaking those
operations which had only propaganda or scientific value. Such a
division of labor exists to this day.
The process by which Eisenhower handled the organizational
aspects of space policy, establishing NASA, reflected his strong
faith in his science advisors and his desire to rise above
politics. By late 1957 intense competition was under way in
Washington among various bureaucratic players for the control of
space exploration. The two main contenders were the Department
of Defense and the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics
(NACA), a research agency formed in 1915 at the dawn of the age
of flight. The fight over space looked like it might be as messy
as the battles over atomic energy in the late 1940s. _
Eisenhower approached this fray by stepping away from it and
depoliticizing his decision to the greatest degree possible. He
turned the problem of organizing a space program over to James
Killian and the President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC),
asking in early February that it recommend the outlines of a
space program and the organization to manage it. _ Eisenhower's
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decision on this point is characteristic of his hidden-hand
approach to leadership. He knew well that Killian shared many of
his views on science, space, and the cold war competition.
Killlan had backed a civilian space agency since late 1957.
And well before Eisenhower formally asked for a recommendation on
space organization, PSAC's position was that an enlarged NACA
should oversee civilian space missions. As Enid Curtis Bok
Schoettle observed in an early investigation of NASA's birth:
"PSAC, vocally representing the interests of the scientific
community, sought a primarily civilian structure in which basic
research and peaceful space missions could be pursued free from
military control. "_ Later explaining his own enthusiasm for
NACA, Killian wrote: "Here was a government scientific agency
that was under the lay direction of some of the best civilian
talent in the country, and the organization operated with freedom
from political influence and unencumbered by government
bureaucracy and red tape. "s5 NACA itself was. more than willing
to take on the mission of space exploration, lobbying actively
for the assignment. Thus, writes Schoettle, "by the end of
January, the group of scientific advisers whom Eisenhower had
charged with designing a space program and the agency's
leadership were agreed that NACAwould be the base on which NASA
would be built. "_
The idea quickly won widespread support inside the executive
branch. On March 5, 1958, Eisenhower approved a memorandum
ordering the Bureau of the Budget to draft a bill for Congress
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which would turn NACA into NASA. The draft was completed by late
March, and on March 27, Eisenhower said that "I expect to send up
shortly recommended legislation providing for civilian control
and direction of governmental activities incident to a civilian
space program. "87 After intensive debate and tinkering, the bill
establishing NASA was approved by Congress and signed into law on
July 29, 1958.
In reflecting later on Eisenhower's relationship with his
science advisors, Killian observed that the president "turned to
our group repeatedly for advice when he felt that recommendations
reaching him on military or other matters were colored by special
interests. "_ The creation of NASA was the foremost example of
Eisenhower's reliance on PSAC to sort out fiercely conflicting
claims. "This whole undertaking is a vivid example of what can
be accomplished by a group of advisers, freed by the president of
bureaucratic controls and wearing the president's mantle,"
Killian states, m
At the February 4 meeting in which Eisenhower discussed the
organization of the space program, he had said that he did not
want to concern himself with the details of the problem. W By
turning the matter over to PSAC, Eisenhower succeeded in this
goal and there is no evidence that he anguished personally over
how to organize space policy. While Killian felt he was caught
in a "political hurricane, "91 Eisenhower seems to have felt only
a strong breeze. The episode was a classic example of
Eisenhower's leadership style: he had gotten exactly the outcome
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he wanted without appearing to engage in any outright political
maneuvering. ....
Eisenhower's choice of T. Keith Glennan as first NASA
administrator served further to point U.S. space policy in the
direction the president preferred. As with Killian,
Glennan--then head of Case Institute of Technology in
Cleveland--was a highly respected and independent figure who
happened to share Eisenhower's basic outlook toward science and
space.
Glennan described his attitude toward his new job in an
memoir he wrote after leaving NASA. First, he believed, like
Eisenhower, that government was "growing too large" and that
every effort should be made to avoid "excessive additions to the
Federal payroll." Second, he was concerned that the United
States proceed at the right pace--"orderly but aggresslve"--In an
area which was filled with technological uncertainty. Third, he
shared Eisenhower's view that the prestige value of space
exploration could not be ignored, but nor should the competition
with Russia dictate America's space program. "In effect," said
Glennan, "this meant that we must avoid the undertaking of
particular shots, the purpose of which would be propagandistic
rather than directed toward solid accomplishments in
understanding the environment with which we are dealing. "_
The Space Race Accelerates
Given the political pressures for an all-out space race with
the Soviet Union, the degree to which Eisenhower controlled the
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space policy agenda in the late 1950s stands as a considerable
achievement. If Eisenhower had genuinely been the passive
president that many of his contemporaries supposed, he would
never have achieved such control, and instead found himself
buffeted by public opinion, outmaneuvered by powerful
congressional leaders, and manipulated by his own bureaucracy.
Eisenhower suffered none of these fates in the area of space
policy.
It would be inaccurate, however, to suggest that he ever was
really in command of events. Eisenhower was correct in his claim
that under his watch the United States "deliberately avoided
hysterlcally devised crash programs and propaganda stunts" in
space. But despite claims to the contrary, both at the time and
in later years, early U.S. space policy was indeed heavily
determined by what the Soviet Union did, especially in the years
1959 and 1960. The most significant indication of this was the
initiation of Project Mercury, the program to put a man in orbit
around the earth. _
In the wake of Sputnik II it had become clear that the next
major milestone in space exploration would be to place a human
being in space. PSAC's early 1958 report, Introduction to Outer
Space, had identified manned flight in orbit as an obvious and
attainable goal of space exploration. The same report had
speculated about the requirements for a manned lunar landing.
The administration's first major policy statement on space, NSC
5814/1, approved in August, 1958, had also cited the
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inevitability of manned space exploration and explored its
political consequences. The paper argued that the "time will
undoubtedly come when man's judgment and resourcefulness will be
required fully to exploit the potentialities of outer space."
Manned flight, it suggested, could have a major impact on world
politics, even greater than Sputnik. "No unmanned experiment can
substitute for manned exploration in its psychological effect on
the peoples of the world." NSC 5814/1 predicted the Soviets
would be able to mount such a flight by 1959-1960. _
The implication of this prediction was clear: if the United
States wanted to have any chance of avoiding what Killian said
could be "a recurrence of the Sputnik hysteria if the Soviets get
a 'man in space' first, "_ it had to initiate a major program to
beat them into orbit. By September 1958, a special panel on
manned flight declared the U.S. goal was to "achieve at the most
early practicable date orbital flight and successful recovery of
a manned satellite. "_
Project Mercury represented everything Eisenhower claimed
that he wanted to avoid in space policy. It was hugely
expensive, driven almost entirely by the competition with Russia,
and lacking in a compelling scientific rationale. A 1960 report
by PSAC on putting a man in space resorted to inspirational
language, declaring that "among the major reasons for attempting
the manned exploration of space are emotional compulsions and
national aspirations. These are not subjects which can be
discussed on technical grounds." The panel concluded that
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"man-in-space cannot be Justified on purely scientific grounds,
although more thought may show that there are situations for
which this is not true. "97 T. Keith Glennan would later comment
about Mercury: "As one looks back on that decision, it is clear
that we didn't know very much about what we were doing. "_
Eisenhower's approval of Project Mercury paralleled his
failure to control NASA's budget. Eisenhower had originally held
that NASA's budget should not be allowed to climb over half a
million dollars. Yet by the time he left office, NASA was
employing sixteen thousand employees, was spending nearly one
billion dollars a year, and had plans for spending much more.
One of those plans involved initiating work on a manned lunar
expedition. During his last months in office, Eisenhower scored
at least one clear victory in his effort to contain the space
race when he refused to approve such work. Appalled at PSAC's
price tag of $26-38 billion dollars to put a man on the Moon he
dismissed the lunar expedition as a "multi-billion-dollar project
of no immediate value. "I_ In his final budget message to
Congress in January 1961, Eisenhower refused to include the funds
NASA had requested for post-Mercury space exploration.
Conclusions
As Eisenhower left office, there was a widespread impression
that he had moved too slowly in the arena of space exploration
and ballistic missile development. The image of the time was
that of a president who was tired and uncreative. Eisenhower was
seen as failing to grasp both the quickening pace of
technological development and the intense anxiety that Americans
felt about falling behind in this area.
The far greater resources that Eisenhower's successor, John
F. Kennedy, committed to space seemed further to confirm the
charge that Eisenhower's response to Soviet gains in space had
been inadequate. The younger, vibrant Kennedy, it appeared,
understood what the aging Eisenhower had not: that the U.S.
couldn't afford to lose the space race and that bold steps were
needed to rehabilitate America's image of technological prowess.
During the 1960s and early 1970s, as the space age unfolded and
Project Apollo succeeded, Eisenhower's legacy for space policy
appeared all the more in question. If the U.S. space program had
continued at the moderate pace established by Eisenhower, America
might never have made it to the Moon. Yet, as with his
presidency in general, Eisenhower's record on space appears
different with the benefit of hindsight and the extensive
declassification of documents on his presidency.
The argument of this chapter has been that early U.S. space
policy reflected elements of Eisenhower's political philosophy
and leadership style which have come to be more clearly
recognized and appreciated by scholars in recent years.
Following Sputnik, Eisenhower projected calm during a time of
near-panic, patiently explaining to the public why American
security was not at risk. In an atmosphere of intense cold war
competition, he resisted conceptualizing space exploration as an
out-and-out race with the Soviets and sought, albeit with mixed
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success, and used the power of his office to place the pursuit of
U.S. space abilities within a balanced program for boosting
American scientific prowess. During the last three years of his
presidency, Eisenhower resisted enormous political pressures to
launch a crash U.S. defense effort. Yet within just ten months
of Sputnik's launch, Eisenhower had created NASA and insured that
it was an independent civilian agency.
Eisenhower was not a visionary when it came to space policy.
Instead, he was a consistent skeptic about the entire enterprise
of exploring the heavens. This outlook, however, reflected his
larger strategic framework, not a passive approach to the
presidency or a failure of imagination. Despite the confusing
nature of the space issue, Eisenhower seems to have had a clear
idea from the mid-1950s onward of what type of space program he
wanted. Through sustained engagement in space policy, especially
after Sputnik, he used the power of the rising "imperial
presidency" to put in place the kind of cautious program that he
believed was most appropriate for the time.
It is never easy for former presidents to watch their
successors shift the direction of national policy. During his
post-White House years, Eisenhower (who resumed the rank of
general of the army) ordinarily resisted criticizing his
successors on matters bearing on national security. Still, he
was dismayed at President Kennedy's announcement in May 1961 that
the United States should place a man on the Moon by the end of
the decade. This decision dramatically reversed one that
Eisenhower had made just six months earlier. It appeared, in
Eisenhower's view, not only ill-advised but clearly motivated by
political expediency--namely, the desire for the Kennedy
administration to regain its momentum after the failed Bay of
Pigs invasion of April 1961.
In a 1965 letter to Major Frank Borman a NASA astronaut who
had been troubled by Eisenhower's criticism of Project Apollo,
Eisenhower explained his thinking. "What I have criticized about
the current space program is the concept under which it was
drastically revised and expanded just after the Bay of Pigs
fiasco." Eisenhower wrote that he thought a race to the Moon was
unwise and that it distorted America's space program. It
"immediately took one single project or experiment out of a
thoughtfully planned and continuing program involving
communication, meteorology, reconnaissance, and future military
and scientific benefits and gave the highest
priority--unfortunate in my opinion--to a race, in other words, a
stunt. ,,101
For the most part, Eisenhower kept quiet about his views on
Project Apollo. He did not mount a public campaign against the
undertaking or devote whole speeches and articles to criticizing
Kennedy's space policy. His most pointed public criticism came
in an August 1962 Saturday Evenlna Post article that dealt with a
wide range of public issues. "By all means, we must carry on our
explorations in space," Eisenhower wrote, "but frankly I do not
see the need for continuing this effort as such a fantastically
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expensive crash program." Eisenhower expressed his dismay that
NASA was requesting $4 billion a year for space and that this
budget figure was headed further upward. He said he felt as
proud as anyone about the successes of U.S. astronauts. "But why
the great hurry to get to the moon and planets? We have already
demonstrated that in everything except the power of our booster
rockets we are leading the world in scientific space exploration.
From here on, I think we should proceed in an orderly, scientific
way, building one accomplishment on another, rather than engaging
in a mad effort to win a stunt race."
In the same article, Eisenhower reiterated his long-held
views on prestige: "If we must compete with Soviet Russia for
world 'prestige,' why not channel the struggle more along the
lines in which we excel--and which means so much to the masses of
ordinary citizens? Let's put some other items in this 'prestige'
race: our unique industrial accomplishments, our cars for almost
everybody instead of Just the favored few, our remarkable
agricultural productivity, our supermarkets loaded with a
profusion of appetizing foods." Eisenhower's central point, one
that he could not stress enough while president, was that the
cold war competition had many fronts and the United States should
fight on those where it was strongest. I_
It was this approach to the cold war that most distinguished
Eisenhower from his successor. In contrast to Eisenhower,
Kennedy held that the struggle with the Soviet Union had to be
waged in every category of power and in every part of the world.
_" 79
He viewed the psychological component of the struggle to be
centrally important, for, as he so often had" emphasized as a
senator, much of the developing world was still ideologlcally
uncommitted and could be lost to communism if the United States
stumbled. In the realm of defense policy, Kennedy argued that it
was not enough to rely on the blunt threat of massive
retaliation. Instead, the United States must be able to fight
and win on each rung in the ladder of escalation, from guerrilla
insurgency to conventional war, to nuclear exchanges. Just as
crucially, the U.S. willingness to fight had to be totally
credible. What all this meant was that America's prestige--the
perception abroad of its overall strength and vitality--could not
be in question if the United States were to remain secure. In
space policy this thinking underpinned a strong determination to
decisively beat the Soviets in what Kennedy, unlike Eisenhower,
readily acknowledged was a race. Kennedy used his presidential
power to carry out this effort, and his announcement of in the
Apollo decision was one aspect of his response to the cold war.
The question of which philosophy of cold war competition was
best suited to the 1950s and 1960s is so dependent on subjective
judgment as to be unanswerable in any final way. Still, a number
of conclusions can be drawn.
First, as the Kennedy administration reluctantly
acknowledged shortly after taking office, there was no missile
gap. Rather, the United States was far stronger than the Soviet
Union in the area of missiles and the larger area of strategic
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potency. I°_ Hence the claim that lack of accomplishment in space
was a sign of military weakness was not valid.
Second, the Soviet success in beating the United States into
space with the launching of Sputnik did not materially damage the
Western cold war position. There were no capitulations to
communism by borderline countries or diplomatic concessions to
Moscow made by the United States and its NATO allies. In
particular, Khrushchev's post-Sputnik missile rattling in Europe
won him no tangible gains. If anything, the Soviet triumph in
space served to enhance both American security and prosperity by
galvanizing the United States to devote additional resources to
education and technological innovation. I_
Finally, and more generally, it is evident that the low
priority Eisenhower placed on prestige in the cold war did not
result in any international setbacks during the 1950s. In
contrast, it is possible to link Kennedy's strong emphasis on
prestige (and that of his advisors who went on to serve under
Johnson) with America's fiasco in Vietnam. Eight years after a
newly inaugurated Kennedy put forth the view that no front in the
cold war could be ignored, America successfully landed men on the
Moon and returned them safely to earth in one of the greatest
technological feats of the 20th century. But it was in that same
year, 1969, that America began its retreat from Vietnam--the
greatest foreign policy disaster in U.S. history. Arguably both
the triumph of Project Apollo and the calamity of the Vietnam war
were outgrowths of the same national-security philosophy.
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With the passage of time, Eisenhower's broad conception of
national prestige has come to be more widely appreciated. In the
late 1950s, when America dominated the global economy, Eisenhower
seemed old-fashioned and lacking in economic sophistication when
he insisted that American prosperity could not be taken for
granted and that budgetary irresponsibility could threaten that
prosperity. Today, these sentiments do not seem so misplaced.
Likewise, Eisenhower was clearly ahead of his time when he
stressed that America's economic performance and its standard of
living were as important, if not more important, to U.S. prestige
than military might and space exploits.
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Chaptez 2
Kennedy and the Decision to Go to the Moon
by
Michael R. Beschloss
In his 1960 presidential campaign, John F. Kennedy never
explicitly called for a crash effort to put an American on the
Moon by 1970, but his campaign rhetoric pointed in the direction
of greater activism in space. Kennedy's critique of Eisenhower
and Nixon centered around the charge that the incumbent
administration had allowed the United States to fall in danger of
slipping behind the Soviet Union in the cold war. He pledged, if
elected, to make the United States a nation that was not "first
but, first and, first when, first if, but first PERIOD. "I
It was that desire, as well as Kennedy's faith in the power
of science and technology to accomplish great feats, that sparked
the 1961 decision to go to the Moon. Kennedy used the amassing
power of the "imperial presidency" that resulted from the cold
war situation to empower experts, in this case aerospace
engineers, with the responsibility and wherewithal to execute as
a "crash" program, to place Americans first on the Moon. 2
Kennedy and Khrushchev
Kennedy framed his desire for American leadership in terms
of military and economic strength as well as international
prestige. American shortcomings in space gave him a powerful
symbol in all three areas. In his effort to demonstrate American
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inferiority, Kennedy thus perversely exploited during his
presidency the issue of space exploration in exactly the same way
that Nikita Khrushchev was doing and to the same effect. In the
military field, Kennedy was not averse to leaving Americans
somewhat in the dark about the distinction between advances in
space exploration and advances in production of ICBMs.
Like Khrushchev, who correctly gambled that launching
Sputnik would lead many of the peoples of the world to conclude
that the Soviet Union had suddenly gained an important form of
military superiority, Kennedy hammered Eisenhower and Nixon for
failing to keep up with the Soviets in rocket thrust. In so
doing he hoped that this would strengthen his effort to charge
that the United States was suffering from a "missile gap,"
lagging behind the Soviets in ICBMs. During the 1960 debates, he
told Nixon, "You yourself said to Khrushchev, 'You may be ahead
of us in rocket thrust, but we're ahead of you in color
television. 'J Elsewhere Kennedy said, "I will take my television
in black and white. I want to be ahead of them in rocket
thrust. ,,4
Khrushchev had argued that Soviet space achievements were an
emblem and dividend of the superior Soviet economic growth rates.
So did Kennedy. Khrushchev had exploited his space triumphs to
suggest to newly emerging Third World nations that his was the
system to emulate. Kennedy too argued that American failures in
space weakened U.S. prestige, and he produced a series of U.S.
Information Agency poll findings to prove it. With amazing
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overstatement, even for a campaign, Kennedy said in New York in
October 1960, "The key decision which [the Eisenhower]
administration had to make in the field of international policy
and prestige and power and influence was their recognition of the
significance of outer space .... The Soviet Union is now first
in outer space. ''5
Thus when Kennedy was elected in November 1960, he was
compelled to use the power of his office to make dramatic
gestures, as he put it, to "turn the tide" back in favor of the
United States in the cold war. 6 This was difficult to do with
the "missile gap." If he had any doubt before the electlon, he
had none afterwards, when given U.S. classified information, that
the "missile gap" had been a false issue and that the United
States held a large lead over the Soviet Union in ICBMs.
It was also difficult to turn the tide with economic growth.
If Kennedy had any doubt during the campaign, he knew after the
election that his comparison of superior Soviet growth rates to
those of the United States had been bogus. Not only was he privy
to classified information that demonstrated the desperate
weaknesses of the Soviet economy, he also knew that the reason
why Soviet economic growth looked so much better than America's
was because the 1959 figures he had used were taken in the middle
of the worst U.S. recession in years and that the Soviet rate was
artificially inflated by cheating and the fact that the Soviet
economy was rebounding from the devastation of World War II. All
of this increased Kennedy's motivation in December 1960 to find
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some quick way of seeming to boost the American position in the
cold war and vindicate the rhetoric of his campalgn.
The Definition of a Space Poli_ 7
At that moment, the outgoing president, Dwight Eisenhower,
received a classified report of an ad-hoc panel on manned
spaceflight. The panel asked the question of "whether the
presence of a man adds to the variety or quality of the
observations which can be made from unmanned vehicles--in short,
whether there is a scientific Justification to include man in
space vehicles."
Its answer was a polite no: "Man's senses can be
satisfactorily duplicated at remote locations by the use of
available instrumentation .... It seems, therefore, to us at
the present time that man-ln-space cannot be justified on purely
scientific grounds .... On the other hand, it may be argued
that much of the motivation and drive for the scientific
exploration of space is derived from the dream of man's getting
into space himself. "7
This finding dovetailed perfectly with Eisenhower's views.
If anything, Eisenhower had a tin ear for the effect of space
achievements on America's international position. In 1957, he
had not dreamt that the launching of an Earth satellite could
have had remotely the impact that Sputnik did on Soviet
prestige--and he refused to be stampeded afterwards by Senators
like John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson who demanded that the U.S.
catch up. Eisenhower felt that spending on space exploration
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could be seriously defended only in military and scientific
terms. He felt that among the various forms of space
exploration, manned spaceflight should be nothing more than one
instrument in the symphony. He said he was not willing to "hock
my jewels" to support the enormous cost of sending an American
quickly to the Moon, which he regarded as a "stunt." He said
that he "couldn't care less whether a man ever reached the
moon. ''a And he used his presidential power to circumvent other
politicians' plans to increase space activities that he thought
were unwise. As a result, the civil space effort in the
Eisenhower administration was moderate and measured, much to the
chagrin of its advocates.
Moreover, Eisenhower in setting up the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration, had used his presidential power to put
in charge of it people who shared his perspective on space
exploration and how aggressively it should be pursued. His
administrator, T. Keith Glennan perfectly reflected Eisenhower's
priorities in space. He emphasized a well-rounded, measured
space program that did not focus on "spectacular" missions
designed to "one-up" the Soviets. He also believed that the new
space agency should remain relatively small, and that much of its
work would of necessity be done under contract to private
industry and educational institutions. 9 Hugh L. Dryden,
Glennan's deputy, expressed repeatedly a cautious stance
regarding competition with the Soviets in any space race. On
April 16, 1958, for example, he testified before a House
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Committee that a Defense Department human spaceflight proposal
had "about the same technical value as the circus stunt of
shooting the young lady from the gun," and lacked any scientific
merit. I°
None of this set well with Kennedy, who saw the opportunity
to use the presidential office for aggressive political ends and
the cold war space rivalry as the avenue where capital could be
expended with positive political results. He was disappointed in
January 1961, therefore, when then President-elect Kennedy
received the report of his own task force on space, chaired by
Jerome Wiesner, who was to become his White House science
adviser. Interestingly, virtually every member of the panel had
been deeply involved as outside consultants in the Eisenhower
administration's policies toward space. Thus the Wiesner Report,
which was written for public consumption, was not the ringing
denunciation of Eisenhower's lassitude on space that Kennedy and
his entourage might have hoped for.
It conceded that "during the next few years, the prestige of
the United States will in part be determined by the leadership we
demonstrate in space activities"--and that recent U.S.
accomplishments in space had "not been impressive enough."
Still, as far as manned exploration was concerned, it was "very
unlikely that we shall be the first in placing a man into orbit
around the earth." The panel warned that "space activities are
so unbellevably expensive and people working in this field are so
imaginative that the space program could easily grow to cost many
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more billions of dollars per year. "11
The Wiesner Report's conclusion was not too different from
Eisenhower's--that human spaceflight should not be given a
distorted amount of attention in the context of other space
activities. This did not delight the new president. Kennedy
treated the panel's findings like a skunk making its appearance
at a wedding. He told reporters, "I don't think anyone is
suggesting that their views are necessarily in every case the
right views. ''12 As with so many areas of his policy toward the
Soviet Union during the first two months of his presidency,
Kennedy played for time on space and kept his options open.
In March 1961, sensing an opportunity, the new NASA
administrator, James E. Webb, asked Kennedy's budget director,
David Bell, for a thirty-percent increase in the budget his
agency had been allocated by Eisenhower. Bell wrote Kennedy that
he wondered whether the U.S. should run races it might lose
anyway, that there were other better and cheaper ways of
enhancing American prestige, and that "the total magnitude of
present and projected expenditures in the space area may be way
out of line with the real values of the benefits. ''13 Bell told
Hugh Dryden of NASA that he had better be patient, because the
president had other problems to worry about. Dryden replied,
with some prescience if without much feeling, "You may not feel
he has the time, but whether he likes it or not, he is going to
have to consider it. Events will force this. "14
That same week, Kennedy saw his new NASA administrator,
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James Webb, who on taking office was eager "to make unmistakably
clear our support for the manned spaceflight program. "15 Webb
had been recommended to Kennedy by his business associate, oil
man Robert Kerr of Oklahoma, the new chairman of the Senate's
Space Committee. Webb, a denizen of Washington political circles
since the 1930s and had served as Truman's budget director and an
undersecretary of state, had fled the city only with the coming
to power of Eisenhower in 1953. Now he was back, full of a
desire to use the power of the federal government to accomplish
"new deal-type" programs on behalf of the nation, and by
temperament not the kind of man to tolerate an America that was
"first if" or "first when." Nor was he the kind of man to be
content with a modest mission or budget for the agency he had
made some financial sacrifices to oversee. 16
Using language that played to his audience, Webb told
Kennedy, "The extent to which we are leaders in space science and
technology will in large measure determine the extent to which
we, as a nation, pioneering on a new frontier, will be in a
position to develop the emerging world forces and make it the
basis for new concept s and applications in education,
communications and transportation, looking toward more viable
political, social and economic systems for nations willing to
work with us in the years ahead. "17 Webb made a sale. In his
defense message to Congress on March 25, 1961, Kennedy asked for
$125.7 billion for the kind of large boosters that would lead to
a Moon mission. Still he was marking time. He told Webb that he
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would not make any final decision on the main elements of the
NASA request until the fall of 1961. la
Crisis
Then Kennedy's plans were changed by two unexpected events
in mid-April. On April 12, for the first time, the Soviets
launched Yuri Gagarin into Earth orbit, creating a worldwide
space sensation dwarfed only by Sputnik. One NASA scientist said
summarized the perspective of space exploration advocates: "Wait
until the Russians send up three men, then six, then a
laboratory, start hooking them together and then send back a few
.19pictures of New York for us to see.
On the day after the Gagarin triumph, Webb came to the Oval
Office. Like Eisenhower after Sputnik, he was not spooked by
Gagarin. He said, "The solid, onward, step-by-step pace of our
program is what we are more interested in than being first. "2°
To boost Kennedy's spirits, he carried a desk model of the
Mercury capsule that would soon take the first American into
space. Kennedy had enough of a sense of humor to tell one aide
afterwards that Webb had probably bought it in a toy store that
morning. He asked NASA for a study of the feasibility and costs
of an accelerated civilian space program.
Kennedy could easily afford to tolerate the Gagarin success.
Less than three months in office, he knew that he could not be
blamed for the American disadvantage he had criticized so sharply
on the campaign trail. Then, one week later, the sky fell when
CIA-backed Cuban exiles failed in their invasion of Fide1
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Castro's Cuba at the Bay of Pigs.
No matter how much Kennedy's aides tried, through background
interviews with reporters, to shift the blame to Eisenhower--and
they did--Kennedy knew that this debacle had the power to shatter
his entire administration. The Bay of Pigs suggested to
Americans that they had elected a president who was at least
inexperienced, and at worst incompetent. Especially after
American reversals in Laos and the Congo, Kennedy's failure in
Cuba was exactly the kind of cold war setback that he had
denounced throughout the campaign and pledged to avoid if he were
elected president. He was desperately in need of something that
would divert the attention of the public and identify the
president with a cause that would unify the American public
behind his administration.
On April 20, the day Kennedy knew for certain that the Bay
of Pigs had failed, he called in Vice President Lyndon Johnson,
Chairman of his Space Council, and asked him to come up with
something fast in space. He gave Johnson a memo that was
redolent of presidential panic. It said, "Do we have a chance of
beating the Soviets by putting a laboratory in space, or by a
trip around the moon, or by a rocket to land on the moon, or by a
rocket to go to the moon and back with a man. is there any other
space program which promises dramatic results in which we could
win?" Kennedy went on, "How much additional would it cost? Are
we working 24 hours a day on existing programs? If not, why not?
• . . Are we making maximum effort? Are we achieving necessary
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results? . . . I would appreciate a report on this at the
earliest possible moment. ''21 That day, Kennedy told reporters,
"If we can get to the moon before the Russians, we should. "22
By giving the chairmanship of his Space Council to Johnson,
another member of the Senate who had used Sputnik to good
political advantage in criticizing the Eisenhower administration
and therefore required to advocate a stronger space program,
Kennedy had tipped the scales in the direction of an aggressive
effort in space. While in the Senate, Johnson had if anything
been more extreme than Kennedy in his demands for an accelerated
space effort. After Sputnik he had grandiloquently exclaimed
that the nation that controlled the "high ground" of outer space
had the capacity to rule the world. _ As president and vice
president Kennedy and Johnson were alike in that they saw the
presidency as a tool to accomplish all types of goals, and in the
early 1960s both emphasized its prerogative over the other
branches of government. The space endeavor fit that mlndset
well, with its large objectives of cold war "one-up-manship" and
its seemingly peaceful and moral purpose.
Johnson went to NASA for information to answer the
president's questions on what to do in space to "beat" the
Soviets. On April 22, 1961, NASA's Hugh Dryden responded to the
request about a Moon program by writing that there was "a chance
for the U.S. to be the first to land a man on the moon and return
him to earth if a determined national effort is made." He added
that the earliest this feat could be accomplished was 1967, but
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that to do so would cost about $33 billion dollars, a figure $I0
billion more than the whole projected NASA budget for the next
z4
ten years.
He also asked Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defense, for his
views. McNamara knew what was on Kennedy's mind and after three
months in the New Frontier, he was already adept at using the
kind of language and arguments that would win the favor of this
president. With the exception of Attorney General Robert
Kennedy, McNamara had already proven himself the dominant figure
in the Kennedy Cabinet. Aside from knowing that Kennedy wanted
an accelerated space program, McNamara had another motivation:
the increased effort would make a perfect customer for companies
in the aerospace industry that were already irate over the
cutbacks McNamara was planning in the U.S. defense program.
McNamara flatly wrote Johnson, "Major achievements in space
contribute to national prestige. This is true even though the
scientific, commercial or military value of the undertaking may,
by ordinary standards, be marginal or economically unjustified.
What the Soviets do and what they are likely to do are therefore
matters of great importance from the viewpoint of national
prestige. ''_
Johnson also canvassed friends in private business, as well
other officials in government, including the fabled space
scientist Wernher von Braun, who had built V-2s for the Nazis in
World War II and come to the United States in 1945. Von Braun
told him that the U.S. had "a sporting chance of sending a 3-man
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crew around the moon ahead of the Soviets" and "an excellent
chance of beating the Soviets to the first landinq of a crew on
the moon (including return capability, of course.)" He added:
The reason is that a performance Jump by a factor ten over
their present rockets is necessary to accomplish this feat.
While today we do not have such a rocket, it is unlikely
that the Soviets have it. Therefore we would not have to
enter the race toward this obvious next goal in space
exploration against hopeless odds favoring the Soviets.
With an all-out crash program I think we could accomplish
this objective in 1967-1968.
Von Braun ominously added, "I do not believe that we can win this
race unless we take at least some measures which thus far have
been considered acceptable only in times of a national
emergency. ,,26
After gaining these technical opinions, understanding
Kennedy's use of the power of the presidential office to advocate
a strong space effort would be worthless without savvy consensus-
building, Johnson began to persuade political leaders of the need
to press on with an aggressive lunar landing program. He brought
together Senators Robert Kerr (D-OK) and Styles Bridges (R-NH)
and spoke with several Representatives to ascertain if they were
willing to support an accelerated space program. Whenever he
heard reservations Johnson used his forceful personality to
persuade. "Now," he asked, "would you rather have us be a
second-rate nation or should we spend a little money?" He also
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persuaded Secretary of State Dean Rusk, a member of the Space
Council, to support the initiative because of the Soviet Union's
image in the world. Rusk wrote to the Senate Space Committee a
little later that "We must respond to their conditions; otherwise
we risk a basic misunderstanding on the part of the uncommitted
countries, the Soviet Union, and possibly our allies concerning
the direction in which power is moving and where long-term
advantage lies." It was clear early in these deliberations that
Johnson was in favor of an expanded space program in general and
a maximum effort to land an astronaut on the Moon. z7
Kennedy's mandate to Johnson had been framed so bluntly and
specifically that the vice president was unlikely to return to
the Oval Office and tell his boss that he should stop worrying
about space and turn to other matters. This was especially true
because in the spring of 1961, Johnson was working hard to
maximize his influence on the Kennedy administration. He also
knew that if he had any presidential ambitions for 1968, as he
probably did, they would largely depend on Kennedy's attitude
toward his vice president.
Thus, not surprisingly , on April 28, Johnson gave Kennedy a
report that was largely what the president wished to hear.
Sounding like Kennedy on the campaign trail, it said:
The U.S. has greater resources than the U.S.S.R. for
attaining space leadership but has failed to make the
necessary hard decisions and to marshal those resources to
achieve such leadership .... This country should be
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realistic and recognize that other nations . . . will tend
to align themselves with the country which they believe will
be the world leader--the winner in the long run. Dramatic
accomplishments in space are being increasingly identified
as a major indicator of world leadership .... We are
neither making maximum effort nor achieving results
necessary if this country is to reach a position of
leadership.
Johnson said that manned exploration of the Moon was essential,
whether or not the U.S. turned out to be first. In this exercise
Johnson had built, as Kennedy had wanted, a strong justification
for a presidential initiative to undertake Project Apollo but he
had also moved on to develop a greater consensus for the
objective among key government and business leaders. _
While NASA's leaders were enthusiastic with the course
Johnson was recommending--they understood the political reasons
for adopting an aggressive lunar landing program first--they
wanted to shape it as much as possible to the agency's long-run
priorities. NASA Administrator James Webb, well known as a
skilled political operator who could seize an opportunity,
organized a short-term effort to accelerate and expand a long-
range NASA master plan for space exploration. A fundamental part
of this effort addressed a legitimate concern that the scientific
and technological advancements for which NASA had been created
not be eclipsed by the political necessities of international
rivalries. Webb conveyed the concern of the agency's technical
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and scientific community to Jerome Wiesner on May 2, 1961, noting
that "the most careful consideration must be given to the
scientific and technological components of the total program and
how to present the picture to the world and to our own nation of
a program that has real value and validity and from which solid
additions to knowledge can be made, even if every one of the
specific so-called 'spectacular' flights or events are done after
they have been accomplished by the Russians." He asked that
Wiesner help him "make sure that this component of solid, and yet
imaginative, total scientific and technological value is built
in."
Although the White House agreed that the program should be
balanced, with an accelerated Moon landing as its centerpiece,
James Webb was not yet convinced. He did not wish to undertake a
Moon project unless assured that NASA would have full funding and
support. Thus he refused to argue on NASA's behalf for a Moon
program. On May 3, Johnson called him to a meeting that included
Senator Kerr to suggest that Webb would get what he wanted and
get him to change his mind. In his notes for the meeting,
Johnson said, "We are here to discuss not WHETHER, but HOW--not
WHEN, but NOW. ''_ In vintage Johnsonian language, he compared
the space program to his success in bring electricity to the Hill
Country of Texas. He told Webb, "So far NASA has gotten
everything it has asked for. I want them to plan and dream big
enough to get us out ahead. "3°
Webb caved in. Five days later, he gave Johnson what he
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wanted--a letter, written jointly with McNamara, asking for a
tacit new doctrine in U.S. space policy that would lead to an
Apollo Moon landing before 1970. No longer would the U.S.
government follow the princlple defined by Eisenhower that
projects that were part of the space competition with the Soviet
Union had to have other elements of "intrinsic merit." It said:
This nation needs to make a positive decision to pursue
space projects aimed at enhancing national prestige ....
The non-military, non-commercial, non-scientific but
"civilian" projects such as lunar and planetary exploration
are, in this sense, part of the battle along the fluid front
of the cold war. Such undertakings may affect our military
strength only indirectly, if at a11, but they have an
increasing effect upon our national posture .... We
recommend that our National Space Plan include the objective
of manned lunar exploration before the end of this decade..
• . The orbiting of machines is not the same as the orbiting
or landing of man. It is man, not merely machines, in
space, that captures the imagination of the world ....
Even if the Soviets get there first, as they may . . . it is
better for us to get there second than not at all .... If
we fail to accept this challenge, it may be interpreted as a
lack of national vigor and capacity to respond. 31
With Johnson on a presidential mission to Southeast Asia,
Kennedy discussed the Webb-McNamara report with his Cabinet on
May 10. Bell of the Budget Bureau was concerned about setting
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specific dates for a Moon landing and about spending so much
money on prestige. Arthur Goldberg, secretary of labor, opposed
the idea that a Moon program would stimulate the economy. But
Kennedy's intentions were clear. Jerome Wiesner later recalled
that when McNamara noted that without Apollo, there would be a
dangerous oversupply of manpower in the aerospace industry, "this
took away all argument against the space program. "_
DecisloD
At the end of May, Kennedy was to fly to Europe for a summit
with Khrushchev. He did not wish to go in the wake of American
failures in Laos, the Congo, Cuba, and in space. He decided to
break presidential tradition by delivering a second State of the
Union address on 25 May that would deal with "urgent national
needs" where he planned to the invoke the power of the presidency
to initiate an aggressive lunar landing program. That speech
would ask for the most open-ended commitment ever made in
peacetime in order to land an American on the Moon and was
representative what may have been the high-tide of the "imperial
presidency."
As the speech was written, Kennedy squabbled with his
advisers over what date should be announced as the target for the
Moon landing. Webb suggested that a late 1968 Moon trip would be
a triumphant climax to his second term as president. White House
aides more cautiously suggested saying "before this decade is
out." They reasoned that this could be interpreted to include
1970. 33 They may also have felt that if no landing occurred
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before the end of 1970, blame for the failure could be shifted
from Kennedy to his successor.
Speaking before Congress, Kennedy sought to avoid the sense
that his demand was being hastily made in the wake of Gagarln and
the Bay of Pigs. He specifically noted that he had been
reviewing U.S. space policy "since early in my term." Space, he
said, "may hold the key to our future on earth .... I believe
that this nation should commit itself to achieving the goal,
before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and
returning him safely to the earth." Kennedy departed from his
prepared text--the only time he ever did that before Congress as
president--to say, "Unless we are prepared to do the work and
bear the burdens to make it successful, there would be no sense
in going ahead. ''_
His aide Theodore Sorensen thought that the President's
voice sounded "urgent but a little uncertain." Afterwards, while
riding with Sorensen in the car back to the White House, Kennedy
said that the routine applause that greeted his announcement had
sounded "something less than enthusiastic." He said that twenty
billion dollars was "a lot of money." The Congressmen knew "a
lot of better ways to spend it. "35
Former president Dwight D. Eisenhower wrote a friend that
Kennedy's decision to back a crash program for the Moon was
"almost hysterical" and "a bit immature. "_ In 1965, he
complained to astronaut Frank Borman of how the Moon program "was
drastically revised and expanded just after the Bay of Pigs
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fiasco .... It immediately took one single project or
experiment out of a thoroughly planned and continuing program
involving communication, meteorology, reconnaissance and future
military and scientific benefits and gave the highest
priority--unfortunate, in my opinion--to a race, in other words,
a stunt. ''37 But the Congress agreed with Kennedy, in part
measure because of intense consensus-building by Johnson and
other politicians, by a nearly unanimous vote. Apollo became the
dominant element of the U.S. space program. The U.S. budget for
space was increased by fifty percent in 1961. The next year, it
exceeded all pre-1961 space budgets put together.
The reaction of Eisenhower's NASA administrator, T. Keith
Glennan, was especially insightful of conservative reaction to
the Kennedy decision. For instance he told Eisenhower, then in
retirement at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, that "this is a very bad
move--that we are entering into a competition which will be
exceedingly costly and which will take up an increasingly large
share of that small portion of the nation's budget which might be
called controllable. ''_ Glennan harped on this issue for years,
never quite able to understand the philosophy of the Kennedy
administration that large expenditures for science and technology
in the form of a race to the Moon against the Soviets could hold
positive benefit for the nation.
Glennan also told Kennedy's NASA head, James Webb, of his
dismay at the Apollo mandate.
I have no doubt at all as to the desirability and
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inevitability of manned flight to the moon. And I would
accept--not willingly--a national decision to beat the
Russians to the moon if such a decision resulted in a truly
"crash" program with no effort spared or held back. No one
knows the intentions of the Soviet Union but all of us
understand the ability they have to dedicate men and
facilities and treasure to that particular effort then
believe desirable or necessary. To enter a "race" against
an adversary under such conditions and to state that no
additional taxes are necessary--indeed to suggest tax
reductions--does no seem to me to be facing facts nor to be
completely frank about the on-going program ....
There can be only one real reason for such a "race".
That reason must be "prestige". The present program without
such a "race" but with full intention of accomplishing
whatever needs to be accomplished in lunar and planetary
exploration, unmanned and/or manned, is a vigorous and
costly one. It will produce most of the significance
technology and essentially all of the scientific knowledge
that will be produced under the impetus of the "race" and at
the lower cost in men and money . . .
No, Jim, I cannot bring myself to believe that we will
gain lasting "prestige" by a shot we may make six to eight
years from now. I don't think we should play the game
according to the rules laid down by our adversary. 39
The best way to establish the importance of John F. Kennedy
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in the decision to go to the Moon is to imagine what might have
occurred in the winter and spring of 1961 had Dwight Eisenhower
been somehow elected to a third term: unmotivated to use space
as a battlefield in the cold war, unstampeded by setbacks in
Asia, Africa, and Latin America, worried about the rising impact
of the military-industrial complex and its academic counterparts,
determined to achieve a balanced budget, Eisenhower would have
been content not to have an American astronaut reach the Moon by
1970, or ever, and have used the power of his office to resist
other initiatives to conduct an accelerated space effort.
It is a measure of Kennedy's aversion to long-term planning
and his tendency to be rattled by momentary crises that one might
conclude that in the absence of the Gagarin triumph and the Bay
of Pigs fiasco in April 1961, he might never have gone to the
length of asking Congress to spend twenty billion dollars on a
crash Moon program. Kennedy's desire for a quick, theatrical
reversal of what seemed to be his new administration's flagging
position, especially before a summit with Khrushchev, is a more
potent explanation of his Apollo decision than any other.
Johnson's desire for turf, McNamara's desire to use aerospace
overcapacity, Kennedy's own conviction that a Moon program was
consistent with what Sorensen called "the New Frontier spirit of
discovery"4°--these things helped the decision along, but none
was decisive.
Assessment ......
Without question Kennedy had correctly gauged the mood of
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the nation. His commitment captured the American imagination and
was met with overwhelming support. No one seemed concerned
either about the difficulty or about the expense at the time.
Congressional debate was perfunctory and NASA found itself
literally pressing to expend the funds committed to it during the
early 1960s. Like most political decisions, at least in the U.S.
experience, the decision to carry out Project Apollo was an
effort to deal with an unsatisfactory situation (world perception
of Soviet leadership in space and technology). As such, Apollo
was a remedial action ministering to a variety of political and
emotional needs floating in the ether of world opinion. Apollo
addressed these problems very well. In announcing Project Apollo
Kennedy put the world on notice that the U.S. would not take a
back seat to its superpower rival. John Logsdon commented: "By
entering the race with such a visible and dramatic commitment,
the United States effectively undercut Soviet space spectaculars
without doing much except announcing its intention to join the
contest. ,,41
Kennedy may have understood that the lunar landing was so
far beyond the capabilities of either the United States or the
Soviet Union in 1961 that the early lead in space activities
taken by the Soviets would not predetermine the outcome. As a
result it gave the U.S. a reasonable chance of overtaking the
Soviet Union in space activities and recovering a measure of lost
status. Even so, Kennedy's political objectives were essentially
achieved with the presidential decision to go to the Moon, and he
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did not necessarily think much about the long term consequences.
Since, as Kennedy conceded, his decislon for an accelerated
Moon landing was ultimately a political decision made in terms of
cold war strategy, how does it stand up now that the cold war is
over? Not well. We now know that the reason why the Soviet
Union surrendered in that struggle was that it recognized that it
could not compete with Western economies and Western societies in
those areas of life and death which mattered. The Moon program
contributed a great deal to the United States in other terms.
But in cold war terms, tens of billions of 1960s dollars, spent
on what Kennedy essentially thought of as world propaganda, could
probably have better devoted at that time to areas of U.S.
defense or the American domestic economy that might have
convinced the Soviets more quickly that it was fruitless for them
to continue to prosecute their tragic conflict with the United
States.
As taxpayers complained about the cost, scientists about the
slighting of more important projects, Republicans began using the
word "boondoggle" and "science fiction stunt. "42 In 1962,
Kennedy was shown hints that the Soviets were not going to
compete with the U.S. for the Moon. By April 1963, he was asking
Lyndon Johnson for advice on how the Apolio program could be
justified in terms other than cold war prestige. Johnson replied
with the reassuring old argument that "our space program has an
overriding urgency that cannot be calculated solely in termsof
industrial, scientific or military development. The future of
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society is at stake. ''43
In the fall of 1963, at the United Nations, Kennedy made his
most serious public insistence that the United States and Soviet
Union explore the Moon together. We shall never know for certain
whether this was predominantly an effort, in the wake of the
Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, to relax the cold war, or an
effort by Kennedy to back away gracefully from an expensive Moon
race from which the other side seemed to be backing away.
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Chapter 3
Johnson, Project apollo, and the Politics
of Space Program Planning
by
Robert Dallek
V
Lyndon Johnson was a difficult, imperious character with a
penchant for overheated rhetoric and big political plans. He
left a record of landmark social gains and disastrous public
failures, always using his presidential office to the hilt.
Civil rights, voting rights, and Medicare alone are enough to
give him a place in twentieth-century American history with
Franklin Roosevelt, the greatest domestic reform president in the
national experience. Johnson's spectacular failure in Vietnam is
enough to label him as one of the worst foreign policy leaders in
the country's history. In the nearly twenty-five years since he
left the White House we have not come to terms with this
political giant. Indeed, this generation of Americans probably
never-will. Memories of Johnson's many transgressions against
the national self-esteem remain too fresh to allow a sufficiently
detached assessment of the man's impact on the country's life.
Hopefully, this will change in time. For we need to see
Johnson's career not as a chance to indulge our sense of moral
superiority, but as an opportunity to gain an understanding of
many subjects crucial to the nation's past and future.
Space policy seems as good a place as any to begin. For the
126
V
major part Johnson played in shaping the country's space program
in the 1950s and 1960s did not provoke then, nor does it now, the
kind of controversy we associate with his war on poverty, the
Great Society, and Vietnam. Moreover, Johnson's views of space
tell us a great deal about his whole political career: about his
priorities and the means he used to achieve them. More
specifically, four considerations determined Johnson's thinking
about space policy in the years between 1957 and 1969: national
security, personal political and party gain, domestic social
advance, and budgetary constraints. None of these concerns,
however, operated to the exclusion of the others. To be sure, at
one time or the other each of these goals became the dominant
motive in determining LBJ's response to changing circumstances at
home and abroad, but the other aims were never far from his mind.
Yet however much Johnson's motives altered over time in dealing
with space matters and however much his levels of support for
space exploration rose and fell, especially in the last years of
his presidency, he deserves to be remembered as the elected
official who did as much, if not more, for space exploration than
any other American political leader in this century.
LBJ and Early Space Policy
Sputniks I and II, the Soviet earth satellites, launched in
October and November 1957 spurred Johnson's initial interest in
fostering an aggressive American space program. His primary aim
was to advance the country's missile technology and eliminate a
"missile gap" between the U.S. and the USSR. Secondly, he
believed that promoting a space program was good politics for
himself and his party. "The issue [Sputnik] is one which, if
properly handled, would blast the Republicans out of the water,
unify the Democratic party, and elect you President," George
Reedy, a principal Senate aide, told him. "I think you should
plan to plunge heavily into this one." Johnson saw the political
advantage to himself and the Democrats in seizing the space
issue. But he feared a witch hunt that might undermine
confidence in the country's military strength and encourage the
belief that we could not meet the Soviet challenge.
Johnson genuinely put the national security issue first in
trying to design a response to the Soviet's demonstrated
superiority in the space race. During the winter of 1957-58, as
chairman of an Armed Services subcommittee on preparedness, he
held hearings on how the United States could produce better
missiles at a faster rate. The hearings sole objective, he
declared, was securing the defense of the United States; he had
no interest in finger pointing or assessing blame for past
mistakes, and wished to use the past strictly as a guide for
future action. John Steele, Time's congressional correspondent,
told his editors that Johnson would "run a good investigation"
that would serve a useful purpose. There would be no "political
witch-hunt. Johnson knows that a good investigation is the only
kind that will satisfy anyone, and in the end bring credit to
anyone .... Here, as downtown [at the White House], there is a
sense of urgency, of consideration of the national interest."
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Yet Johnson was not simply a selfless patriot. As one
official at the Defense Department said, "No sooner had Su_D_'s
first beep-beep been heard--via the press--than the nation's
legislators leaped forward like heavy drinkers hearing a cork
pop." The facts emerging from Johnson's investigation
demonstrated the Eisenhower administration's ineptness in
mounting an effective missile and space program. It also allowed
LBJ to identify himself as the country's leading congressional
advocate of a stepped-up effort in space. He dominated the
hearings, introducing witnesses, leading cross-examinations, and
making himself the principal spokesman to the press. In January
1958, he told the Senate Democratic caucus that "control of space
means control of the world" and urged his party colleagues to
sign on to a greatly expanded space effort. Later that month, at
the conclusion of the hearings, he persuaded his subcommittee to
issue seventeen recommendations that, without being overtly
partisan, showed Johnson and the Democrats as pushing the
Eisenhower administration into what they thought essential for
the national well-being.
The journalists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak described
Johnson's handling of the Sputnik crisis as "a minor
masterpiece." Without involving himself in a direct collision
with the president, Johnson used the space issue to damage the
White House and benefit himself and the Democrats. Yet at the
same time, he served the nation by propelling it into the space
age. Specifically, he took the leading role in Congress in
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sponsoring legislation to create a National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA). Although Johnson's aides did much of the
work on the space bill, he played a significant part in shaping
NASA's organization. While understanding that the military would
have a large say in any space program, he armed successfully for
making NASA a civilian agency. It would avoid service rivalries
and satisfy political demands for peaceful uses of space. "The
space program was a paramilitary operation in the cold war, no
matter who ran it," historian Walter A. McDougall says, but
civilian control headed off a significant imbalance between the
services and met the political needs of American officials at
home and abroad. I
The Vice President as Space Tsar
Johnson's election to the vice presidency in 1960 gave him a
continuing role in space policy. This defied the tradition of
consigning a vice president to the outer fringes of power. The
office of vice president, Thomas R. Marshall, Woodrow Wilson's
V.P. said, "is like a man in a cataleptic state. He cannot
speak. He cannot move. He suffers no pain. And yet--he is
conscious of all that goes on around him." "The chief
embarrassment in discussing his [the vice president's] office,"
Wilson wrote, "is that in explaining how little there is to be
said about it, one has evidently said all there is to say."
Johnson, who had a life-long aversion to being anything but top
dog, later described the vice presidency as "nothing," saying "I
detested every minute of it." Daniel Patrick Moynihan remembered
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looking into Vice President Johnson's eyes and thinking, "This is
a bull castrated very late in life. "2
Though Johnson's vice presidency was largely a ceremonial
job, he played a part in space matters that went beyond what a
vice president normally did. In 1961 President Kennedy persuaded
Congress to amend the 1958 space law to make the vice president,
instead of the president, the chairman of the Space Council, an
advisory group that President Eisenhower had laraelv ianored
between 1958 and 1961. Kennedy had no intention of letting
Johnson eclipse him on a matter given high public visibility by
Soviet space shots, but he was eager to use Johnson's expertise
on something of vital national concern. Moreover, in giving
Johnson some prominence as an architect of America's space
program, JFK was making him a political lightening rod. Should
an effort to catch and pass the Soviets in space technology fail
or suffer a well publicized defeat, LBJ would be out front taking
some, if not much, of the heat. 3
Yet Johnson eagerly accepted the risk. He saw American
achievements in space as vital to the Cold War contest with the
Soviet Union. The Soviets' more advanced space program in
1957-1961 persuaded Kennedy, Johnson, and millions of Americans
that they were not only falling behind in missile technology, but
also in the global competition for "hearts and minds."
Consequently, in April 1961, after a Soviet cosmonaut became
the first man to orbit the earth and the failure at the Bay of
Pigs had embarrassed the United States, JFK asked Johnson to make
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"an overall survey of where we stand in space. Do we have a
chance of beating the Soviets by putting a laboratory in space,
or by a trip around the moon, or by a rocket to land on the moon,
or by a rocket to go to the moon and back with a man? Is there
any other space program which promises dramatic results in which
we could win?" Johnson replied that the Soviets were ahead of us
"in world prestige attained through technological accomplishments
in space." And other nations, identifying space gains as
reflections of world leadership, were being drawn to the Soviets.
A strong effort was needed at once to catch and surpass the
Russians if we were to win "control over . . . men's minds
through space accomplishments." Johnson recommended "manned
exploration of the moon" as "an achievement with great propaganda
value." "The real 'competition' in outer space," he said, was
between the Communist and free enterprise social systems. The
control of outer space was going to "determine which system of
society and government [would] dominate the future .... In the
eyes of the world, first in space means first, period; second in
space is second in everything." When people complained about the
cost of space exploration, Johnson replied: "Now, would you
rather have us be a second-rate nation or should we spend a
little money? ''4
Kennedy needed no prodding from Johnson to make the case for
some dramatic space venture. At the end of May 1961, he told a
joint session of Congress: "If we are to win the battle that is
now going on around the world between freedom and tyranny, the
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dramatic achievements in space which occurred in recent weeks [a
sub-orbital flight by astronaut Alan Shepherd] should have made
clear to us all . . . the impact of this adventure on the minds
of men everywhere, who are trying to make a determination on
which road they should take .... Now it is . . . time for this
nation to take a clearly leading role in space achievement, which
in many ways may hold the key to our future on earth." Kennedy
asked the country to commit itself to the goal of landing an
American man on the Moon and returning him safely to earth before
the decade was out. 5
Yet Kennedy worried that a highly publicized American space
effort that ended in failure would further damage the nation's
prestige and inflict a political wound that could jeopardize his
hold on the presidency. Shepherd's flight had encouraged
Kennedy's hopes that America might catch and pass the Soviets,
but he remained concerned about future mishaps. In June, when
Shepherd drove with the President, LBJ, and Newton Minow, head of
the Federal Communications Commission, to speak before the
National Convention of Broadcasters, Kennedy poked Johnson and
said: "You know, Lyndon , nobody knows that the Vice President is
the Chairman of the Space Council. But if that flight had been a
flop, I guarantee you that everybody would have known that you
were the Chairman." Everyone laughed, except Lyndon, who looked
glum and angry, especially after Minow chimed in: "Mr.
President, if the flight would have been a flop, the Vice
President would have been the next astronaut. "6
The possibility that he would be a sacrificial political
lamb for a faulty space effort did not dampen Johnson's
enthusiasm for a manned mission to the Moon. His commitment
partly rested on his faith in liberal nationalism, the ability of
government to assure economic and social progress through the use
of its largesse. For Johnson, whose whole career had been built
on the assumption that federal monies well spent on
infrastructure, social programs, and defense, could serve the
national well-being, but especially in the less affluent South,
the space program was a splendid way to serve the country's
defense, expand the domestic economy, and advance scientific
understanding. In 1963, when criticism from academics,
journalists, and political conservatives began to be heard
against "the moon-doggle," Johnson told Kennedy: "The space
program is expensive, but it can be justified as a solid
investment which will give ample returns in security, prestige,
knowledge, and material benefits." During a plane trip as vice
president to visit various space installations around the United
States, Johnson gave "a very impassioned talk" to Newton Minow
for about an hour on the virtues of communications satellites in
advancing education in underdeveloped countries and educational
television in the United States. 7
Johnson also saw other, more selfish benefits flowing from
the space program. Convinced he was backing a winner, he made
strong efforts to identify himself with every aspect of its work.
Not only didhe crisscross the country in publicized visits to
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vspace installations, he also gave a series of "factual space
reports to the public" on the work of NASA and his space council•
The ostensible objective was to educate the country but it had
8
the added advantage of keeping his name in the news.
Then there were the pork-barrel gains that served the
economic interests of Texas and the South and strengthened his
political hold on the state and the region, especially at a time
when his support of civil rights for blacks was undermining it.
Although he denied any part in the selection of southwestern
companies receiving Apollo or Moon program contracts or in
shifting half of space operations from Cape Canaveral in Florida
to a command center in Houston, Senator George Smathers knew
better. "He and I had a big argument about it, big fight,"
Smathers says. ". . . Johnson tried to act like he didn't know.
• . . It never has made sense to have a big operation at Cape
Canaveral and another big operation in Texas. But that's what we
got, and we got that because Kennedy allowed Johnson to become
the theoretical head of the space program." Indeed, with Robert
Kerr of Oklahoma, a Johnson friend, running the Senate Space
Committee; Texas Congressmen Overton Brooks and Olin Teague the
House counterparts; Albert Thomas, another Texas representative,
chairing the Appropriations Committee; and James Webb, Johnson's
nominee, directing NASA, the southwest generally and Texas in
particular profited most from Kennedy's accelerated space
9
program.
In 1962, when lobbyists and Congressmen from outside the
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South began to complain about a southwest monopoly on NASA
contracts, Kennedy made Richard L. Callaghan, a congressional
staffer, an assistant administrator to Jim Webb. Callaghan's job
was to arrange for a more equitable distribution of contracts,
which would relieve congressional pressure on Kenny O'Donnell,
JFK's liaison to Congress, and find out whether Kerr and Johnson
were pulling strings for their friends at NASA. As Callaghan
later told Robert Sherrod, a 2_ reporter: "'Kenny
O'Donnell wasn't only interested in getting the contractors off
his back. He wanted to satisfy himself about the Kerr-Johnson
influence on the Space Agency. He wanted to find out who was
getting what--wanted to satisfy himself that the organization was
honest.' VERY INTERESTING," Sherrod wrote in a note to himself.
"OBVIOUSLY JFK PUT OIDONNELLUP TO PLANTING CALLAGHAN, BUT HOW TO
PROVE THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS SUSPICIOUS OF THE BIGGEST TEXAS
WHEELER DEALER OF THEM ALL, AND OF THE 'KING OF THE SENATE,' WHO
SUCCEEDED HIM AS CHAIRMAN OF THE SPACE COMMITTEE?" According to
what Sherrod later learned from O'Donnell, there was no evidence
to prove any wrongdoing by any one at NASA. Nor could they find
anything on LBJ that might have made him a potential liability to
the Kennedy administration. As Johnson himself later put it,
"the damn press always accused me of things I didn't do. They
never once found out about the things I did do. "I°
Johnson's thousand days as vice president justifiably
enhanced his reputation as someone who saw substantial national
benefits flowing from an expanded U.S. effort in space. It also
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demonstrated his effectiveness in building a national consensus
for a space program. As James Webb later toid a BBC interviewer,
When President Kennedy asked him [LBJ] to prepare a
memorandum as to what our space programme should be, . . .
he called in some businessmen .... Then he called in
Wernher von Braun and General Schriever from the Air Force
and a large number of technical people and sort of had
hearings. As we approached the end of that, he called in
the political leaders .... in Congress and he in effect
said to them: 'We ought to go forward but we don't want to
go forward unless you are going to commit yourself to stay
with us.' . . . So he developed this commitment of certain
leaders . . . and this you see made it a lot easier for the
rest of the country to come along. They saw that these very
powerful, responsible people, both political people in the
Congress and business people from outside, believed this
should be done, then we will accept it and go forward. 11
A Space Advocat_ in _be White House
During his first year in the White House, from November 1963
to November 1964, Johnson pushed hard to keep the space effort on
track. Although determined to keep his first budget under $I00
billion in order to win passage of JFK's $Ii billion tax cut
pending before Congress, Johnson agreed to increase NASA spending
by $150 million to $5.25 billion. "Our plan to place a man on
the moon in this decade remains unchanged," he told the Congress
in January 1964. "It is an ambitious and important goal. In
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addition to providing great scientific benefits, it will
demonstrate that our capability in space is second to no other
nation's." But, he emphasized, "we cannot reach this goal
without sufficient funds. There is no second-class ticket to
12
space.
At the same time, Johnson's decision to press ahead with
Apollo--the U.S. Moon landing--rested less now than in 1961-63 on
considerations of national security, in May 1963, he had
declared: "I do not think this generation of Americans is
willing to go to bed each night by the light of a Communist
moon." During the first year of his presidency, he remained
eager to beat the Soviets in the space race, but a U.S. missile
buildup under JFK, Kennedy's success in the Cuban Missile Crisis
in 1962, and the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963 had eased
concerns about a missile gap and fears that we had fallen behind
the Soviets in military might and scientific research. Kennedy
himself had intended to say on the day of his assassination "that
there was no longer any fear that a Communist lead in space would
become the basis of military superiority. "13
Some worries about these matters remained, but during the
first half of 1964 Johnson put greater emphasis on working out
cooperative agreements with Russia to explore outer space.
"President Johnson has apparently lost his enthusiasm for the
Soviet-American space race," the New York Herald Tribune reported
in June of 1964. Earlier in the year, the President had sent the
deputy administrator of NASA, Hugh L Dryden, to Geneva "to seek
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agreements for a 'widening area' of cooperation in space with
Moscow." Judging from National Security Action Memoranda in
1964, Johnson was clearly eager for less competition and more
cooperation with the USSR in space. As the astronaut and later
Senator John Glenn saw it, the Congress was no longer so easily
moved to increase space spending by appeals to the Soviet threat.
"The anti-Russian theme had worn out," Glenn says. Johnson, ever
sensitive to congressional moods, saw the need to press the case
for space exploration on other grounds. 14
A more compelling consideration with Johnson; especially at
the start of his presidency, was to carry out John F. Kennedy's
agenda. Johnson had to confront the grief and despair many
people felt over the assassination of a beloved leader and their
antagonism toward someone who, however much he might identify
himself with JFK, seemed like a usurper, an unelected, untested
replacement for the man the country now more than ever saw as
more suitable for the job. In the first days of his presidency,
only 5 percent of the public felt they knew very much about LBJ,
while 67 percent said they knew next to nothing about him.
Seventy percent of the county had doubts about how it would
"carry on without" Kennedy. Seeing an essential need for
continuity, for reassurance that the new president would be
faithful to the previous administration's ends and means, Johnson
made the fulfillment of Kennedy's promise to put a man on the
Moon and safely return him to earth by 1970 one of his major
priorities. 15
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Apollo: A Great Society Initiative
Johnson also believed that the Apollo mission made excellent
economic and political sense. Landing a man on the Moon would
not only reaffirm America's superiority over Russia and honor
JFK's memory it would also spur both immediate and long-term
economic growth and gain the administration considerable
political credit with the public. Less than a month after
becoming president, Johnson was pressing NASA to use its
resources to help Wisconsin and Minnesota expand "their research
and engineering capabilities." Webb, who was a good politician
in his own right and understood perfectly the importance of tying
NASA to specific economic benefits around the country, laid plans
to double NASA's "activity" in both states. More important, he
kept close track of how NASA affected the nation's economy and
took every opportunity to apprise Johnson of these gains. In a
1965 report to the president, for example, he pointed out that in
the previous year 94 percent of NASA's "procurement dollars" had
gone to 20,000 private U.S. industrial companies: $331 million
had been spent in 120 cities in 22 states with high unemployment
rates; and as many as+750,000 people worked directly or
indirectly on NASA-related business. 16
Johnson understood that much more than pork barrel spending
would result from NASA's efforts generally and the Apollo project
in particular. To be sure, as a seasoned politician with a keen
appreciation for federal largess, he greatly valued the economic
and political gains coming to localities and his White House from
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NASA spending in Florida, Alabama, Texas, Oklahoma, California,
and other states around the country. But he also placed
considerable value on the longer-term national advances NASA's
work seemed likely to produce. As Webb told him, NASA's
accomplishments were leading to the development of "new materials
• . . new structures" as well as "complex electronic, mechanical
and chemical systems .... This new technology . . . is bringing
with it revolutionary change in the way of making and testing
things, not only for space systems, but for innumerable other
non-space services, processes and materials."
Because these benefits were essentially abstractions, Webb
took pains to enumerate the many more concrete returns
flowing from NASA's research and development. He told
Johnson: NASA has something to offer law enforcement in
terms of data processing and communication systems; to the
construction industry through NASA developed materials; to
pollution control through the development of an outlook
whereby the Earth's air and water are beginning to be viewed
as finite resources operating as closed systems; to
transportation of people in and out of the inner city
through research on short-haul aircraft; to improvement of
economic opportunities for all citizens by stimulating
business through new inventions and transfers of space
technology to industry; and to a richer life by development
of techniques making possible cheaper, lighter, and more
reliable television sets and other electronic items for use
in the home. 17
For Johnson, the work of space exploration was part of a
larger vision he enunciated in May 1964 called the Great Society.
In a speech at the University of Michigan, he appealed to the
best in the American temperament. "For a century," Johnson said,
we labored to settle and to subdue a continent. For half a
century we called upon unbounded invention and untiring
industry to create an order of plenty for all of our people.
The challenge of the next half century is whether we have
the wisdom to use that wealth to enrich and elevate our
national life, and to advance the quality of our American
civilization .... For in your time we have the
opportunity to move not only toward the rich society and the
powerful society, but upward to the Great Society .... It
is a place where men are more concerned with the quality of
their goals than the quantity of their goods.
To reach this promised land, Americans would have to pledge
themselves to a crusade for excellence. "For better or for
worse, your generation has been appointed by history . . . to
lead America toward a new age," he said. "Will you join in the
battle to build the Great Society, to prove that our material
progress is only the foundation on which we will build a richer
life of mind and spirit? ''18
"An obvious component of this [Great Society] theme," a
White House aide told Edward Welsh of the Space Council, "is the
vast array of implications of our present Research and
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Development activity." Jim Webb understood perfectly what LBJ
had in mind: "I know of no area," he told the president, "where
the inspirational thrust toward doing everything required of a
great society can be better provided on a proven base of
competence, and with so many practical additional benefits to be
derived, than through the space program .... The space program
lies in your first area of building the great society, for it is
truly an imaginative new program based on new ideas and new
capabilities." Early in 1965, after becoming vice president,
Hubert Humphrey echoed Webb's point in a speech at the Goddard
Memorial Dinner:
Let me assure you that the Great Society envisioned by
President Johnson is not one limited to the fight against
poverty, ignorance, disease, and intolerance. The Great
society requires, in addition, an urgent quest for
excellence, for intellectual attainment, for crossing new
frontiers in science and technology. Let me emphasize that
an adequately funded, well-directed space program is an
integral part of our nation's commitment to its future, to
its greatness. 19
Johnson himself told a group of astronauts in 1965 that
their missions not only increased "our knowledge of technology"
but also would lead "to a better life for all." In a 1969
interview, Johnson said that plans to get to the Moon inspired
the country to do something about its educational systems,
medical care for the elderly, conservation, and poverty. In his
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1971 memoirs he wrote: "Space was the platform from which the
social revolution of the 1960s was launched. We broke out of far
more than the atmosphere with our space program .... If we
could send a man to the moon, we knew we should be able to send a
poor boy to school and to provide decent medical care for the
aged. In hundreds of other forms the space program had an impact
on our lives." A few of the benefits he saw the country reaping
from investments in space included pacemakers for heart patients,
intercontinental television, lightweight electronics equipment to
improve navigation techniques for ships and planes, more abundant
food supplies, improved conservation of natural resources, and
weather control capabilities which saved lives and crops and
cattle. 2°
If space exploration tied into LBJ's hopes for a Great
Society, it also served his political purposes in the 1964
presidential campaign. Johnson's opponent, conservative Arizona
Senator Barry Goldwater, complained that "We are spending
entirely too much money on the manned moon program." He promised
that as president he would have "all manned space research . . .
directed by the military," and would use the "billions of dollars
saved from abandoning the manned lunar program" for "military
space missions." As with so many other issues in the campaign,
Goldwater was out of sync with the national mood. Polls in the
spring and fall of 1964 showed between 64 and 69 percent of the
public favorably disposed to landing an American on the Moon,
with 78 percent saying the Apollo program should be maintained at
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its current pace or speeded up. Only 20 percent of the country
supported space spending strictly for military purposes. In
response, Johnson refused "to slacken in our nationally approved
effort to reach the moon as soon as we can." Identification with
the widely backed Apollo mission was superb politics in an
21
election year.
LBJ and the Budqet Crisis
At the same time Johnson gave wholehearted support to
Apollo, he thought about what, if any, big projects might come
next. In January 1964, he asked Webb to describe NASA's future
plans, specifically asking how "hardware and development
programs" would be tied to "prospective missions." Webb provided
a tentative answer in May, in which he said that NASA had
"virtually completed the investment in facilities" that would
land astronauts on the Moon and "meet a broad range of not yet
specified tasks." These might include a greater mastery of space
science, which would improve weather prediction and control;
exploration of the Moon to expand our understanding of the
origins of the solar system; a search for life on other planets;
the development of space stations, manned and unmanned; better
weather, communications, and navigation satellites; and
exploration of the near planets and probes of more distant ones.
It wasn't until February 1965, however, that Webb gave the
president a more precise statement of NASA's future plans.
Sensing that Johnson, with expanding commitments at home and
abroad, was not eager for new big spending on space, Webb backed
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away from most of the proposals he had identified in his May 1964
letter. Instead, he urged commitments to two modest programs:
the exploration of Mars through an unmanned landing and further
exploration of the Moon with the technology developed for Apollo.
The distinguishing features of the Webb proposals, an aide told
LBJ, was the absence of a request for any "major new launch
vehicle systems" and a continuation of NASA funding at current
levels. 22
With Apollo still years away from fulfillment, Johnson was
unwilling to make any new commitments of any kind. When Webb
asked permission to give the chairmen of the House and Senate
space committees copies of his February letter to inform the
Congress about possible future NASA projects, Johnson resisted.
"Why do we need to do anything?" he asked in a reply to Jack
Valenti, his aide handling the matter. "I would think I would
have more leeway & running room by saying nothing[,] which I
would prefer. ''_
Beginning in 1965, Johnson took a two-track approach to NASA
and space exploration. His only priority was landing a man on
the Moon by the end of the decade, as Kennedy and he had
promised. Beyond that, he resisted significant commitments to
post-Apollo planning that would cost billions of dollars and
engage the country's prestige and energy. One of the striking
features of Johnson's memoirs on his presidency is that he
devotes only seventeen out of six hundred pages to a discussion
of space. And of those seventeen pages, only three describe
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space policy during his presidency. The rest focuses on his
Senate and vice presidential years, the period 1957-1963, when he
felt he had done his most important work for the space program.
Indeed, in an interview with Walter Cronkite in 1969, Johnson
said: "Very frankly, I think I spent more time in the space
field in '57 and '58 and '59 and '60, and up to '63, than I did
after I became President. "24
This is not to say that Johnson lost interest in space
achievements. He closely attended to the various space missions
between 1965 and 1968. As Ed Welsh remembered, Johnson watched
each mission on television. "He had the astronauts in to see him
at the White House. He had them to the ranch. He followed them
with a real sense of personal interest. As a matter of fact, he
said that he really in a sense flew with them on every flight
from the beginning of the launch till they landed safely." LBJ
himself told Cronkite: "I have ridden on every mission ....
I've watched with eagerness, and pride, their every movement. ''25
'Nevertheless, his interest didn't translate into support for
post-Apollo projects. Everything that had initially spurred
Johnson to back a major American effort in space--fear of Soviet
superiority and a desire for economic and political gains--now
became reasons to avoid substantial commitments to new big space
programs. Johnson's concern, for example, that Soviet advances
in space might undermine America's national security and prestige
in the Soviet/American competition for global influence steadily
faded from view during his presidential years. In the spring of
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1966, after the Soviets had landed an unmanned spaceship on the
Moon, Jim Webb pressed the president to use the Soviet feat to
extract more money for NASA from Congress. Webb told LBJ that he
had done his best to "minimize the political risk to your
Administration from the fact that we are operating substantially
under what would be the most efficient program." This was
Webb's way of warning that the Soviets might beat the U.S. to the
Moon, for which Johnson would pay a high political price. 26
But Johnson was not impressed. He had justifiable
confidence that the U.S. would land men on the Moon ahead of the
Soviets, and he was confident that Moscow was now more eager for
cooperation than competition with the United States in space.
Indeed, nine days before Webb's warning about the continuing
Soviet threat to America's leadership in space, LBJ had issued "a
statement outlining the essential elements of a celestial bodies
treaty" and asked U.N. Ambassador Arthur Goldberg to initiate
discussions. During the next three months, Soviet/American
negotiators drafted nine initial articles of an outer space
treaty. By December, additional points of agreement were
incorporated into the treaty, which Johnson now publicly
described as the "most important arms control development since
the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963." The treaty, which was
signed in January 1967 and entered into force in October, banned
the placing of weapons of mass destruction in orbit, in outer
space, or on celestial bodies; established an unconditional
commitment to assist and return astronauts who landed in another
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country; and forbad claims of sovereignty over celestial
bodies. 27
To Johnson and the State Department, the agreement meant a
"de-fusing of the space race" and a reduction or even an end to
"much of the pressure to race for new and distant goals." Henry
Owen of the Department's Policy Planning Council anticipated
"strong opposition" from NASA and the Space Council to additional
cooperation with the Soviets in space, because it would mean less
funding of post-Apollo projects. More cooperation with Moscow
and less ambitious space plans, Owen told Walt Rostow, Chairman
of the Policy Planning Council, "will save money, which can go to
(i) foreign aid, (ii) domestic purposes--thus mitigating the
strain of the war in Vietnam." Owen urged Rostow to get into the
fight with NASA and to enlist "someone on the domestic side of
the White House staff . . . to ensure that someone, • • •
representing the constituency whose interests are most directly
affected, gets into the fight." A State Department paper on
"Space Goals After the Lunar Landing" argued that by
deemphasizing or stretching out "additional costly programs aimed
at the moon and beyond, resources may to some extent be released
for other objectives--foreign aid, domestic needs, scientific
efforts in other areas--which might serve more immediate, higher
priority U.S. interests. "_
Johnson agreed. The increasing costs of fighting in
Vietnam, which began to expand rapidly in 1965, and the outlays
for the antipoverty and Great Society programs, which also made
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substantial demands on the budget beginning in 1965, were central
considerations in making Johnson resistant to post-Apollo
commitments. In July 1969, at the end of his Administration and
after the successful Moon landing, Johnson was vague and evasive
about post-Apollo plans. "What would you like to see as the next
space goal?" an interviewer asked him. "I don't want to be
setting goals for those that are responsible for this effort," he
said. "I would like to take all that we had done and be sure
that we utilize all the knowledge that we have gained up to now,
and to follow through to milk the entire Apollo program of every
benefit that can come from it." Johnson then ticked off the
various ideas others had for post-Apollo planning: space
stations, additional Moon shots, studies in space medicine, and
unmanned trips to other planets. Personally, he would not say
what he favored, but hoped that we would continue to have a
vigorous space program. _
Johnson's remarks were symptomatic of his refusal to make
significant, large-scale commitments beyond Apollo in his
1967-1969 budgets. His rhetoric masked the battles he and Webb
had fought over funding for NASA's future. After suffering a
modest cut of about $75 million from 1965 to 1966, Webb was
determined to increase NASA's funding in 1967. But Johnson
wouldn't hear of it. Webb's request for $5.3 billion could not
withstand a $300 million reduction. In accepting the president's
cut, Webb warned against keeping NASA's funding at the current
level for another year. "The 1968 budget will be a major turning
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point with indicated requirements on the order of $6 billion of
new obligational authority," he told Johnson in May 1966. By
August, however, it was clear that Congress and the president
would drop NASA's funding below $5 billion for fiscal year 1967.
This would "leave no choice," Webb warned Johnson, "but to
accelerate the rate at which we are carrying on the liquidation
of some of the capabilities which we have built up." He
predicted that options would now be foreclosed and doubt and
uncertainty would demoralize NASA. And, he bluntly declared,
"There has not been a single important new space project started
since you became President. Under the 1968-guidelines very
little looking to the future can be done next year .... I
cannot avoid the feeling that this is not in the best interests
of the country. "30
Johnson relied on his Budget Director, Charles Schultze, to
counter Webb's assertions. Schultze argued that NASA's funding
was entirely adequate to meet the 1969 deadline for a Moon
landing and to work toward more distant goals like a Mars landing
and/or earth orbital stations. After all, "the space program is
not a WPA," Schultze declared. Nor did he or Johnson feel that
NASA's budget was skimpy alongside of $2 billion in spending on
elementary and secondary education, $1.8 billion on the poverty
program, $200 million on water pollution control, and $25 million
for high-speed ground transportation. A $5 billion space budget
or even a little below that would not "wreck the space program,"
Schultze said, nor would it lead to "the liquidation of some of
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the capabilities we have built up." NASA's funding did not
represent "a lack of it; support for the space program."
Schultze did not see how in the context of the fighting in
Vietnam the administration could afford to meet Webb's request.
Johnson agreed with Schultze and convinced Webb publicly to back
his decision, though privately the NASA administrator continued
to press his case, unsuccessfully asking for an additional $182
million above the $455 million slated for post-Apollo planning. 31
Johnson saw little political risk in turning aside Webb's
demands for more money. By the end of 1966, it was clear to him
that NASA and space exploration beyond the Apollo landing had
diminished popular appeal. By the summer of 1965 a third of the
nation favored cutting the space budget, while only 16 percent
wanted to increase it. Over the next three and a half years the
number for cutting space spending went up to 40 percent, with
those preferring an increase dropping to 14 percent. A poll
taken in the summer of 1969 recorded 53 percent of the country
was opposed to a manned mission to Mars. At the end of 1967, the
New York Times reported that a poll conducted in six American
cities showed five other public issues holding priority over
efforts in outer space. Residents of these cities preferred
doing something about air and water pollution, job training for
unskilled workers, national beautification, and poverty before
spending federal funds on space. The following year Newswee_
echoed the Times story, stating: "The U.S. space program is in
decline. The Viet Nam war and the desperate conditions of the
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nation's poor and its cities--which make space flight seem, in
comparison, like an embarrassing national self-indulgence--have
combined to drag down a program where the sky was no longer the
limit.,, 32
The Congress as well was strongly disposed to reduce NASA's
budget. A White House survey of congressional leaders at the end
of 1966 revealed pronounced sentiment for keeping Apollo on
track, but for cutting NASA spending by skimping on post-Apollo
outlays. In this context, a Johnson request in January 1967 for
a $5 billion NASA budget for fiscal 1968, including $455 million
for post-Apollo programs, was pretty bold. _
Yet Johnson's inclination to be generous with NASA and
provide for a modest amount of post-Apollo spending could not
withstand a disastrous fire in an Apollo command module in
January 1967 and a growing budget deficit spurred by the fighting
in Vietnam. On January 27, a fire destroyed the module and
killed astronauts Roger B. Chafee, Edward H. White III, and
Virgil I. Grissom during a test at Cape Kennedy. In addition to
the tragic loss of life, the fire undermined national confidence
in NASA, which was now accused of carelessness in trying to move
the Apollo project forward too quickly. The fire, Johnson said
later, represented "an all-time low" for the space effort. "I
grieved [not only] for the men and their families but [also] . .
• for the space organization. I felt very sad and sorry for Jim
Webb and all of his loyal employees." Senate hearings raised
questions about a great many defects in the spacecraft and
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brought Webb into sharp conflict with three Senators, who saw him
as whitewashing NASA's failings. The New york Times, which was
also highly critical of Webb, said that NASA stood for "Never a
Straight Answer." Though the hearings were "unpleasant and
embarrassing for NASA; . . . on the whole," an administrative
history of the agency asserts, "they gave NASA a sympathetic
forum in which to explain how a tragedy had come about, and show
how it would serve to correct deficiencies." NASA's
forthrightness in responding to the failings that produced the
fire restored a measure of confidence in the agency and prompted
the Senate committee to recommend that NASA continue to move the
Apollo program forward to achieve its goal. _
A federal budget crisis in the summer of 1967 dealt NASA
another blow. A $29 billion deficit brought on by Vietnam
spending persuaded Johnson to ask the Congress for a i0 percent
increase in income taxes. To persuade Congress, LBJ felt
compelled to match the tax increase with spending cuts applied to
fiscal year 1968 beginning in October 1967. NASA was targeted for
$500 million in reductions. Webb objected that with NASA "just
now getting back up to speed after the interruptions and
difficulties associated with the accident," it would be "the
straw that break's the camel's back," meaning, "the momentum we
have achieved will be lost." For Johnson, there was no choice,
except where to apply the cuts in NASA programs. As before,
despite recommendations to the contrary, he stuck to keeping
Apollo on schedule, agreeing instead to center cuts on
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post-Apollo applications and the unmanned landing on Mars. Once
again, Webb and NASA had to accommodate themselves to a reduced
budget, now, $4.59 billion. In spite of everything, Webb was
still able to assure Johnson that "the goal of the manned lunar
landing in this decade is preserved. "35
The cuts genuinely troubled Johnson. Whenever there were
reductions, he would tell Webb, "Next year I hope to make up for
this." Johnson "had almost supreme confidence that at some point
he could give us resources again and that we could catch up,"
Webb recalled. More specifically, in a message to Webb in
September 1967, the president asked him to "be sure to make
abundantly clear [to a congressional committee] that I do not
choose to take one dime from my budget for space appropriations
for this year." The "Congress forced me to agree to effect some
reductions or lose the tax bill." While Johnson's message was
partly a case of political finger-pointlng, he was truly
uncomfortable reining in NASA or any government program he
believed served the national well-being. He loved to quote
Speaker Sam Rayburn's adage: "Any jackass can kick a barn down,
but it takes a good carPenter to build one." More to the point,
his whole political career had been given over to building and
using government programs to expand the economy, raise living
standards, relieve privation, and build his Great Society.
Overreaching himself by trying to institute domestic reforms and
fight a war at the same time, he could not find the means
simultaneously to spend on guns and butter. It was a reality he
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found difficult to accept. _
Jim Webb also struggled against the reality of declining
commitments to NASA. In November 1967, he pressed Budget
Director Charles Schultze to urge a strong statement by the
president about NASA funding when signing its appropriation bill.
NASA's congressional backers, Webb said, saw the president as
having "'knifed' the very activities he had previously been
urging them to support." LBJ's inconsistent leadership, Webb
added, had created "bitter feelings . . . in a number of
quarters." Webb wanted Johnson to emphasize the continuing
Russian danger to American preeminence in space and to say:
"Although we will at this time have to postpone important parts
of our space program, let this fact be clear: We are fixed in
our resolve to master the challenge of space. "37
LBJ and W_bb
Yet nothing Johnson said could change the reality of
shrinking budgets and enthusiasm for space exploration after
Apollo. A New York Times story in April 1968 stated: "After a
heady decade of uninterrupted hiring, building and dreaming great
dreams of farreaching exploration, the American space program is
gearing down to a slower pace and a less certain future ....
The growing feeling in the space establishment that once
astronauts have landed on the moon, they will have no other place
of significance to go for several years because of sharp budget
cuts. These cuts have trimmed to the bone all preparations for
future missions. It is as if the astronauts are heading for a
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Jdead-end on the moon." By September, after the White House had
proposed to reduce NASA spending another quarter of a billion
dollars and congressional appropriations committees penciled in
only $3.99 billion for NASA in fiscal year 1969, James Webb
resigned. _
There are conflicting accounts of the reasons behind Webb's
departure. Webb himself claimed that he wanted to get out before
the Apollo seven and eight missions, the manned orbits of the
Earth and the Moon in the fall of 1968, so that he could respond
to any failure by going after critics in and out of the Congress.
Others say that Webb was surprised when Johnson accepted his
resignation. According to these accounts, Webb had used the
threat of resignation repeatedly with the president as a way to
press NASA's case. On September 16, 1968, however, Johnson, who
had gotten "fed up with this same old story," took Webb up on the
offer, saying, "Let's call in the press. "39
Whatever the realities behind the decision, Webb tried to
turn his resignation to NASA's advantage. At a press conference
on September 16, he "bitterly" complained that "Congressional
budget cuts had put the United States second in the space race"
behind the Russians. Though he denied that he was leaving
because of reductions totaling $1.4 billion over the last four
years, he nevertheless said that "the agency had been used 'as a
sort of whipping boy' by Congress and other agencies competing
for Federal funds. And he made it clear that he felt the U.S. is
still behind the Soviet Union in space, and that the reason for
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this second place is a lack of funds." Sources told the
Washington Post that "Webb was discouraged by the budget cuts,
tired of fighting to have Congress restore them and even wearier
of debating the urgency of the space program with the Bureau of
the Budget and President Johnson. "4°
Webb's public comments provoked an angry response in the
administration. Donald F. Hornig, the President's Science
Advisor, sent Johnson a memo describing Webb's assertions as
"unconscionable statements," which "were undoubtedly motivated"
by NASA's "budgetary problems." Hornig disputed assertions that
the Soviets had "'a capability that could change the basic
structure and balance of power in the world,' that the U.S. was
clearly second in space and that a Soviet manned lunar landing
could be achieved in the next year--a time scale that is
competitive with, or ahead of Apollo." Hornig thought the U.S.
was at least a year ahead of the Russians and, if the president
agreed, he wished to press Webb and others at NASA to set the
record straight. Ed Welsh at the Space Council also felt that
Webb's estimate of Soviet space capabilities was "inaccurate" and
that the U.S. missions in space had demonstrated our
preeminence. 41
Johnson sided with Webb, inviting him to respond to Welsh
and telling his aides to instruct Hornig not to get into the NASA
debate. In a response to Hornig's memo, Johnson said: "Drop it!
That is my feeling, but get Jim Webb to get me a prompt
reply--all his scientists--all his private ones--to support him
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and me." In a written memo to Hornig, which Johnson wanted
conveyed only on the phone, the president said: "It is hard for
me to believe that Jim Webb would make 'unconscionable
statements' or be 'motivated' entirely by budgetary problems."
Johnson defended Webb's concern that "the trend of the Soviet
program upward and the U.S. program downward" might allow the
Russians "to achieve both the image and reality of power and
forward motion." Johnson warned Hornig that "even if your group
should develop evidence to sustain their views, your report might
be shortly followed by some tragic occurrence in the U.S. program
or a major triumph in the Russian one. This would inevitably
bring into question the judgment of your group in a way that
might impair its usefulness." Johnson also identified himself
with Webb's complaints about budget shortfalls, saying, "It was
only with great reluctance that for the past two years I have
taken action to meet the overall fiscal requirements laid down by
a determined group in the Congress by accepting cuts made in the
House Appropriations Committee. "42
Webb's concerns were greatly exaggerated, as demonstrated by
the successful Apollo 7 and 8 missions in September and December
respectively. But Johnson backed him nevertheless. Partly, he
had a warm feeling for Webb, who had served him so loyally for
almost five years. And to Johnson, this was no small
consideration. In February 1968, with the Tet offensive in
Vietnam in full swing and the White House besieged by anti-war
protests, Johnson talked to Thomas O. Paine about becoming deputy
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administrator of NASA. As Paine recalls, Johnson stressed the
problems faced by his administration, "how much he needed people
to come into the government and shoulder part of this burden and
relieve him of it, to serve him loyally, help him move the
country ahead in these very difficult times." In addition,
Johnson liked Webb and admired him. After a conversation with
Webb about the Apollo fire, Johnson remembered telling Mrs.
Johnson: "I know now why Jim Webb was an old Marine and a good
one. He's got the courage. He goes through a disaster like this
and he says, 'We just got to go on and do what we know is right'
• . . And he did. ''43
But more than personal sentiment determined Johnson's
support of Webb. He felt that the historical reputation of his
administration was partly at stake. If Webb was right about the
potential for renewed Soviet dominance in space, if Moscow beat
the U.S. in the Moon race, Johnson believed that he and Webb
would be seen as having presided over a failed or at least
inadequate space program. By letting Webb beat up on Congress
for shortchanging NASA, Johnson was preparing to point the finger
at Congressmen and Senators for any retrospective weaknesses
historians saw in the Johnson administration's space effort.
Shortly after the Apollo 7 and 8 successes, when Johnson gave
Webb NASA's Distinguished Service Medal and praised him as "the
best administrator in the Federal Government," he was leaving no
doubt that, unlike many in the Congress, he had been an ardent
advocate of NASA generally and of Apollo in particular. Lyndon
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Johnson wanted to be remembered as a president who made his mark
in space.
Conclusion
Johnson's historical reputation as a Senator, vice
president, and president will never be more than marglnally
affected by his part in the development of America's space
program. His initiatives as an "imperial president" will always
identify Johnson more with domestic reforms like civil rights,
Medicare, federal aid to education, and other war on poverty and
Great Society measures than with Project Apollo. They will stand
with the disaster in Vietnam as the centerpieces of his political
career much more than his presidential goals in space.
Nevertheless, in time, as the United States progresses into the
space age and ever more important discoveries emerge about our
universe, Johnson will stand in the front rank of those who had
the foresight and determination, as well as the skill to use
presidential power--in spite of its undeniable limitations--to
initiate America's probe into the farthest reaches of outer
space. For this driven, almost madly ambitious man from rural
south central Texas, it may be fairly said that in his lifetime
he both figuratively and literally reached for the Moon.
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Chapter 4
The Presidency, Congress, and the Deceleration of the
U.B. Space Program in the 1970s
by
Joan Hoff
Richard Nixon inherited many things from Lyndon B. Johnson's
presidential administration; among them, the Vietnam War, the
"Great Society" social reform effort, and the clvil space
program. In the 1960s all three experienced spiraling costs, as
well as public disagreement of greater or lesser extent over
their means and ends, and they all suffered both from managerial
problems inside the government and exaggerated expectations by
supporters. Each of these difficulties contributed to a growing
public dissatisfaction about their purposes and costliness. As
the smallest of these inheritances, the space program was the
easiest to target for cuts by the new economy-minded
administration because it had the least broad public
constituency. Accordingly, each of the three U.S. presidents and
three NASA administrators in the 1970s had to face budgetary and
planning problems originating in the heyday of NASA's development
in the 1960s.
By January 1969, when Nixon took office, NASA had already
experienced a decline in funding from a peak of $5.25 billion in
1965 to $3.99 billion. The first lunar landings later that year
did little to stave off additional funding cuts in future years.
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In fact, the July and November moon landings probably contributed
to, rather than diminished, the disillusionment felt by so many
Americans about Project Apollo. The program, while
technologically innovative and visually exciting, left much to be
desired from most other vantage points. Many Americans felt
little sympathy for the celebrities who became regular members of
an elite audience at Apollo launches; or for astronauts promoting
all types of business endeavors and marketing space memorabilia;
or for NASA leaders who by 1968-1969 seemed to believe in the
wake of the successful lunar missions that their agency deserved
whatever funding it requested; or for rising taxes and a
worsening economic situation that were exacerbated by these
programs; or finally for a worried aerospace industry that stood
to lose billions if the space program were cut. There were
simply too many charges of "misplaced government priorities" and
"misguided government allocations of funds" by 1969 for NASA to
continue with business as usual. I
For all the blame that has been laid on the Nixon
administration because of Watergate, one thing that he did was to
move space technologyaway from being merely a political/military
weapon in the cold war--as it had usually been since the
successful Soviet launching of Sputnik I on October 4, 1957--
toward a more balanced and deliberate effort that avoided
international competition. He tried to downplay the cold war
tensions that had done so much to make Project Apollo the vehicle
for achieving international prestige and to return to the more
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ordered approach of his 1950s mentor, Dwight D. Eisenhower. 2
Nixon--perceiving Eisenhower's worst fears about the creation of
a "scientific-technological elite" that stressed engineering over
science, competition over cooperation, civilian over military,
adventure over applications--also tried to minimize what he
viewed as the rise of technocracy in the American federal
system. 3 The result was a deceleration of the rate of space
exploration in the 1970s, an emphasis on scientific return, and a
commitment to obtaining the most efficient space effort for the
least expenditure of funds.
Even had Nixon been so inclined he probably could not have
continued his predecessor's impossible dream of capturing outer
space from the Soviets as a twentieth century equivalent to the
road system of the Roman Empire and control of the seas by the
British navy. 4 In fact, in an exuberant post-president interview
with Walter Cronkite after the first moon landing, Johnson
attributed the floodtide of social legislation that became the
hallmark of his administration to the fact that the space program
had begun it all by breaking down the resistance in the South
among Democrats and Republicans alike to federally funded
programs. 5
Nixon, while not above wining and dining astronauts as
American heroes to further his political purposes, never
exhibited the personal enthusiasm or expansive commitment for the
space program that Kennedy and Johnson had shown. This was_ ...... _
probably in part because he did not need to use the space program
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to prove himself in dealing with the Soviets as Kennedy and
Johnson apparently thought they did. Moreover, he had inherited
too many economic problems created by the massive spending
programs launched in the name of the cold war in Vietnam and the
Great Society. These programs, in response to crisis and
division and a breakdown of the older political tradition, had
gradually lost support among the public in the course of the
1960s. In a word, fighting the cold war and conducting a
domestic reform program had become so expensive that the Nixon
administration had no choice but to retrench. 6
However, I do not agree with most space scholars that Nixon
reduced the size of the space program primarily because of public
disillusionment with high priced, high tech solutions that did
not seem to resolve basic foreign or domestic problems such as
the war in Vietnam and poverty and crime at home. Nixon was not
one to bow to public opinion on foreign or domestic issues.
There were other concrete reasons for the continued deceleration
than national polls showing opposition to the expense of the
manned space program, 7 or what NASA administrator James C.
Fletcher called the "antitechnology kick" of the countercultural
generation, 8 or even the antidemocratic overtones and cultural
elitism of the technocratic approach to government introduced by
the Kennedy administration. 9 While these attitudes made future
funding of the space program more difficult than in the years
between Sputnik I and the mid-1960s, I believe that they are
incomplete answers and that to them must be added an
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institutional obstinacy at NASA when asked to comply with
changing government budgeting methods and changing public
expectations about the meaning of the space program by the late
1960s and throughout the 1970s.
The principal reasons for the deceleration of the space
program under Nixon and for the rest of the 1970s arose from four
rather broad issues that have been largely unexplored in the
history of NASA: personnel, budgetary, foreign policy, and
political factors. By personnel, I mean that Nixon had no close
advisers promoting the space program as he did on the major
domestic initiatives he undertook. Put most simply, NASA
Administrators Thomas O. Paine, James C. Fletcher, and even
Nixon's first two science and technology advisers, Lee A.
DuBridge and Edward E. David, Jr., did not have the ear of the
president or any of Nixon's inner staff. At the time Nixon also
did not perceive the space program in crisis due to lower
funding. On other domestic issues this "crisis mentality" on the
president's part had proven an essential criterion if additional
funding was to be recommended. In particular, I am referring
here to the environmental and welfare legislation proposed during
Nixon's first administration. While Nixon thought that a crisis
existed in funding research and development, he did not think a
similar one existed in the space program. I°
From a strictly budgetary point of view, NASA was a classic
example of the myriad cost over-runs present throughout the
Federal government in the first half of the 1960s. 11 As an
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example, in 1963 Webb announced the establishment of the
Electronics Research Center in Boston, one of his most criticized
administrative decisions. The subsequent investigation of this
and a number of other governmental procurement decisions by Webb
continued into the last half of the 1960s, yet one would never
know this from the memoranda and subsequent budgets submitted by
Administrator Thomas O. Paine who succeeded James E. Webb in
September 1968. I_ Neither Paine nor his successor, James C.
Fletcher, seemed to grasp the necessity of not only complying
with, but actually understanding the new cost accounting methods
instituted by the Johnson, Nixon, and Carter administrations.
Neither grasped the importance of knowing with whom in the Bureau
of the Budget and later the Office of Management and Budget they
absolutely had to maintain relations in order to receive serious
consideration for their projects during the complicated process
that went into determining the yearly expenses of government. As
I will detail a little later in this chapter, Paine's behavior
during the budget process of 1970-1971, in particular, appeared
to Nixon stalwarts at best as irrational and at worst as
obstinately arrogant.
My third point in this summary is that the space budget
would probably have been reduced in any case in the 1970s because
it had originated as a product of the cold war and was therefore
subject to rising and falling expectations about favorable
relations between the U.S. and USSR. Under Nixon these
expectations were high and therefore arguments about "beating"
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Othe Soviets in space carried less weight that they had under
Kennedy and Johnson, but NASA administrators and White House
science advisers between 1969 and 1972 failed to appreciate this
important shift and so they tried to convince Nixon to commit
himself to certain aspects of the space program before the Soviet
did. 13 In fact, instead of funding more competition with the
Soviets, Nixon's geopolitical ideas and his policy of detente
emphasized international cooperation and coaptation of the Soviet
Union. This included matters involving space.
Finally, the political considerations that worked against
increased funding for NASA are self-evident. By 1969 liberals
and conservatives in both parties, but especially liberal
Democrats, were highly critical of more spending for space when
such domestic problems as the environment, poverty, urban
renewal, and racism loomed large. Given the fact that until 1988
Nixon remained the only twentieth century president to be elected
without his party having control of either house of Congress, he
was constantly trying to co-opt liberal opinion on certain issues
like welfare to minimize liberal opposition to the war.
Likewise, he initially tried to placate conservatives with a
"southern strategy" as demonstrated through his first
unsuccessful Supreme Court nominees, only to find that they did
not fall in line with him on social policy issues. 14 When the
chair of the House Committee on science and Astronautics George
P. Miller (D-CA) called the manned Mars mission "premature," and
chair of the Senate Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee,
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Clinton P. Anderson (D-NM), did not think "we could afford it
now," echoing the skepticism of other "key congressional leaders,
Nixon and his close advisers became convinced they would lose
little in Congress or the country at large by trimming the NASA
budget. 15
I will now take up each of these four perspectives in more
detail to argue that even if the country had been able to finance
the cold war in the style to which it had become accustomed under
Kennedy and Johnson, and even without the economic dislocation
such financing was causing the American economy by 1969, Nixon in
all likelihood would not have continued to fund NASA at its peak
of the mid-1960s for reasons having to do with his immediate
advisers and their relationship with key NASA personnel,
reorganization of the executive branch as it affected the budget
process, Nixon's "grand design" for foreign policy which included
detente with the Soviet Union, and the president's relations with
Congress over other domestic and foreign policy issues, in
addition to political disagreement among member of Congress over
the space program in the post-Apollo era. Moreover, many of
these same conditions (with the exception of detente with the
USSR) prevailed under the Ford and Carter administrations,
insuring that NASA funding throughout the 1970s would not return
to the heights it reached trying to beat the Soviets to the moon.
Nixon,s _dvlsers and NASAz & Gap That Was Never Closed
Before describing the specific attitudes about NASA among
Nixon's advisers I want to consider the president's own views
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about space. Generally speaking, he was probably not a space
buffor very knowledgeable about technical details of the Apollo
program he had inherited at the moment of its dramatic moon
walks. Moreover, Nixon's Memoirs do not reveal any unusual
interest in the subject as a member of Congress or later as vice
president. 16 It is true that under Eisenhower he had been so
impressed with Sputnik that he countered the statements of such
presidential aides as Sherman Adams who said the satellite race
was no more than an "an outer space basketball game" and
advocated increased spending for the missile program and later
for human space flight vehicles. In general, however, Nixon
seems to have subscribed to the more cautious way Eisenhower
approached the militarization of space by connecting it with
defense, rather than civilian engineering and prestige. 17
In fact, Nixon mentioned the space program more during his
1960 campaign for the presidency than he did in 1968. In 1968 he
stressed increasing federal and private funds for research and
development (R&D) for civilian needs more than space research,
and he fulfilled the former as president. By 1972 the Nixon
administration had increased R&D funding from $15.6 billion in FY
1969 to $17.8 billion for FY 1973, or an increase of 14
percent. 18 Although he spoke of the Apollo ii mission as the
"most exiting event of the first year of my presidency," Nixon's
presidential papers clearly document that his personal interest
was more in the diplomacy of space and in the defense and
commercial applications of such spinoffs of the space program
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such as the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system and supersonic
transportation than in its purely scientific or interplanetary
potential. 19 In one of his first meetings with Paine, Nixon kept
repeating the phrase "space and defense," leaving little doubt in
the administrator's mind that they were inextricably connected in
the president's. 2°
As with all issues Nixon did his homework and tried to keep
informed, but NASA would probably not even have been on his list
of priorities for study had it not been that Johnson
intentionally left it for him to formulate national space policy
in the post-Apollo period. Again, for someone who has studied
other aspects of the Nixon administration, this is not surprising
because Johnson also deliberately postponed implementing
desegregation of southern schools so that this controversial task
would likewise fall on the Nixon watch. 21 Had it not been for
Johnson's procrastination, Nixon would not have immediately
turned his attention to space policy by establishing a task force
during the interregnum period headed by Charles Townes. Its
January report to the president-elect essentially reiterated what
the 1967 President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) had told
Johnson. In both reports the "code word" became "balance" which
meant a "program based on the expectation of eventual manned
planetary exploration, integrating manned and unmanned efforts,"
with the specific recommendation from the Townes task force,
which NASA opposed, that a $4 billion budget would be "adequate
for the important programs envisaged." Like the arbitrary figure
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that one of Nixon's other task forces set for a new welfare
program, this one became imbedded in the thinking of Nixon's
White House advisers. _
This task force report led Nixon to ask Lee DuBridge, his
first presidential science adviser and director of the Office of
Science and Technology (OST) to establish a Space Task Group
(STG) headed by Vice President Spiro T. Agnew (as chair of the
Space Council) to "report on possible cost reductions in
specified portions of our space program." In another memo he
said that he wanted a "definitive recommendation on the direction
which the U.S. space program should take in the post-Apollo
period," specifically "a coordinated program and budget
proposal," as well as information on "international implications
and cooperation. "_ This directive proved a mixed blessing for
NASA because Paine almost immediately assumed that Agnew's
personal and public support of a "manned flight to Mars by the
end of this century" would carry the day inside the White House
and Bureau of the Budget when nothing could have been further
from the truth. Agnew carried little weight with Nixon or his
close advisers and none with the director of the Bureau of the
Budget, Robert Mayo, whom the vice president purportedly called a
"cheapskate" at one of the STG meetings. 24 Consequently, Paine
wasted much time and effort in the summer and fall of 1969 acting
as a link between NASA and the STG in the hope of using this
report as ammunition against Mayo, instead of preparing the
reports requested by the BOB for FY 1971. He apparently never
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tunderstood the limited function and impact of most task force
reports, and certainly he mistook the lack of favor Agnew enjoyed
in the Nixon administration. _
Even in the best of times, but particularly in the time of
turmoil that existed in the late 1960 and early 1970s,
presidential policies seldom reflect exclusively the ideas or
personality of any given president. They are, instead, the much
more collective product of his aides and various divisions of the
executive branch and his own personal administrative mode of
operation. I have divided those who advised Nixon on major
issues into two camps: the "free-thinking" outsiders who
brainstormed with the president about new ideas and comprehensive
programs, and the "political-broker" insiders who worked to draft
and implement his legislative and administrative priorities. _
None of these two sets of advisers included any outspoken
advocates of the space program and, therefore, none took it upon
themselves to present the space program or the NASA budget as a
high priority, crisis issue to the president.
These two quite different sets of advisers agreed on one
thing: that the president should appoint generalists (policy
specialists and politicians) like themselves to oversee the work
of civil service specialists (experts or technicians) from the
very beginning of his presidency. The reason for this was that
generalists would provide him with more moderate and less self-
(or agency-) interested advice. Initially, however, Nixon
thought that he could appoint generalists both as strong agency
and department heads and as strong White House staff people to
monitor them. After the two inevitably clashed in the course of
his first administration, he decided to move members of his White
House staff (and other generalists who had proven loyalists on
policy) from his personal staff into key positions within the
executive branch. 27 This did not mean that Nixon was against
technology or brought an anti-technology bias to the White House.
He and his two sets of advisers simply did not want technocrats
to be in the influential policy-making positions they had
occupied under Kennedy and Johnson.
John Ehrlichman's papers reveal that although he emerged as
the strongest (and one of the most liberal) of Nixon's insider
advisers on domestic policy, he had little interest in the space
program. (In one interview he implled that Nixon's major
interest in Apollo was as a vehicle for uplifting pomp and
circumstance for the nation similar to the panoplies surrounding
the return of the POW's, national parades, and the short-lived
experiment with palace guard uniforms for the White House police
force.) _ This meant that Peter M. Flanigan, an investment
banker who had been the deputy campaign manager for Nixon in
1968, was assigned oversight responsibilities for space as part
of his general duties as assistant to the president for internal
economic affairs. Flanigan in turn relied on Thomas Clay
Whitehead, a former RAND systems analyst, to evaluate NASA budget
and planning proposals. Although Jerome Wolff, an aide Agnew
brought from Maryland to advise him on science and technology,
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Lcontacted all these White House advisers about the STG report,
Flanigan and Whitehead turned out to be instrumental in making
decisions about the NASA budget for FY 1971. _
In this environment, there was little push from Nixon
insiders for an aggressive space program. Increased funding for
NASA would have been an uphill battle in any case, however, since
neither DuBridge nor David as science advisors favored human
space flight programs and Flanigan and Whitehead were mainly
interested in proving to the president that they were at least as
committed to cost effectiveness and to producing a balanced
budget as Robert Mayo at the Bureau of the Budget. In truth,
there was no one in the White House who had much interest in the
space program and who wanted to increase its funding levels. As
a result, Thomas Paine had no success in February 1969 in
convincing Nixon that he should move forward with bold plans for
a new objective in space.
When Nixon did not respond to Paine's demands, the
administrator threw all of his energy into influencing the STG
report and in the process systematically offended both White
House aides and top officials at BOB. Whether he felt compelled
to act in this manner because, as a Democrat and member of the
NAACP, he had actively supported the campaign of Hubert Humphrey,
or whether this was his normal operating style remains a question
for debate. His resignation in September 1970 came as a welcome
relief to both the executive and legislative branches of
government. One of the reasons there was a five-month delay in
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finding his successor was that his behavior had convinced the
Nixon administration that it did not want another Paine as head
of NASA. Flanigan, for example, was specifically told to find
someone to be NASA administrator "who will turn down NASA's
empire-building fervor and turn his attention to 1) sensible
straightening away of internal management and 2) working withOMB
and White House. "31
While tempers improved once James Fletcher became NASA
administrator in the spring of 1971, the funding situation for
NASA did not. This was in part because he relied too heavily on
Flanigan for access to Nixon, and by the time of Fletcher's
arrival Flanigan had also been appointed executive director of
the Council on International Economic Policy (CIEP) and was too
busy to be a space advocate inside the White House even he had
been so inclined. Because of the situation in the Nixon White
House in the early 1970s, without Ehrlichman's active support
cuts in the NASA budget could not have been prevented, let alone
the increases Paine demanded and Fletcher pleaded for, achieved.
In an January 1970 meeting with Paine, the president told him
that he regretted the additional cuts in FY 1971, but that
congress and the people were all for severe cuts in "space and
defense. ''32 By that time Nixon had already begun to withdraw
U.S. troops from Vietnam and cut back on defense spending.
Whether the public and Congress would have tolerated some
increase in spending for space for purely scientific purposes
unrelated to defense was never tested by Nixon. For the
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president defense and space were one and the same thing as a
budget item.
From BOB to OMB and More Headaches for NASA
Closely related to this personnel problem that NASA never
solved under Nixon and only marginally so under Presidents Gerald
Ford and Jimmy Carter--with whom Fletcher had more cordial and
direct access but no more profitable relations in terms of
funding for NASA--was the budgetary process itself. In the late
1960s and early 1970s both the Johnson and Nixon administrations
introduced new concepts into budget formulation. Nixon's was
particularly effective because with Congressional approval it
transformed the Bureau of the Budget into the Office of
Management and Budget in July 1970. This reorganization was
based in part on the advanced corporate theory known as
management by objectives (MbO) recommended by the President's
Advisory Council on Executive Organization (PACEO), also known as
the Ash Council. Nixon did not introduce the MbO component until
early 1973, the same year he eliminated the OST, saying that the
National Science Foundation was better equipped to carry out the
advisory functions of the White House science adviser. Both
actions were taken on the recommendation the Ash Council had made
as early as the fall of 1969 based on corporate organization
theories. 33
Neither move reflected any anti-technological or
anti-science bias on the part of the president or his immediate
advisers, including Roy L. Ash who at the time was president of
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the high-tech company, Litton Industries. Although Congressional
hearings in 1973 and 1974 on Nixon's Reorganization Plan No. 1
were influenced by the emerging Watergate scandal and cannot be
taken at face value in discussing the wisdom of eliminating the
OST and PSAC, the idea of using the National Science Foundation
because it fostered "pluralism" in government funding for science
(and hence, better geographical distribution of funds) had its
defenders among some scientists, as well business theorists.
(Later as head of the Office of Management and Budget Ash would
favor funding for certain projects of the NSF over those of
NASA.) This reorganization also was completely in keeping with
other decentralized programs established in the name of Nixon's
New Federalism, but some scientists viewed the demise of OST and
PSAC as depriving "the science community of substantial status
and influence in the White House," not realizing how little
influence either had under the presidents since Kennedy as
personal White House advisers came to play increasingly important
roles. _
Likewise, the adoption of MbO reflected no intrinsic bias
against science by the Nixon administration. This recommendation
from the Ash Council came on the heels of the failure of the
Performance Measures System launched in 1971 as a variation of
the Planning Programming Budgeting System (PPBS) originally
introduced in 1965 under the Johnson administration. The MbO
system was not intended to save money, to decide between
competing programs, or even to be a means for the White House to
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vmandate priorities for individual departments. However, because
it insisted on maximizing the best use of government funding
based on national priorities, MbO indirectly allowed any
president more influence in facilitating the achievement of some
of his preconceived objectives. 35
With or without MbO, the establishment of the Office of
Management and Budget remains one of the most influential
management changes initiated by Nixon. OMB's review procedures
based on central clearance of all department, agency, and
commission budgets before they were submitted to Congress was
institutionalized by Nixon's successors because of its power to
evaluate program performance and to control spending. _ OMB can
be viewed as his most "imperialistic" achievement, because "OMB
is on paper the single most powerful managerial unit in the
government." It has been so significant that since 1973 only the
CIA and the Defense Department have successfully challenged OMB's
budget setting powers. In spite of this, by the early 1970s only
a few isolated scientists had realized the OMB's potential for
"usurping scientific judgment and congressional intent through
its impoundments of allocations for scientific research. "37
There is little evidence, however, in Nixon's presidential
papers or in NASA records that either Paine or Fletcher or their
aides understood the enormous significance of the basic
structural and analytical change that had taken place in budget
formulation by the summer of 1970 or the place of OMB in the
process. This is especially true of all the interviews with
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Fletcher, as well as his correspondence, in which he expressed
either dismay or irritation with OMB's procedures but little
understanding of how to "play" the game of compliance so as not
to hurt NASA requests for budget increases. The same appears
true of his attitude toward Congress. _
This was even more true of NASA's reaction to Carter's
famous, or infamous depending on your point of view, "zero-based
budget" (ZBB) plans for OMB. James Fletcher rather pathetically
wrote a note saying: "I am not sure what 'zero-based budget'
means--but what it used to mean is what I thought we were doing
every year. Is this going to give us problems? "39 It is also
not evident that Robert A. Frosch--the oceanographer, flutist,
and sculpturer who became Carter's NASA administrator in 1977--
was prepared to present NASA budgets any more effectively under
OMB management than his predecessors. Not since James Webb in
the 1960s had NASA effectively made its case for large budget
growth--Webb even received praise from Congress for "his ability
to present a very complex budget every year with the enthusiasm
of a true believer"--but Webb had operated in a much different
budget environment which he understood from his time as Truman's
head of the BOB. 4°
Of the three NASA Administrators during the 1970s, Paine
behaved more arrogantly than the others, especially when it came
to conforming to budgetary process. He ignored BOB's requests
for PPBS budget analysis not once, but twice in the spring and
fall of 1969. Technically speaking, because sophisticated cost
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analysis and budget preparation required computers, NASA should
have been able to produce the best in the business. That it
could not was evident from the moment that Paine tried to comply
with the requests from the STG for its long range plans. Hard as
it is to believe now, Webb did not put any formal long range
planning structure in place until 1968 even though the House
Committee on Science and Technology had called for a report from
NASA by the end of 1966 on future national space objectives.
According to one authoritative government study, it is quite
possible that if Webb had taken this request from Congress
seriously, NASA might have fared better later on in the budget
making process. Instead, Webb dismissed this request, saying:
"Because of the difficult budgetary situation resulting from the
war in Vietnam and other factors .... we [are] precluded by the
regular budgetary procedures from presenting specific statements
on our future plans at this time." Thus, spending for Vietnam
and domestic social programs began to be used by NASA to
rationalize its own inability to present coherent plans or budget
for the future of space flight. As late as 1979, members of the
House Committee on Science were still complaining about "lack of
long-range planning and what seems to be a lack of more
specificity in what may be the plans [of NASA] for the future. ''41
Not until 1968 did Webb belatedly put Homer E. Newell, who
had run the NASA space science program, in charge of a formal
planning structure. Apparently he operated under the illusion
that post-Apollo policy would arise out of some kind o£ public
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debate and NASA would simply follow that lead. When this curious
way of approaching long-range planning did not materialize and
the BOB requested that NASA establish a PPBS system on which to
base future budgets, Newell proceeded to set up a cumbersome and
unworkable structure, consisting of a Planning Steering Group
(PSG) and 12 planning panels representing the complicated
competition among manned and unmanned subunits of NASA. 42
Not surprisingly, NASA's PSG produced mountains of data, but
no coherent plan emerged from the process that satisfied Paine in
1969 so that he could respond to the STG request. So Paine
turned to George E. Mueller, head of the Office of Manned Space
Flight, for help. Mueller produced what was called the
"integrated plan," calling for cost effectiveness through
developing a reusable spacecraft for operations between the Moon
and Earth, once again tieing NASA's future to a huge human space
flight project as had been the case during Apollo. Paine liked
Mueller's general idea but arbitrarily decided to throw out his
"cislunar" emphasis and replace it with human planetary
exploration, which would be more inclusive and therefore appeal
to more scientists through the pursuing of a larger goal of Solar
System exploration. To help focus this plan, Paine highlighted a
manned Mars expedition in the report that went to the STG a day
before the Apollo ii launch on July 16, 1969. In spite of the
hoopla surrounding the lunar landing, within days Congress and
the public were questioning the cost of placing an astronaut on
Mars as advocated by the STG. 43
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In the long run, Paine's arbitrary decision to stress a
mission to Mars was unsound, especially since Nixon had privately
and publicly been stressing international cooperation in space
based on a "partner instead of a patron" relationship. The
president's greatest worry was that opponents of the space
program in Congress would negatively compare "his positive
statements on space to problems in poverty and social programs
here on earth. ''_ While Paine sympathized with this view, he
hindered rather than helped the Nixon administration in 1969 and
1970 with his intemperate rhetoric and bullish attitude. 45
In the process of working on its report, the STG not only
contacted members of Congress, but also prominent individual
Americans called "invited Contributors. "_ Among them was
Shirley Temple Black who sent the vice president a thoughtful
nine-page report, stressing international cooperation as the
highest priority in space. The vast majority of the members of
the STG, the PSAC, and the outside contributors opposed Paine's
idea of a hastily organized Mars expedition based on current
technological capabilities. Most importantly, STG member Robert
C. Seamans, Secretary of the Air Force, joined by budget director
Mayo, strongly opposed a manned planetary mission. 47 By the end
of July both NASA and the PSAC presented reports to the STG.
Criticism in Congress and by the American public led the STG to
recommend the concurrent or sequential building of a space
station and shuttle and to speak only of an "eventual, potential
option of manned mission to Mars before the year 2000." In
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keeping with advice from White House advisers the report stressed
the low rather than high cost options that would not cause the
president political damage if he rejected any of them.
Therefore, the STG did not recommend any one of the three
specific program options to the president and there were no
figures in the report analyzing the various costs of the
alternatives. _ In essence, the STG report represented much ado
about nothing, except that Paine mistakingly chose to make it the
focus of his activities throughout much of 1969.
Because of the inefficient budget process and Paine's
obsession with satisfying requests from the Space Task Group
rather than those from BOB, he could not comply with two BOB
deadlines for NASA FY 1971 submissions in the spring and fall of
1969. It also did not help matters when Mayo criticized the
"shortcomings" of the STG report, since it did not recommend any
one program to the president. To most observers in the White
House and BOB the NASA budget process was in a state of
"disarray," not simply because of Paine's insisting on responding
to the STG rather than to the BOB, but also because of the
inability of NASA to put together the type of budget being
requested by the budget director and his staff. 49
After declaring that the inevitable BOB cuts were
"unacceptable," Paine appealed the decision and then presented a
budget in November 1969 of $4.25 billion (down from an earlier
$4.497 billion NASA request) that he said was the lowest the
space agency could tolerate with the response from the BOB that
192
\NASA's budget could be no more than $3.7 billion (up from an
original mark of $3.349 billion). Obviously an impasse had been
reached and at this point the White House staff intervened, but
not on the side of NASA because only Vice President Agnew, whose
advice was ignored, supported a higher budget. As a result, NASA
not only had to accept a cut in FY 1970 prepared by the Johnson
administration after the Nixon administration reviewed it, but
also in the BOB figure for FY 1971 after the White House staff,
consisting of Flanigan and Whitehead, had reviewed that one and
recommended $3.53 billion. Even as Paine was announcing this
figure to the press, the White House decided on another 2.5
percent across the board cut for all agencies in order to present
a balanced budget to Congress. So without consultation with
NASA, the agency's budget was reduced to $3.3 billion. 50
What these figures and subsequent ones throughout the Nixon
and Ford administrations meant was that there would be no
development of a space station or space shuttle during FY 1971, a
reduction of Apollo missions from three to one a year, the
termination of the Saturn V booster, and no new unmanned projects
because science and application programs would be held to
existing levels. 51 In this fashion the budget begat space policy
instead of space policy begatting budget as had been the case
during the heyday of Apollo in the Kennedy and Johnson
administrations.
Early in the 1976 presidential campaign Carter tried to
distance himself from Nixon's and Ford's "balanced" approach to
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manned and unmanned space projects, saying his administration
would reject "costly missions . . . in favor of unmanned
scientific exploration and practical applications of existing
technology. ''52 In particular, Carter thought that it was
"neither feasible nor necessary at this time to commit the U.S.
to a high-challenge space engineering initiative comparable to
Apollo." As president, Carter returned U.S. space policy closer
to what it had been under Eisenhower "which saw the development
of space technology only as a means, not as an end in itself."
Specifically Carter said (somewhat redundantly) that "activities
will be pursued in space when it appears that national objectives
can most efficiently be met through space activities." He also
decided to retain the same link between "military and space" that
Nixon brought to the office of the presidency. And, of course,
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so did Reagan with his "strategic defense initiative" program.
This acrimonious relationship between NASA, the White House,
and BOB preceded both Fletcher's becoming NASA administrator in
1971 and Nixon's decision to endorse the reusable Space Shuttle
program in 1972. By that time, however, Mayo and the BOB were no
longer around to plague NASA; instead there was the new Office of
Management and Budget under the direction of Roy L. Ash, whose
earlier reorganizational plansas head of PACEO had contained
implicit criticisms of NASA's management approach. Paine had
gone out of office after adopting the most excessive aspects of
vice President Agnew's argot by taking potshots at "Potland" (a
reference to those in the counterculture whom Paine insisted were
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enemies of technology). This did not endear him to Nixon
stalwarts. Neither did his antics in a 1970 commencement address
at Worcester Polytechnic Institute when Paine proposed a
hypothetical cabinet made of up of Timothy Leary as secretary of
agriculture; Jane Fonda as secretary of interior; Arlo Guthrie as
secretary of HEW; Ralph Nader as secretary of commerce; and Bobby
Seale as Attorney General. He also took shots at congressional
critics of the space program, such as Senator Edward M. Kennedy
(D-MA), accusing him of poor taste in cuisine because of the
quality of a lunch he had with him. Without question, Paine
bequeathed to Fletcher a bewildering public relations problem
with his trail of mixed and ill-considered messages, leading one
commentator to say that he "appear[ed] a little fey." Paine also
left office under the cloud of mishandling a $50 million contract
with GE-Hiller Fairchild. With all of these concerns, there was
little sentiment in the Nixon administration for Paine to stay at
NASA. 54
After all that had gone before James Fletcher was ridiculed
in 1971 when he took over NASA's reigns--one reporter even
describing him misleadingly as a "Mormon for the Moon"--and he
had to work hard to return to a more productive relationship with
the White House by adopting a mild-manner demeanor in dealings
with the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations. It was
inaccurately assumed by the press that Fletcher would not stay
long in the job because he only took two-year leave of absence as
president of the University of Utah. He stayed at NASA from 1971
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until 1977--almost as long as Webb--and he became quite
successful in working quietly to achieve the ends of the agency
as he interpreted them. At the same time, Fletcher exhibited
some of the same grudging attitude in dealing with OMB and
Congress that Paine had displayed in a more overt fashion. He
once said that the one thing he had learned as NASA administrator
was that a "deal from OMB is no deal at all," in reference to a
perception that NASA had suffered budget cuts below the level
agreed to by the agency and the White House. He also criticized
Congress for having too few "prospace" members on the
appropriations committee. 5s
Fletcher immediately had to deal with Nixon's March 7, 1970,
statement about space that specifically encouraged "greater
international cooperation" in keeping with his September 1969
address to the United Nations where Nixon called for the
"internationalization of man's epic venture into space. "_
Because this was such a vague mandate, Nixon's White House
advisers, OMB, and NASA all tried to convince the president that
their specific recommendations should be selected to fill in the
gaps. In this process two of Nixon's political broker insider
advisers at OMB--Casper W. Weinberger, OMB deputy director, and
Donald B. Rice, an OMB assistant in charge of NASA budget
initiatives--provided Nixon with most of his information before
his 1972 decision in favor of the reusable Space Shuttle. Within
the white House, Flanigan and Ehrlichman also occasionally
contributed to the discussion. 57
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Rice carried on Mayo's budget slashing ways under his new
boss, Roy Ash, at the newly created Office of Management and
Budget. In particular, Rice did not think that NASA was capable
of qualitatively evaluating its own programs and priorities. No
other federal agency on the domestic side of policy making except
the Atomic Energy Commission, according to Rice, was so
unreflective. NASA always appeared to be trying to place the
president in an either/or situation. As Rice put it, the
president "could either proceed with [NASA's] program . . . or he
could take the U.S. out of manned space." Rice kept pressing
NASA to produce the best shuttle for the least money. Fletcher
tried to convince him of NASA's ability to conduct a space
program that included a reusable Space Shuttle. He eventually
did so, compromising NASA's plans for full-reusability in the
process, but not before much before more ill-will had been
generated between NASA and OMB during 1970 and 1971. _
Had it not been Weinberger's presence, and to a lesser
degree that of Robert C. Seamans and David Packard at the
Department of Defense and a few individuals involved in foreign
policy issues such as Henry Kissinger--all of whom also supported
the reusable shuttle idea, but for quite different reasons--the
space shuttle decision might not have been reached in 1972. It
is to Fletcher's credit that he realized this and incorporated
and kept key leaders in the Nixon administration in his shuttle
coalition. Among other selling points he emphasized military
applications and the international cooperation inherent in the
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shuttle program, and several of these leaders--including Nixon--
were impressed by both arguments, s9
Weinberger opposed recommendations from the OMB staffers who
did not want to fund the shuttle program and in a crucial
memorandum to Nixon in August 1971, the OMB deputy director
argued that the administration should not give the impression to
the world that its best years in space were behind it and so he
recommended funding the last two Apollo flights, the Skylab
orbital workshop, and the space shuttle. Weinberger's access to
Nixon through his second boss at OMB, George Schultz, may have
"saved" NASA from declining even further as a budgetary priority
because Nixon replied in a handwritten comment: "I agree with
Cap. ''_ OMB staffers and NASA personnel were not immediately
informed of this exchange and they continued to haggle over
funding for space, including the Space Shuttle. At one point
White House Science Advisor Ed David informed Fletcher that there
were no staffers "in OMB who could be completely trusted--not
that they were dishonest, but that their sole function was to put
a ratchet on the budget and couldn't make a commitment to hold
the line on anything. "61
An important factor aiding NASA in gaining approval of the
Space Shuttle at this time was the fact that 1972 was, after all,
an election year. John Ehrlichman pointed out to Nixon that some
"close" states controlling large number of electoral votes were
also those with space industries which would benefit from a the
new shuttle program. Toward the end of the process in December
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1971, Fletcher and George Low, NASA deputy administrator, met
with Flanigan and science adviser David. At that time they were
told that the president had all but decided to go ahead with the
shuttle program. It was at that point that Fletcher and Low flew
to California to meet with Nixon when he announced his decision
on January 5, 1972. _ The decision-making process had clearly
been driven by advisers who knew Nixon best, not NASA personnel.
In retrospect it is clear that Nixon had no choice but to
opt for some kind of major human space flight project to succeed
Apollo; the astronauts provided the necessary human element of a
science that was largely unintelligible to the average person.
No president in the 1970s wanted to be responsible for "killing"
the only compassionate symbol of space exploration: the
astronaut in orbit. Nixon, Ford, and Carter proved no exceptions
to this rule, so the U.S. manned space program continued but at a
decelerated pace, except in the area of space diplomacy.
The Diplomacy of Space Under Nixonz Cooperation not Competition
During the summer of 1969 as U.S. foreign policy was being
formulated largely in secret (including the bombing of Cambodia),
congressional opposition loomed large in the president's mind.
The ways in which he and his aides tried to outmaneuver
diplomatic initiatives on the part of the U.S. Senate forced
Nixon into a delicate political balancing act that ultimately
shaped his and Henry Kissinger's "grand design" more than they
wanted at the time and more than they have admitted since. Their
"grand design" thus became more of a "balancing act" than a
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blueprint for U.S. diplomacy; and, much like the detente that
became its center piece, it remained a process rather than a
fixed policy. _
In reality, detente from a "Nixinger" perspective
represented nothing more or less than a political and economic
means or strategy or process (as opposed to an actual goal or
condition) for: I) avoiding nuclear war; 2) "building a network
of mutually advantageous relationships"; and 3) a way of
modifying Soviet behavior by gaining its_l___ acceptance of
international cooperation and competition (sometime referred to
as "competitive coexistence") in order to preserve international
stability by according the soviet Union a greater stake in the
status uuo. In other words, it was an attempt to coopt the USSR.
To a lesser degree than some have argued, detente also reflected
the domestic and international economic problems the United
States faced as a result of the impact of the Vietnamese war,
which meant among other things that it could not continue to fund
the race for space with the Soviets as it had previously. _ An
aspect of detente not explained to the American people was that
for Nixon space always meant defense first, and he associated it
with ICBMs, reconnaissance satellites, and especially an
important personal agenda item, the ABM program.
The U.S. space program entered this equation in a very
unusual way soon after Nixon entered the White House. He viewed
any opposition from Congress to the proposed ABM system as not
only a threat to the possibility of detente, but also to
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continued U.S. conventional arms support for the North Atlantic
Treaty nations because liberal, Democratic Senators who opposed
ABM tended to be the same Senators who wanted to reduce U.S.
troop strength for NATO. Nixon was forced to deal publicly with
ABM and NATO issues surrounding disarmament, even though arms
reduction had not orlginally been part of his "grand design. "65
Many of the same Senators also opposed any expansion of the space
program and this complicated Nixon's problem in dealing with them
because, like the president, they associated the ABM with the
space program, but unlike him, they did not want to fund either
an aggressive civilian or military program. Nixon's only public
concession on the issue was to downgrade the "extensive ABM
coverage" known as Sentinel under the Johnson administration to a
"reduced version" he called Safeguard--another major policy
decision about which NASA was not consulted. OST, PSAC, and NASA
were simply out of the loop when it came to major foreign policy
decisions that affected the space program.
During the spring and summer of 1969 Nixon dealt publicly
and privately with NATO nations and constructed his gradually
emerging detente policy--all the while battling U.S. Senators
over the ABM--but conceding to their frugal perspectives on the
space program. The president's handwritten comments and
memoranda testify to his personal involvement in the domestic
political fight over the ABM issue, but they do not indicate that
he became personally involved in the House and Senate battles
over the funding of other space efforts. The president persuaded
201
most of the American public to accept his ABM proposals, and at
the same time to question more spending for space. Nixon
privately called Senator Edmund Muskie's proposal to use the $6.6
billion proposed for the ABM on hunger and poverty at home and
abroad, "unbelievable nonsense from a national leaderl" When he
read that former astronaut and then Ohio Senator John Glenn had
called the ABM a "false hope" because "no one knows if its
works," the president sarcastically asked: "did he know the
first space shot would absolutely work?" Obviously Glenn's
criticisms did not encourage the president to accept NASA's
requests for increased funding while the ABM debate raged during
the spring and summer of 1969. _
In this political battle over the ABM system, Nixon and his
staff never reconciled the potential contradictions inherent in
it; namely, competition with the Soviet Union over the two
countries' respective ABM systems and international cooperation
with the Soviets in space. Their views and actions clearly
convey that the space program was but one of many complicated
issues the new administration dealt with in its first months in
office and that it took a back seat to most of them. Fletcher's
memoranda indicated that despite the fact that Kissinger, along
with his aides A1 Haig and Jack Walsh, supported the continuation
of some kind of human space flight, there was a "lack of advocacy
in the Executive office," except in the general area of
international cooperation, because "they have been so busy" with
other policy areas. 67 Fletcher and Low, like Paine and Low
202
I_! El
previously, placed too much confidence in presidential advisors
who did not deliver under either Nixon or Ford.
Given these basic principles of Nixon's foreign policy, it
should come as no surprise that from the moment he became
president he and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger urged
NASA to pursue international cooperative opportunities, which
both the agency, and some of its corporate clients, and some
Congressmen often found difficult to accept for ideological and
commercial reasons. _ Nonetheless, internal White House
memoranda in the early 1970s made it clear that NASA was
following rather than leading the way toward international space
cooperation. A segment of one such memorandum read: "NASA has
been proceeding in this area with the understanding that it is
responding to the President's policy," while another described
Paine as "alluding repeatedly to what he described as [the
president's] views" when encouraging "international cooperation
in space..69
Less than two weeks after he was inaugurated, Nixon
requested a "summary of European space activities . • •
appropriate . . . to discuss with the Europeans." Paine sent him
a six-page confidential response, emphasizing "additional ways in
which you might express your personal interest in space
cooperation." Paine indicated to the president that the
half-dozen European nations developing their own space programs
all feared that the United States would "impose its will on the
direction of future West European space activities." Paine also
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kept Nixon informed about the results of his trips abroad on
behalf of space cooperation. The administration considered the
issue of cooperation on space by western nations in the post
Apollo era so important that the Natlonal Security Council
produced a National Security Decision Memorandum No. 72 creating
an Ad Hoc Interagency Group headed by Arnold W. Frutkin to
coordinate space cooperation. _ In retrospect, the most
important cooperative action in space completed during Nixon's
administration was the International Telecommunications Satellite
Organization (INTELSAT), which went into operation in December
1972. Although a global communications consortium had been
formed in 1964 after the launching of the first Telestar
satellites, ratification by 54 of the 83 Intelsat nation members
took eight years of complicated negotiations, the most energetic
of which came during the first term Nixon occupied the White
House. 71 However, the center piece of Nixon's space diplomacy,
which emphasized international cooperation, became the much
publicized Apollo-Soyuz mission which both Paine and Fletcher
pursued at the insistence of the president.
There was no substantive response from the Soviets about
cooperating with the United States on space until the end of the
1969 and even then it was clear that the USSR was at only
interested in coordinating planetary "goals" and in exchanging
"results of unmanned planetary investigations." An interim step
in this process resulted in the January 1971 NASA/Soviet Academy
of Sciences agreement on space science and applications, but at
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that the time Soviet policy still prevented "discussing future
mission plans and experiments in advance." Finally, the
Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (ASTP) became a reality in the summer
of 1972 following Nixon's successful May summit meeting in
Moscow, which included four cooperative agreements with Moscow on
space, medicine, science, and technology. Although some
secondary sources attribute this achievement to the efforts of
either George M. Low, acting NASA administrator following Paine's
resignation, or to his successor, James Fletcher, it is unlikely
that the necessary equipment for international rescue and the
crew exchanges could have successfully taken place in 1975 if it
had not been an important ingredient in Nixon's policy of detente
with the Soviet Union. _
The Politi_s of Spaoe in Congzess: Disagreements and
Investigations
Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter generally did not have to
fight Congress over the space program because members of both
houses fought each other over it at two levels. Sometimes, when
they were not disagreeing over the merits of manned versus
unmanned space projects and competing their costs with domestic
social programs, they were competing with one another to obtain
space contracts for their respective states. The only notable
bipartisan consensus that emerged in the 1970s occurred in
opposition to Nixon's decision to abolish the Office of Science
and Technology in 1973. This consensus was strengthened as
Watergate related events began to overtake the Nixon
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administration and when Vice President Ford implied he would
support legislation to reinstate a science adviser in the White
House. As president, Ford signed the 1976 legislation
establishing the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP),
but then angered some senators by appointing H. Guyford Stever,
former head of the National Science Foundation, who had been
accused in 1975 of mismanaging public funds in a NSF-funded
project called "Man: A Course of Study" or MACOS. While
President Carter appointed Frank Press as his OSTP director in
1977, the new president did not agree with the congressional
interpretation of the 1976 act and finally overrode a portion of
it in 1978 by issuing an executive order that transferred
responsibility for preparing science policy reports back the
National Science Foundation. By 1979 most of these differences
over procedure between Carter and Congress had been ironed out
and the administration gave strong support to completing shuttle
development. Thus, the decade ended on a note of cooperation
between Congress and the White House. _
Of the three men who served as NASA administrators in the
1970s, Fletcher was more careful than either Webb or Paine in
handling NASA contracts with the space industry because these had
been the source of bitter political controversy in Congress since
the 1960s as individual congressmen fought each other over the
awarding of lucrative space contracts through the promotion of
certain sections of the country over others. Such charges first
became public in 1964 when it was discovered that NASA personnel
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at certain facilities were assisting contractors and universities
in their regions to obtain procurement contracts. The most
publicized investigation took place after the tragic fire in
January 1967 which killed three Apollo astronauts. At one point
during the investigation Representative Olin E. ["Tiger"] Teague
(D-TX), normally one of the strongest congressional supporters of
the space program, issued a broad indictment of NASA's exercise
of quality control over North American Aviation, the Apollo
capsule contractor. Although Webb left office highly praised by
individual members of Congress, he left behind a history of
contract problems that his successors could only ignore at their
peril. As noted above, Paine resigned with similar charges of
favoritism hanging over his head. _
Fletcher found, however, that he had a unique problem with
regard to awarding procurement contracts. From his earliest days
as administrator, Fletcher was under pressure to put space money
in Utah, his home state. When faced with unusually strong
pressure he finally had to write to Senator Frank E. Moss (D-
UT), chair of the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space
Sciences, the following letter in February 1973:
I feel an obligation to respond to the numerous efforts
made by your office of late to have this Agency, and, in
particular myself, look with considerable favor at the
placing of some of our business in your State. Not only
would it be highly irregular to say the least, but might
provoke the kinds of inquiries we are not prepared at this
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time to handle ....
Bear in mind that I also have roots there too . . . and
while I may not have a particular constituency to serve as
you might, yet there are particular individuals whom I hold
in high regard and have tried to help from time to time when
it was within my power to do so.
One of these, as you may well know, is President
Tanner. He has exhibited considerable energy and
determination in revitalizing some of your downtown area in
Salt Lake City .... We've explored together various
options at great length as to how this might best be
achieved with a minimal amount of attention being drawn to
either of us.
But the fact remains, Mr. Chairman, that my hands are
tied for the time being. In my present position here at
this particular Agency, it would be extremely difficult if
not somewhat unethical for me to channel any more of our
contracts towards your State without arousing further
suspicion. . . .
I should also like to call your attention to another matter
along these same lines. One of your staff -- I think you
probably know who I am referring to -- went so far as to
insinuate sometime ago that I had a moral, if not a
spiritual obligation to acquiesce on some of [sic] business
issues previously raised by President Tanner. This person
voiced an unthinkable opinion to the effect that my Church
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membership took precedent over my Government
responsibilities. Knowing that you share similar sentiments
with me in the clear separation of Church and State, I would
like to request that you take this unpleasant matter under
advisement with the individual in question and explain just
how serious and unconscionable those inferences were. In
the meantime, I will see what else can be done for you.
But right now I must pursue a course that, at least,
seems to be equitable to all parties concerned. Sometimes
substantive actions don't count as much as how other
perceive them to be. Who would know better about this, Mr.
Chairman, than someone in your position. I'll be in
touch. _
Clearly the life of any NASA administrator was not an easy
one when it came to avoiding favoritism or conflict of interest
in approving NASA contracts. After a long drawn out process, in
1975 the Utah-based Thiokol Chemical Company did obtain a $1.59
billion Space Shuttle solid rocket motor contract, but only after
such competing companies as Lockheed, United Technology Center,
and Aerojet, members of the House and Senate, and governors
representing them to NASA unsuccessfully appealed the decision to
the General Accounting Office (GAO). 76 The fact that NASA's
procurement decisions were upheld in the face of contractor
appeals did not alleviate the political controversy they caused
in Congress at the time.
Aside from geographical and partisan disagreements over the
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awarding of NASA procurement contracts, Congress disagreed most
during the Nixon administration over his decision to fund the
Space Shuttle program and the president's insistence on the
Apollo-Soyuz mission as part of detente with the Soviet Union, in
spite of the fact that Nixon held both up as cooperative projects
that could save NASA money. The debates in 1972 over the shuttle
probably represent the most partisan ones of the decade because
of the pending presidential election. On the other hand, the
Apollo-Soyuz produced in the early 1970s another kind of partisan
debate because some of the strongest congressional defenders of
the space program, such as Teague, were also adamant cold
warriors who did not want to cooperate on anything with the
Soviet Union. _ That these two sets of congressional debates An
the 1970s took place under the Republican administration of
Richard Nixon should not come as a surprise because both houses
of the congress were controlled by Democrats.
The shuttle had to compete with Democrats (some of them
potential presidential candidates) who wanted to fund domestic
spending programs rather than any of Nixon's foreign policy
endeavors and they perceived space almost entirely as part of his
geopolitical designs (even though the administration considered
space a domestic budgetary issue). Consequently, Senators
William Fulbright (D-AR), Edmund S. Muskie (D-ME), George S.
McGovern (D-SD), Thomas F. Eagleton (D-MO), William Proxmire (D-
WI), Jacob K. Javits (R-NY), and Walter F. Mondale (D-MN) all
came out against funding for the shuttle program as did such
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members of the House as Bella Abzug (D-NY) and Les Aspin (D-WI).
It should be noted, however, that Senators Hubert Humphrey (D-
MN) and Henry M. Jackson (D-WA) supported the Space Shuttle
program. While congressional opponents of the Apollo-Soyuz
mission were not quite as prominent, with the possible exception
of Teague, they were no less formidable.
Of all the partisan opponents of the shuttle program,
Mondale pursued the issue with the most slngle-minded vigor.
"virtually all of the useful things we have gotten out of space;
communications, earth surveillance, weather stations, navigation,
the technology of instrumentation and miniaturization," he said
on the television program, "Issues and Answers," in January 1972
"most of this has come about through unmanned instrumented [sic]
flight." Mondale also introduced on the floor of the Senate a
bill that would have killed funding for the shuttle program in FY
1973, but it was defeated on the floor by 21 to 61 on May ii,
1972. As the Democratic presidential candidate McGovern went so
far as to say that the shuttle was "Nixon's boondoggle," and an
"enormous waste of money," while his first running mate, Thomas
Eagleton, said that it would "deprive important social programs
of much-needed revenue." Eagleton's argument was echoed by
almost all the Democratic (and some Republican) opponents of
funding for the shuttle, m
In addition to the two major partisan debates that took
place in the first half of the 1970s noted above, there were
three other important attacks on space funding in 1974, 1975, and
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1977, led by Representative Edward P. Boland (D-MA), chair of the
House appropriations subcommittee in charge of NASA and NSF
programs. In the first instance, Boland successfully opposed the
"development of a large space telescope and deferred development
of an experimental satellite to observe ocean characteristics
(SEASAT)." Some funding for the later was restored by the
Senate. Then in 1975, Boland successfully delayed for one year
the "active development" of the Pioneer satellite to explore the
planet Venus, but again the Senate restored the funding for this
mission. Finally, in 1977 Boland succeeded in getting the House
to vote against funding the develop the Galileo probe to
Jupiter. _ All in all, however, Boland's efforts proved delaying
tactics rather than permanent cancellations in the 1970s. By the
end of the decade, he was still holding the llne on NASA
appropriations. However, he began working more cooperatively
with Representative Don Fuqua (D-FL) when he succeeded Teague as
head of the House Committee on Science and Technology. _
In summary, neither the three NASA administrators nor the
three men occupying the White House in the 1970s experienced
total defeat in Congress on any given space idea (with the
exception of Paine's efforts to gain approval for a manned
mission to Mars, although that never came to a vote in either
house). Nonetheless, even Carter, the one Democrat of the
presidential trio, and his NASA administrator, Robert A. Frosch,
the second Democrat to serve at the space agency in the 1970s,
faced problems on the Hill with their space projects from time to_
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time. Congress played a prominent role in the deceleration of
the space program despite the entrenched power of several
committees in both houses which traditionally favored strong
funding for NASA. In retrospect, the most drastic decreases in
NASA budgets, between what various administrations requested for
NASA and what Congress appropriated, occurred in FY 1959 (-20.6
percent), FY 1964 (-10.7 percent), and FY 1968 (-i0 percent).
These cuts before 1970 were proportionately much larger than any
that occurred in the following decade when the discrepancies
between White House requests and congressional appropriations
showed a positive rather than negative relationship, meaning that
Congress usually appropriated more than the administration
requested. Nonetheless, NASA's budget continued to decline from
FY 1967 through FY 1974 with the most precipitous declines taking
place under Johnson, leveling off under Nixon, and beginning to
rise slightly under Ford and much more steeply under Carter until
in FY 1980 it reached $5.24 billion, almost equal to the previous
peek appropriation in FY 1965 of $5.25 billion. During the same
period NASA staffing fell from a high of 34,000 in 1965 to 23,000
in 1980. 81
Conclusion
A combination of political disputes in Congress, sometimes
stimulated by White House policies and sometime not, along with
new and more demanding budgeting procedures, and the increased
importance of White House personnel at the expense of science
advisers or NASA administrators, combined to reduce funding for
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space in the decade of the 1970s. Without either a strong
popular constituency to overcome these factors or effective
leadership on the part of NASA to mobilize popular or
congressional support as a counterbalance to the agency's
decreasing importance inside the White House, or both,
deceleration was inevitable. It did not, however, take place
exclusively in the 1970s, nor did Nixon initiate it, as is
usually assumed.
Curiously, in 1975 Art Buchwald, a cartoonist not known for
his knowledge of space, touched on an important part of the
problem in a conversation with James Fletcher. In discussing why
NASA manned flights and non-space program applications had not
been given more attention in the press since 1969, Buchwald
unhesitatingly said it was because they were not controversial
enough. "Webb was a very 'abrasive' guy [who] was always
stirring up controversy," Buchwald told Fletcher. He recommended
that the administrator "stir things up a bi_." Fletcher, who was
to head NASA for most of the decade sadly agreed, but said that
he could not follow such advice: "I believe I understand . . .
[what is meant] by gray leadership at the top. [But] I am not
about to change--I think a degree of professionalism is called
for right now, not controversy. Unfortunately however, it
probably is true, that as a result we're going to have some
difficulty attracting public attention." In 1977 when the Wall
Street Journal declared thatFletcher "had no flair for politics
or publicity," Barry Goldwater (R-AZ) defended him by saying that
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"we have enough people heading agencies in this town with a
flair for circus-style showmanship. It is a pleasure to have a
man like Jim Fletcher who knows where he is going and what he is
supposed to do and does it. "_
Indeed, in the decade following the moon landings, NASA
seemed to have greater talent for attracting either the wrong
kind of attention, especially early on, or no attention at all,
especially later in the 1970s. As a result, its budget,
programs, and prestige suffered and space policy took a back seat
to a myriad of other concerns by those sitting in the White
House. NASA's programs were not simply the failure of
presidential leadership--the so-called myth of the imperial
presidency--or of NASA and congressional leadership, but were
related to larger questions facing the American nation in the
1970s. To a very real extent the space agency was throughout the
decade of the 1970s out of sync with political, cultural, and
socioeconomic trends in the United States, and it is unlikely
that affirmative leadership at any level could have overcome all
of those. Rather the broad themes of personnel, budgeting
processes, foreign policy, and political factors all combined
with the leadership issue to bring about the deceleration of NASA
in the period.
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\Chapter 5
Politics not Sciencez The U.8. Bpaoe Program
in the Reagan and Bush Years
by
LynRagsdale
With American flags flying seemingly everywhere, Ronald
Reagan stood before an audience of fifty-thousand people at
Edwards Air Force Base, California, on the Fourth of July 1982 to
welcome the return of the Space Shuttle _ and its crew.
This marked the last test flight for the shuttle program which
would begin a regular schedule of commercial and government
flights. Likening the Space Shuttle to the Yankee Clipper of the
early Republic, Reagan spoke of a "national space policy" that
would "look aggressively to the future by demonstrating the
potential of the shuttle and establishing a more permanent
presence in space." The crowd cheered as Reagan suggested that
"our freedom, independence, and national well-being will be tied
to new achievements, new discoveries, and pushing back new
frontiers" in space exploration. I
Reagan's remarks, certainly apropos to the symbolism and
ceremony of the day, were nonetheless misleading. During the
twelve years that the U.S. Congress and the Reagan and Bush
administrations made decisions about space, there was no national
space policy. What might generally be considered a national
space policy was not policy, it was not about space, and it was
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not national.
Decisions about the space program did not constitute policy,
if policy is defined by a reasonably well-thought out plan of
action to achieve a relatively well-defined goal. Instead during
the 1980s, decisions were made to pursue projects "by the yard"
rather than comprehensively so they could be sold to a
cost-conscious White House and Capitol Hill. 2 In addition,
decisions were made about matters unrelated to the space
program--budget deficits, massive military spending, and the size
of the federal pork barrel--that nonetheless shaped the space
program.
During the Reagan and Bush administrations, the two
presidents and Congress did not have space policies; they had
only political ones. At the root of public officials' choices
about the space program were political ca!culations about what
they could support on behalf of American taxpayers. Similarly,
at the root of officials' choices at the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) were political calculations about how
best to sell technologically complex projects, the immediate
benefits of which were not always obvious. Politics created a
set of expectations about what NASA should be able to accomplish
based on commitments the agency itself made and budgets the
president and Congress offered. Politics posed an especially
keen irony for the space program during Reagan's second term. A
president who normally touted large budget cuts, supported
relative increases for NASA--especially for its key programs--
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because this continued to send a message to the Soviets about
American superiority in space. A Congress, which resisted large
budget cuts overall, supported cuts for NASA in favor of funding
domestic programs.
As a result, no one national direction for U.S. space
programs characterized the Reagan and Bush years. The two
presidents and Congress moved in independent directions regarding
matters of space. Indeed, the term "the Reagan and Bush years"
is only a descriptive convenience. Reagan was not Bush and Bush
was not Reagan on space programs. In addition, the phrase
obscures that Congress was an equal player with the presidency on
space issues during this period. Decisions that emerged were
typically the result of compromises that left many matters
unresolved. What may be labeled a "national" policy was more a
diverse product of competing fiefdoms among NASA, the president,
the White House staff, congressional committees, subcommittees,
and individual members of Congress.
This chapter considers the tangle of decisions regarding the
U.S. space program during the Reagan and Bush administrations and
the corresponding 97th-102d Congresses. It analyzes in detail
three key events of the space program during the period:
(1) the launching of the Space Shuttle in 1981,
(2) the explosion of the shuttle _ in 1986, and
(3) the development of the space station beginning in 1984.
In so doing it examines why these three milestones contributed to
a space program that was not policy, was not about space, and was
not national. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion
about the Bush administration's plan to return to the Moon and
begin exploration of Mars scuttled by Congress and the Clinton
administration's and the 103d Congress' approach to space
initiatives.
Billions to spare: The Space ShuttlQ, 1981-1985
The 1980s began with NASA, a beleaguered agency, facing
tough questions: What kind of space program did the United
States need? Or did it need one at all? The triumph of the
Apollo Moon missions seemed a dim memory. Indeed NASA officials
worried that in Apollo's success were the seeds of the
organization's self-destruction. The public's interest in
astronauts had waned as its interest in fiscal restraint had
peaked. Thomas O. Paine, NASA administrator in the late 1960s,
reflected that "the American people . . . didn't give a damn. By
then, hell, we had been to the Moon. What do you care if we fly
another orbital flight or not. We know we can do it. "3 Instead
the watchwords of the Reagan administration were smaller
government and budget cuts. President Reagan accused government
of "not solving the nation's problems, but being the nation's
problem. ,,4
NASA had spent the 1970s building the Space Shuttle, a
partially-reusable two-stage spacecraft consisting of a booster
and an orbiter. After the success of the Moon landing in 1969,
NASA officials had urged that "the next logical step" in the
space program was to develop a space station and explore Mars. 5
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When the Nixon administration rejected these grand policy
innovations, NASA administrator James Fletcher pushed for the
shuttle as a more politically feasible alternative. "The only
way to go," he decided, "was some sort of shuttle. "6
The shuttle held several advantages for NASA. First, it
continued NASA's emphasis on manned space flight, which many in
the agency felt was at the heart of its past glory and,
therefore, its future survival. Fletcher argued in a letter to
Caspar Weinberger, then Nixon's deputy director of the Office of
Management and Budget, that "The shuttle provides the capability
for a continuing U.S. manned space flight program, a capability
we believe to be essential--without flying men just for their own
sake. "7 Walter Mondale, a vocal shuttle critic of the shuttle as
senator from Minnesota, spoke more harshly: "There was this
whole empire of people left over from the Apollo program with
nothing to do. And to sustain their efforts, they needed show
business. And manned flight was the drama. "8 The shuttle
offered NASA an optimal program: it preserved human space
missions without the immense cost of space stations and flights
to Mars.
Second, the shuttle protected the future of the space
station. NASA officials viewed the shuttle and the space station
as inseparable. Although the station might not be the very next
step, it could be an eventual step when the shuttle was in
operation. How, so the logic went, could the Space Shuttle be
developed without it some day serving as transportation for the
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space station.
Third, according to Fletcher, "The United States urgently
needs the space shuttle to provide 'routine' access to near-earth
space. "9 Ironically, the novelty was the routine aspect of the
shuttle's flights. Shuttle flights to launch military and
commercial satellites and to perform hundreds of scientific
experiments would be frequent, like regularly scheduled air
travel. This argument helped promote the shuttle to the
Department of Defense (DOD) which NASA succeeded in courting as
one of its prime customers.
Fourth, the shuttle would help shore up the aerospace
industry after the halcyon days of Apollo. Fletcher told the
Nixon White House that "an accelerated start on the shuttle would
lead to a direct employment of 8,800 by the end of 1972 and
24,000 by the end of 1973." Moreover, as Nixon aides calculated,
this job growth would occur in several states crucial to Nixon's
1972 reelection bid. I°
Finally, NASA made cost effectiveness the chief selling
point for the shuttle program with a wary White House and Capitol
Hill. An independent report had concluded that cost should not
be the chief criteria "to justify [the shuttle's]
desirability. "11 But NASA contended that not only would the
shuttle offer routine trips to space, it would also be reusable
with the cost of its development and operation paid for by its
customers "with billions to spare. "12 According to NASA, the
shuttle would be cheaper in the long run than expendable launch
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vehicles (ELY). Thus, NASA touted the shuttle as a good
investment. Fletcher presented a fact sheet to a Congressional
committee: "If, as is likely, new useful and economically
beneficial mission possibilities open up during the 1980s because
of the routine and quick access to space the shuttle provides,
the investment will be returned many times over. "13 Nixon
ultimately agreed, saying "it will take the astronomical costs
out of astronautics," and formally approved a total budget of
$5.15 billion in 1972 to develop the manned space vehicle. 14
The justifications NASA offered for the shuttle program in
the early 1970s became the criteria upon which its success and
that of the entire space program were judged in the 1980s. With
the first test flight of the shuttle Columbia on April 12, 1981,
NASA embarked on a new era of manned space effort that was not
guided by any fully-developed, consensus national space policy.
What was fundamentally missing in the activity was any emphasis
on the scientific advances it offered. Beyond providing routine
flights to space, the scientific payoff of the shuttle was not
fully outlined. The space science board of the National Academy
of Science concluded that "It is clear that space science and
applications by themselves are insufficient to Justify the cost
of developing the shuttle. "15 In the ensuing decade the
president did not develop a coherent, long-term strategy for
scientific and technological achievements using the shuttle.
Ancillary policy and Primary Policy
In place of a national space policy was what might be called
_-J 249
an "ancillary policy" based on compromises between political
realities and technological abilities and on conflicts among
government institutions more interested in political rewards than
technological advances. Ancillary policy involves three
dimensions. First, it is marked by an ongoing but secondary
governmental commitment to an initiative that is not a top
national priority. Second, ancillary policy is driven by a
universal, but usually erroneous, political expectation that
great things can be accomplished for very little. Third, the
policy is shaped by institutional conflicts which arise from
jurisdictional disputes, clashes of personality, and ambiguous
decision making and foreclose a national, comprehensive profile.
Ancillary policy can only loosely be termed "policy."
Policy is typically viewed as a plan of action to solve an
identified problem. Instead ancillary policy is more aptly a
continuing government commitment, which exists for its own sake,
not necessarily to solve a problem. Moreover, the commitment is
of secondary importance to the public and public officials.
Ancillary policy stands in contrast to "primary policy" that
breaks with past decisions and perspectives to meet the nation's
top priorities. These high priority issues dominate public
attention, public funds, and the deliberations of public
officials. Primary policy is a policy of innovation, while
ancillary policy is one of continuation.
In the 1960s space policy was primary policy. President
Kennedy announced in 1961 that America's goal in space was to
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land men on the Moon by the end of the decade. That mission,
framed as part of a race between the United States and the Soviet
Union, gave the nascent space program a clear direction and
purpose. It was a policy of innovation, existing where nothing
of a similar magnitude had existed before. There was general
agreement on Capitol Hill, at the White House, and in the country
on the singular goal. 16 Although the goal held clear political
implications, it was also a matter of scientific exploration as
the nation worked to land on the Moon. In short, there was a
national space policy.
Yet a great deal changed in the next two decades as
President Reagan stood on the tarmac at Edwards Air Force Base.
After 1969, ancillary policy replaced primary policy in the space
program. With old ground already broken, new ground was
developed with fewer grand strokes. Three characteristics of
ancillary policy more precisely distinguished the space program
generally and the shuttle program specifically in the 1980s: (i)
low agenda status, (2) budgetary incrementalism, and (3) modest
political support.
Low Auenda Stat_@
Ancillary policy always has a low agenda status. 17 It is a
matter of modest continuing importance, which generates little
concern among policy makers about long-term goals or directions.
Instead, policy makers discuss immediate costs and benefits.
There is an imbalance in these discussions between those policy
makers with vested interests in the policy and other policy
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makers who have little interest in the policy. The former group,
of course, has much greater sway over the policy than the latter.
As a result, it is difficult to organize opposition to ancillary
policy.
At the outset of the Reagan administration, the shuttle
program was in midstep. It had been an ongoing part of the
governmental agenda for nine years. The program was not highly
visible, but it never disappeared. Public officials gave little
attention to the shuttle's long run launch capability or the
future of space transportation. In its report released in 1990
the Advisory Committee on the Future of U.S. Space Programs found
that "the most significant deficiency in the nation's future
civil space program is an insufficiency of reliable, flexible,
and efficient space launch capability. "18 Yet little notice was
given this issue because correcting it would require a consensus
about long-term plans and priorities, a consensus that ancillary
policy avoids. Instead, the focus was on the near term. Members
of Congress from states with NASA and aerospace facilities were
not surprisingly the shuttle's chief sponsors, many of whom had
considerable influence over the course of shuttle policy.
Opposition arose about cost overruns, but was not especlally
organized or successful.
Budqe_rv Incrementalism
Ancillary policy also entails incremental funding. Although _j
shifts occur at the margins, the ongoing governmental commitment,
at the heart of such policy, mandates continued albeit stable
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\resources. Incremental funding for NASA, as shown in Table i,
demonstrates that the budgets for the Space Shuttle and other
"big-ticket" projects such as Space Station Free_gm were
relatively steady throughout Reagan's first term during which the
greatest pressure for budget cuts was felt. After the_l_Dgg_
explosion, shuttle funds increased and continued to do so during
the Bush years. Space station funding also increased
incrementally, on average 57 percent annually from flscal year
(FY) 1985 to fiscal year 1991.
Table 1
Space Shuttle and Space Station Funding,
(FY 1982-FY 1991, in billions)
Fiscal Year Space Shuttle* Space Station
1982 3.105 --
1983 3.567 --
1984 3.494 --
1985 3.493 .146
1986 3.304 .185
1987 3.779 .309
1988 4.251 .490
1989 4.791 .877
1990 5.160 1.715
1991 4.991 1.931
*Figures total funds for shuttle production, capability
development, and operations.
SOURCE: Successive volumes of Budaet of the U_ted Sta_es.
One may well argue that although these showcase items were
spared, NASA's overall budget was not. Yet several aspects of an
incremental budget picture for the entire space program suggest
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that this notion does not bear scrutiny. As one feature, NASA's
portion of the federal budget did not slgniflcantly erode during
the Reagan and Bush years. Indeed, there has been little change
in the funding of the space program relative to other portions of
the federal budget since the 1970s. NASA commanded 4.4 percent
of the federal budget in FY 1966, its largest percentage; this
dropped to 1.3 percent by FY 1973 and 1.0 percent in FY 1976.
NASA's federal budget share was eight-tenths of one percent in
fiscal 1982 when Ronald Reagan took office and was estimated to
be i.i percent for fiscal 1993 when George Bush left office. 19
As a second feature, data in Table 2 reveals that NASA's
space funding (in current dollars) increased gradually during the
Reagan and Bush years. Many portrayed David Stockman, Reagan's
first director of the Office of Management and Budget, as out to
get the space program when he announced a $600 million cut from
Carter's proposed FY 1982 budget. Yet, as Stockman himself
observed: "NASA was hardly suffering. Even with the cut, its
1982 budget would be ii percent higher than 1981. "_ Indeed,
NASA's budget more than doubled from FY 1982 to FY 1991 even
after the imposition of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Balanced Budget
and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985. The increases were
especially true in the aftermath of the _ explosion.
There was a 51 percent increase in total NASA funding from FY
1987 (the year in which funds were allocated to rebuild the
shuttle) to FY 1993. Incrementalism is also discernible across
the entire history of the agency. As Table 2 shows, NASA's space
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Lbudget nearly doubled each year for five years from FY 1959 to FY
1964 and peaked in 1965 in the heyday of the Apollo program
(column 2). But it dropped slowly, not precipitously,
thereafter. There was a decade of modestly declining resources
from FY 1965 to FY 1974 with the largest percentage loss of 13.7
percent from FY 1968 to F¥ 1969. Thereafter, funds increased as
steadily as they had decreased during the decade before.
Fiscal
Year 7
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
TQ
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992(est.)
1993 (est.)
Table 2
U.S. Space Budget in Current Dollars
1959-1993
(Budget Authority in Billions of Dollars)
NASA Total
Total Sp_ce Defense Other sp_ce
3
4
4
5
5
6
6
7
7
7
I0
9
I0
13
14
15
15
0.331 0.261 0.490 0.034 0.785
0.524 0.462 0.561 ' 0.043 1.066
0.964 0.926 0.814 0.068 1.808
1.825 1.797 1.298 0.200 3.295
3.673 3.626 1.550 0.259 5.435
5.100 5.016 1.599 0.216 6.831
5.250 5.138 1.574 0.244 6.956
5.175 5.065 1.689 0.217 6.971
4.966 4.830 1.664 0.216 6.710
4.587 4.430 1.922 0.177 6.539
3.991 3.822 2.013 0.141 5.976
3.746 3.547 1.678 0.115 5.340
3.311 3.101 1.512 0.127 4.740
3.307 3.071 1.407 0.097 4.575
3.406 3.093 1.623 0.109 4.825
3.037 2.759 1.766 0.116 4.641
3.229 2.915 1.892 0.107 4.914
3.550 3.225 1.983 0.iii 5.319
0.932 0.846 0.460 0.310 1.340
.818 3.440 2.412 0.131 5.983
.060 3.623 2.738 0.157 6.518
.596 4.030 3.036 0.178 7.244
.240 4.680 3.848 0.160 8.688
.518 4.992 4.828 0.158 9.978
.044 5.528 6.679 0.234 12.441
.875 6.328 9.019 0.242 15.589
.248 6.648 10.195 0.293 17.136
.573 6.925 12.768 0.474 20.167
.766 7.165 14.126 0.368 21.659
.507 9.809 16.287 0.352 26.448
.026 8.302 17.679 0.626 26.607
.969 10.098 17.906 0.440 28.444
.073 12.142 19.382 0.330 31.854
.647 13.603 20.443 0.373 34.419
.088 NA NA NA NA
.858 NA NA NA NA
Aeronautics and Space Report of the President.
Fiscal Year 1991 Activities (Washington, DC: NASA,
1991), p. 180.
As a third feature, data in Table 3 shows the steady
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increases in NASA's budget during the Reagan and Bush years, even
with the effects of inflation controlled. Although NASA's
constant dollar budget dropped sharply after FY 1965, it
stabilized by FY 1974 and remained relatively constant until FY
1982--the first Reagan budget year--when it actually began to
increase. The increases grew even more in the Bush years. As
the figure makes plain in its comparison of NASA's budget in
current dollars and in constant 1982 dollars, the increases in
funding were real and not eaten away by inflation.
As a final feature, employment remained steady during the
Reagan and Bush years. As shown in Table 4, the number of
employees at the start of Reagan's first term was nearly equal to
the number of personnel at the end of Reagan's second term
(23,039 in 1981 and 23,130 in 1988). The payroll actually
increased slightly during Bush's term.
Fiscal
Year
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
Table
U.S. Space Budget in Constant Dollars 1959-1993
(Budget Authority in Billions of 1982 Dollars)
NAsA
Total Space Defense Other
Total
Space
1.134 0.894 1.678 0.118 2.689
1.766 1.557 1.892 0.146 3.595
3.220 3.093 2.718 0.228 6.039
6.029 5.937 4.289 0.660 10.886
11.992 11.839 5.060 0.844 17.744
16.421 16.152 5.150 0.695 21.997
16.621 16.266 4.983 0.773 22.021
15.939 15.599 5.202 0.667 21.467
14.862 14.457 4.979 0.646 20.082
13.179 12.727 5.521 0.509 18.758
10.879 10.419 5.487 0.384 16.290
9.642 9.130 4.320 0.296 13.746
8.165 7.648 3.729 0.314 11.691
7.906 7.343 3.364 0.231 10.938
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1973 7.667 6.963 3.653 0.245
1974 6.162 5.597 3.583 0.235
1975 6.003 5.420 3.518 0.198
1976 6.238 5.667 3.485 0.195
TQ 1.637 1.492 0.809 0.054
1977 6.296 5.673 3.977 0.216
1978 6.220 5.550 4.195 0.241
1979 6.342 5.562 4.189 0.245
1980 6.367 5.687 4.676 0.195
1981 6.059 5.482 5.301 0.173
1982 6.255 5.721 6.912 0.243
1983 6.896 6.347 9.046 0.242
1984 6.965 6.389 9.797 0.281
1985 7.027 6.426 11.849 0.440
1986 7.090 6.542 12.897 0.336
1987 9.246 8.632 14.332 0.310
1988 7.636 7.024 14.956 0.529
1989 8.852 8.149 14.450 0.355
1990 10.014 9.300 14.847 0.253
1991 10.751 9.984 15.005 0.274
Bouroe|
10.861
9.415
9.136
9.347
2.355
9.866
9.986
9.996
10.557
10.956
12.876 -
15.635
16.467
18.715
19.775
23.274
22.509
22.954
24.400
25.263
Calculated by the author adjusting Table 2 for
inflation.
Although some supporters of NASA lament the agency's "lean"
budgets during the Reagan and Bush years, this predicament seems
exaggerated. 21 NASA may, however, have had less budgetary
flexibility with the ancillary policy of the 1980s than it had
with the primary policy of the 1960s. Yet, incrementalism as a
feature of ancillary policy indicates that funding neither soared
nor stopped. The agency's size and shape were not so radically
altered as to make the agency or its programs unrecognizable.
V
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Noder_ Political SUDDort
Ancillary policy inspires political support based on
practicality rather than sheer enthusiasm. The policy is not a
key Congressional, presidential, or public priority.
Congressional support for the space program generally and the
shuttle more specifically shifted from a national to a more local
perspective: how will the policy benefit particular states and
districts? Presidents Reagan and Bush gave little personal
attention and only limited public visibility to the policy,
although they were more active than some of their predecessors.
In addition, public opinion was generally, but not
overwhelmingly, positive. In 1981, 40 percent of the public said
that the United States should "do more" in space, while only 25
percent felt it should "do less." This was the highest support
noted since 1965, at the heighth of Apollo. The next highest
level of support occurred in 1968, the year before the Moon
landing, when 30 percent of Americans thought that the government
should do more. 22 During the Reagan and Bush years, favorable
opinion remained relatively constant. In answer to a somewhat
different question, on average from 1984 to 1991, 23 percent of
Americans said that space program spending should be increased,
44 percent said spending should remain the same, 24 percent felt
it should be decreased, and 6 percent wanted the program ended
altogether. _ In 1991, 61 percent of Americans believed that the
space shuttle program had been "a worthwhile and important
program" for the country, while 36 percent felt "the money would
have been better spent in some other way." Yet, when asked
whether the space program should concentrate on unmanned versus
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manned missions, a significant number of people favored the
unmanned option: 39 percent compared to 49 percent for manned
efforts like the Space Shuttle. 24
Biq Sclence--Small Policy
Thus, ancillary policy posed a central contradiction for
NASA. The shuttle was a "big science" project--an innovative,
technologically sophisticated, megaprogram that would take years
to develop, years to run, and years to perfect. Yet within the
framework of ancillary policy, the shuttle had to be done cheaply
and incrementally; it had to match the vested interests of a few
and not upset other interests of the many; it had to be done with
public support, but without national excitement. The Space
Shuttle program was big science crammed into small policy.
The Politics of Expectation
It is unclear whether big science can succeed as ancillary
policy, which removes the moorings of long-term planning from
policy making and substitutes the politics of the moment.
Politics, rather than the substance of the policy, drives
decisions. Ancillary policy fosters two opposing sets of
political expectations. First, it creates low expectations
regarding means. Absent a consensus on a long-term commitment to
space, the questions "What can we afford?" and "How can we sell
it?" replaces "What should we do?" Second, ancillary policy
creates high expectations regarding ends, for the very reason
that the ends are never fully addressed. Although the government
is committed to only one portion of a project at a time, there is
nonetheless a vision of what the finished project will look like.
But because of the low expectations about means, the vision may
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be far more grandiose than what can ultimately be achieved.
These antithetical expectations created a vicious circle for
NASA between what the agency needed to promise to win political
support for the shuttle program and what it needed to adequately
build and run the shuttle. Ancillary policy pushed NASA to
compromise the end--the feasibility of the project--in order to
obtain the means--the political support--to carry it out. A
Reagan budget official remarked that "I think they [NASA] have
allowed their political assessment of what they have to do to get
support to interfere with their scientific judgment. "_
As initially approved, the shuttle program was to cost a
little more than $5 billion and be flying by 1978. By President
Reagan's inauguration, the shuttle program had overrun its
budget, costing $14.7 billion (not accounting for inflation) from
fiscal 1973 to fiscal 1981, and had taken three years longer to
build than anticipated. _ More important, the orbiters' cost per
launch, projected at $26 million, exceeded $270 million; their
cost per payload pound, estimated at $270, reached $5,264. 27 The
shuttle had been expected to make at least 25 flights per year,
but it never exceeded nine (in 1985) and totaled 42 for the
decade from 1981 to 1991. _ NASA had promised shuttle flights
would be frequent, cheap, and manned. Instead, they were
occasional, expensive, and manned. What happened between the
planning of the shuttle and its launching? NASA created two
expectations regarding means about the shuttlein the 1970s left
unfulfilled in the 1980s: cost effectiveness and a fast launch
schedule. Politics surrounding these expectations, not the
technological facets of space transportation, became a focus of
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the shuttle program.
Cost Effectiveness
Big science is by definition high priced. But NASA wanted
to present the shuttle as big science made affordable. During
tight budget times, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
wanted it cheap. Congress wanted it to pay for itself by
charging commercial and military users. NASA promised both--a
program that was too good to be true and one no politician could
resist. The agency pursued, as one observer put it, the "myth of
the economic shuttle. "_ "We had to argue that it was cheaper,"
a NASA official noted. "It would be cheaper than the expendable
launch vehicles. It would be better than all the expendable
launch vehicles. "3° Political scientist Maureen Casamayou
concluded that NASA "may have felt compelled to adopt this kind
of strategy because . . . it was the only way to save . . . [the]
organization from serious cutbacks and loss of turf."
The strategy meant that NASA offered Congress and OMB
"buy-in numbers"--projected costs that were too optimistic and
ultimately had to be revised upward later. As Max Faget, one of
NASA's premier engineers, remarked, "If you don't quote a low
cost, you ain't goingto get it to begin with. "31 Rep. Bob
Traxler (D-MI), chair of the House Appropriations subcommittee
that funded NASA's budget also acknowledged the strategy:
"Mega-science projects are intentionally sold to us with a low
price tag, with the understanding that as the project begins to
gain momentum, it gains friends within the Congress and outside
in industry, and that those kind of supporters will be able to
roll the high numbers. "32
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Although the low figures helped NASA sell the shuttle
program, the agency also paid a price for the estimates. Shuttle
economics depended on a tradeoff between development and
operating costs to keep within the $5 billion ceiling. High or
increasing development costs had to be offset by projecting
relatively low operating costs. Rising operating costs had to be
balanced by cutting back on development costs. Initially, NASA
lowered development costs by abandoning a fully reusable shuttle
in favor of a semireusable shuttle. To decrease development
costs further, the agency eliminated some $500 million in safety
and other tests. _ C. Thomas Newman, a NASA comptroller,
observed that unlike the fully tested Apollo program, "The
shuttle set out some different objectives. To produce a system
of moderate costs, the program was not as thoroughly endowed with
[safety] test hardware. "_ To make operating costs look as
attractive as possible to Congress and OMB, NASA crafted a series
of numbers about costs, flights, and payloads that would not
stand careful scrutiny. An OMB assistant director commented:
"What needed more attention and never got any more attention was
a good careful scrubdown of the operating costs. The number[s]
that NASA was carrying around [were] absurd. "35 The results were
cost overruns and missed budget projections.
But the cost overruns were more than the result of an
external political strategy coming back to haunt NASA. They were
also the result of internal practices, which included, according
to auditor in NASA's Inspector General Office, the absence of
competitive bidding, the failure to negotiate price agreements
before work began, impractical deadlines, design changes in the
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middle of construction, and building parts before the completion
of their design and testing. _ For instance, in 1982 an internal
NASA audit uncovered problems with the development of the
shuttle's external fuel tank, the cost of which had more than
tripled, to $502 million, from its original estimates. The
auditors found over 2,700 changes in components of the tank which
were often purchased, fitted, ripped out, and then redone. They
concluded that the "current external tank management is not cost
effective and, in our opinion, is a microcosm of the overall
shuttle program management difficulties. "37
The General Accounting Office (GAO) echoed the concerns of
the NASA auditors in a series of reports which deemed as
"generally ineffective" NASA's systems to track and correct
financial, equipment, property, and management problems. _ One
of the biggest problems uncovered by GAO auditors was NASA's
inability to monitor the work of thousands of contractors paid
billions of dollars to manufacture and maintain the shuttle.
Even though NASA's procurement regulations specified that a price
agreement be reached before work began, contractors often started
and, at times, finished projects before costs were determined.
Auditors disclosed that the main shuttle contractor, Rockwell
International, working without a price agreement, spent $20
million on a propulsion system which NASA had anticipated would
cost $3.2 million. Eventually NASA paid Rockwell $19.2
million. 39
Excessive contract spending forced NASA to cut its own
staff, including those whose job it was to specifically monitor
contractors, to meet budget targets. While NASA had 28 contract
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monitors at the Johnson Space Center during the Apollo program,
by 1981 there were only two. One person monitored the 44,700
purchase orders Rockwell issued in 1981. _ This contributed to
shuttle management problems, which in turn fueled cost
ineffectiveness.
Fast Launch Schedule
The economic shuttle myth not only created unrealistically
low estimates of development and operation costs, but it also
established an unrealistically high launch rate. NASA originally
predicted 60 flights per year, although this was soon downgraded
to 50. By 1986, the number had dropped to 24 flights annually,
although, as noted above, there had been no more than nine
flights in any one year. Some senior astronauts warned that
anything more than nine would actually jeopardize the safety of
the program, because of the long time needed between flights for
maintenance and preparation. 41 The high launch rate depended on
a shuttle monopoly over all military, domestic, and international
customers. NASA secured a policy commitment from Congress that
all U.S. space ventures, whether military, commercial, or
scientific, be required to use the shuttle. In order to recoup
shuttle costs, Congress established a pricing policy that
amounted to $71 million a ride in the mid-1980s. _
Yet two circumstances defied this expectation: competition
from abroad and demands from the Defense Department. The
European Space Agency's _ unmanned launch system attracted
well over $1 billion of business from Japan, the Soviet Union,
and the People's Republic of China. NASA found it difficult for
the shuttle to be competitive, because its payload prices
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exceeded those of_. 43 In addition, Congress approved an
Air Force request for $2.1 billion to build ten new Titan IV
rockets in fiscal 1986 before the _ explosion and
permitted the modification of 13 existing Air Force
intercontinental ballistics missiles for satellite launches.
After _j_LI_, Congress approved $2.5 billion for another 25
Air Force ELVs. _ A comparative analysis of NASA and DOD space
budgets indicates that there was a dramatic increase in the
budget for the Defense Department's space activities beginning
with fiscal year 1982 when the Pentagon's space budget surpassed
NASA's for the first time. As seen in Table 5, Defense
Department spending on space activities accounted for 54 percent
of total federal spending on space in 1982 compared to NASA's 44
percent. Thereafter, DOD spending rose much faster than that of
NASA, even when controlling for inflation. This continued
through the Bush years. The increase reflected a recognition
that the four shuttle orbiters, regardless of their launch
schedules, could not handle the volume of Pentagon business
created primarily for aspects of President Reagan's strategic
defense initiative, or "star wars." Thus, although there was
significant pressure to accelerate the shuttle program's launch
schedule, the schedule was not fast enough to make it
commercially viable or meet the Pentagon's demands for military
payloads.
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Tablo S
Total Space Budget by Agency, 1959-1991
(in percent)
Fiscal
Year NASA DOD Other
1959 33.2 62.4 4.4
1960 43.3 52.6 4.1
1961 51.2 45.0 3.8
1962 54.5 39.4 6.1
1963 66.7 22.7 10.6
1964 73.4 23.4 3.2
1965 73.9 22.6 3.5
1966 72.7 24.2 3.1
1967 72.0 24.8 3.2
1968 67.9 29.4 2.7
1969 64.0 33.7 2.3
1970 66.4 31.4 2.2
1971 65.4 31.4 3.2
1972 67.1 30.8 2.1
1973 64.1 33.6 2.3
1974 59.4 38.1 2.5
1975 59.3 38.5 2.2
1976 60.6 37.3 2.1
1977 57.5 40.3 2.2
1978 56.2 42.0 1.8
1979 55.6 41.9 2.5
1980 53.9 44.3 1.8
1981 50.0 48.4 1.6
1982 44.4 53.7 1.9
1983 40.6 57.9 1.5
1984 38.8 59.5 1.7
1985 34.3 63.3 2.4
1986 33.1 65.2 1.7
1987 37.1 61.6 1.3
1988 31.2 66.4 2.4
1989 35.5 63.0 1.5
1990 38.1 60.8 I.I
1991 39.5 59.4 i.I
V
Sourcez Calculated by the author from Table 1.
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Oversold and Underfunded
The economic shuttle myth, then, was just that--a myth.
NASA oversold the shuttle. The two central expectations of the
program went unmet: the shuttle was neither cheaper nor did it
fly more frequently than unmanned space vehicles. In overselling
it, NASA also underestimated its true costs and insured not only
that the program would run over budget, but that it would be
underfunded. But the cost increases had little impact on support
for the space shuttle from either Congress or the presidency.
Although there were regular battles over funding and attempts to
cut the budget, both institutions continued to back budget
increases (as observed in Table i). The ancillary policy existed
for its own sake, even when the expectations were not met.
;nstitutional Conflict
Ancillary policynot only involves immediate political
bargains but also is influenced by longstanding institutional
conflicts. In a system of separate institutions sharing power
through various checks and balances, institutional conflict is
business as usual. In order to circumvent institutional
conflict, officials in one or more institution must be willing to
invest political capital to raise public awareness and break with
past practices. But this is unlikely with ancillary policy.
Institutional conflict--withln Congress, the presidency, and
NASA and among the three organizations--Impeded the extent to
which space policy generally and the shuttle program specifically
could be labeled "national" policy during the Reagan and Bush
years. The three organizations may be referred to as plural
_Dstitutions. 45 A plural institution is a complex set of
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speclalized units with many hands going off in many directions to
handle a multitude of tasks for which the organization has
assumed responsibility. It enjoys a life of its own, independent
of any person or group of people within the institution. The
institution operates with two central features: decentralization
and decision ambiguity. This decentralization involves a
proliferation of units, many with roughly equal status, each of
which has direct input into the final decisions of the
organization. There is little top-down control of the offices
and their efforts. Decision ambiguity results from the
decentralization. It is characterized by decision makers who are
unclear about what is going on, what they want, how they will
attain it, and who will be involved, yet they make decisions
nevertheless. Thus, a plural institution is no small family
business. Instead, the interplay of decentralization and
ambiguity creates a conglomerate of semi-feudal, loosely allied
offices, with considerable independence from each other.
_tra-Institutional C0nfl_ct
Within Conaress
Congress, known for its decentralization rooted in the
committee system, is curiously so when considering NASA. Two
authorizing committees handle NASA. In the 1980s the Senate
Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee with its
Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space matched the House
Science, Space, and Technology Committee with two relevant
subcommittees: Investigations and Oversight and Space Science
and Applications. In addition, the House and Senate
Appropriations Committees are keenly involved in space decisions.
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Both had subcommittees that handled the funding of Veterans'
Affairs, Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Agencies,
of which NASA is one.
Congressional decentralization placed NASA in an awkward
political position during the development and operation of the
shuttle. The space authorizing committees received little
respect from and had little power over the appropriations
committees. Unlike many authorizing committees which develop
informal understandings with their spending committee
counterparts that prevent appropriations when there is no
authorization, the space authorizing committees failed to reach
such agreements with appropriators. _ In part this was because
the authorizing committees were consistently looked upon, in the
words of the House committee's ranking Republican member F. James
Sensenbrenner, Jr., (R-WI) as "simply rubber-stamp[ing] NASA's
wish list without prioritizing. "47 In addition, with only one
exception in 1991, the House Science Committee voted on its NASA
authorization bill after the House Appropriations Committee had
marked up its spending bill. _ The Senate Commerce Committee
acted even later than the House Science Committee, doubly
diluting the impact of the authorizing committees. 49
The delays were partly due to a battle between the House and
Senate authorizing committees over whether NASA should receive a
multi-year or single year authorization; the former favored by
the House committee, the latter by the Senate committee. The
result of the battle mattered little in the Senate where for part
of the period Ernest F. "Fritz" Hollings (D-SC) chaired the
Commerce Committee and was also a senior member on the
271
Appropriations Committee. Thus, Hollings could exert his
influence over the space program through the appropriations
process without worrying about his own authorizing committee or
its relations with the House committee. Disagreements and
standoffs between the two authorizing committees dragged late
into the year, year after year. 5° With the cart before the
horse, the appropriations committees in both houses largely set
shuttle policy through their funding decisions.
In 1989 the House Science Committee chair Robert Roe (D-NJ)
did triumph in a funding dispute with the Appropriations
Committee chair Jamie Whitten of Mississippi. Yet the incident
pointed to the impact of institutional decentralization and the
resulting conflict on decision making for ancillary policy. Roe
controlled authorization for the Advanced Solid Rocket Motor
(ASRM), a new motor that would give added booster thrust for the
shuttle to put the space station into orbit. NASA decided to
build the ASRM in Yellow Creek, Mississippi, located in Whitten's
district and chose Lockheed and Aerojet General as contractors.
But before the contractors could secure private funding for the
multi-billion dollar project, Congress had to grant authority for
the federal government to reimburse the manufacturers should the
ASRM project ever be canceled. Roe had to grant this liability
authority which Whitten ardently wanted. Even though Whitten
initially tried putting the provision in an appropriations bill,
he realized it could be knocked out on the floor and so he
removed it. Roe then worked out a clever quid pro quo: the
Science Committee would approve the liability authority as part
of its authorization bill, but the bill would not be moved
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through committee until the Appropriations Committee provided
funding for the space station. 51 Whitten agreed. Thus, the
decentralized committee structure heightened decision ambiguity
between the authorizing and the appropriations committees.
Decision ambiguity was further advanced in the peculiar
domestic arena within which NASA competed for shuttle funds.
This included the departments of Housing and Urban Affairs and
Veterans Affairs as well as other independent agencies, the most
prominent of which is the Environmental Protection Agency. Thus,
the appropriations subcommittees Juggled federal spending
requests among such strange bedfellows as space activities, low
income housing, veterans hospitals, and environmental cleanups.
It was never clear in any given year how the appropriations
subcommittee would respond to these competing requests. Thus,
the funding climate was neither well-suited to NASA's overall
policy profile, nor was it well-organized and cohesive in
general.
This also meant that several of the principal appropriators
during the 97th through 102d Congresses were openly hostile to
NASA funding, especially the shuttle. From 1975 until the
Republican party gained control of the Senate in 1981, William
Proxmlre (D-WI) served as the chair of the Senate Appropriations
Subcommittee on VA-HUD-Independent Agencies. After the Senate
returned to Democratic hands, he reclaimed the chairmanship in
1987 and 1988, when he retired. During these years, Proxmire
built a reputation as one of the most vocal critics of manned
space ventures. He once bluntly described the Space Shuttle as
"about the best example of a wasteful program I can think of. 52
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On the House side, Proxmire's counterpart until 1988 was Edward
Boland (D-MA). Boland, his successor Bob Traxler (D-MI), and
Bill Green (R-NY), the ranking Republican on the House
Appropriations Subcommittee on VA-HUD-Independent Agencies,
shared Proxmire's antipathy to big science projects with
correspondingly big budgets. While NASA had advocated funding
its projects "by the yard," Traxler's metric was smaller. He
felt that Congress should fund space projects "a foot at a time,
and if all we can afford to put up there is two feet, then that's
all we'll put." Traxler clashed with space supporters who
belleved that with tight budgets his logic would lead eventually
to funding an "inch at a time" and soon no funding at all. 53
Within the Presidency
Although Congress is typically viewed as a decentralized
body prone to ambiguous decision making, it is much less common
to view the presidency as a plural institution. Instead, people
concentrate on the president as a single individual. Yet, the
presidency is a plural institution characterized by
decentralization among many units in the Executive Office of the
President and decision ambiguity as many of these units have
overlapping and confusing jurisdiction on a single policy matter.
Presidents, especially when they are involved in ancillary
policies, rely on these numerous offices to make their decisions
for them. The chief executives become involved in the decision
process at its end, if at a11. Thus, although there is more
hierarchy in the White House than on Capitol Hill, presidents do
not have (nor do they often wish) to have full control over
decisions made on their behalf.
274
\The presidency as a plural institution was apparent in its
decisions on the space program during the Reagan and Bush
.o
administrations. The decentralization was observed in the
several units within the presidency which had jurisdiction over
space. The Office of Management and Budget was keenly interested
in trimming the shuttle budget. The Office of Science and
Technology Policy, headed by the president's science adviser,
favored unmanned exploration of space as faster and more
efficient than manned flight. _ The National Security Council
attempting to balance civilian and military space priorities,
favored the latter. Thus, among three key White House units
which had input on the shuttle, one did not like the cost of big
science, another liked unmanned big science, and the third liked
it best at the Pentagon.
These differences were reflected in a White House staff
group, known as the Senior Interagency Group for Space or SIG
(Space), appointed by President Reagan in 1983 to coordinate the
study of space issues. There was perhaps no better example of
the presidency operating as a plural institution than SIG
(Space). The eight-person advisory committee included the
president's national security adviser as chair and
representatives from NASA, the Army, Navy, Air Force, Central
Intelligence Agency, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and
the Department of Commerce. officials from OMB and the Office of
Science and Technology policy were also observers. 55 Decision
ambiguity and bureaucratic infighting were rampant. Although SIG
(Space) was specifically charged with investigating the merits of
the space station, it also was involved in other issues,
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including recommendations on the shuttle in the wake of the
Cballenqer accident. The group, locked in a dispute between NASA
and the Pentagon, which wanted a new orbiter, and OMB which
wanted to reduce space program costs, took eight months after the
shuttle explosion to recommend a replacement orbiter and was
unable to agree on a way to fund it. 56
These disputes within the plural institution of the
presidency led Congress in 1986 to call for the creation of a
National Space Council to coordinate U.S. space policy. Reagan
pocket vetoed the bill to show his opposition to such a council
that he felt with tie the president's hands. _7 The 1988 NASA
reauthorization bill again called upon the president to create
such a council, but this time Reagan did not object. _
Within NASA
Finally, NASA itself is a plural institution characterized
by decentralization among fifteen field centers across the
country, including three manned flight centers, all linked to
headquarters in Washington, D.C. 59 The decentralization is
further complicated by the geographic dispersion and built-in
rivalries among its three manned space flight centers--the Lyndon
B. Johnson Space Center in Houston, Texas, the John F. Kennedy
Space Center at Cape Canaveral, Florida, and the George C.
Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama. The
rivalries were apparent in the shuttle program. Marshall handled
the shuttle's components: main engines, external fuel tank, and
rocket boosters. Kennedy assembled and launched the shuttle, and
Johnson trained the astronauts and was mission control. A
researcher on NASA management summed up the competition among the
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three space centers: "Each center nourishes a conviction that it
is the best of the lot. Each center is hard at work to make its
own place strong and secure in whatever lies ahead for NASA. No
center is willing to reveal its entire hand to other centers, or
for that matter, to Headquarters. "_ As will be discussed in
greater detail below, their divided responsibilities created
ambiguity and turf fights about who was to do what and
exacerbated problems leading up to the _ explosion in
1986.
_D_er-Institutional Conflict
The most significant inter-institutional conflict affecting
NASA existed between the presidency and Congress. Presidents and
members of Congress alike often invoke a maxim that the president
proposes and Congress disposes policy initiatives. Senator Jake
Garn (R-UT) summed up this perspective applied to the space
program: "Congress will wait for the president to act. We're
535 members up here--how are we to come up with a policy by
ourselves. The initiative has to come from hhe
administration. "61 Often as they wait, members are quick to
accuse the president of not setting national priorities. But
they are equally quick to step into the void. Even if the
president has set his own version of national priorities,
Congress often has its own ideas. Congress, especially when it
not controlled by the president's party, proposes as often as
presidents do.
This created conflict between the two branches revealed by
their budget decisions for NASA, shown in Table 6. The
disagreements varied by year. There was no disagreement in FY
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1985, but fairly significant ones in FY 1991 and FY 1992. The
table also makes plain that in the early years of the Reagan
administration, Congress acted to restore monies to NASA cut by
the White House. By Reagan's second term and continuing into
Bush's term, the pattern reversed: Congress was much more likely
to cut funds from those requested by the president.
_nte_-institutlonal Cooperation
Congress, although often likely to feud with the presidency,
is much less likely to be openly hostile to the bureaucratic
agency for which it sets policy. Although these agencies, such
as NASA, are commonly denoted as part of the executive branch,
the chief executive often has less affinity with them than do
members of Congress. A close association among Congressional
committees or subcommittees, executive agencies, and interest
groups is depicted as a "cozy" or "issue network." For the
shuttle program, the network consisted of members of the
appropriations and authorizing subcommittees, contractors
responsible for the building of the shuttle, and NASA itself.
The three points of the triangle were connected by one central
factor, resources. Thus, the shuttle's greatest support came
from committee members whose states had vested economic interest
in its development: Florida, California, and Texas which had
tens of thousands of NASA and contractor employees. These
interconnections were illustrated when Floridian Don Fuqua, chair
of the House Science and Technology Committee and avid NASA
backer, resigned from Congress in 1986 to become president of the
Aerospace Industries Association of America, an organization
representing many aerospace contractors. _
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The extent of institutional conflict in shuttle decisions,
within and across political branches and within NASA makes it
difficult for decisions to be made comprehensively. In addition,
responsibility for decisions can easily be lost within and across
the plural institutions. These conflicts place a premium on
incrementalism and compromise. Thus, the policy is likely to
continue, but it is not likely to be developed with long range
priorities in mind.
Rush tQ Launch: The Challen_er Crisis. 1986
On January 28, 1986, the Space Shuttle _
disintegrated shortly after takeoff, killing all seven astronauts
on board. The accident was caused by the failure of two
synthetic rubber O-ring pressure seals in a joint between
segments of the right solid rocket booster. The leak allowed
white-hot combustion gases to burn through the joint and ignite _....
the highly combustible liquid-fuel external tank in an explosion.
To supporters and opponents alike, it was evident in the months
followingfj_Lilgdi_that the U.S. shuttle program was in
disarray. The explosion grounded the three remaining shuttles,
suspended shuttle operations for 32 months, and triggered a
fervent debate about the future of the space program. The
accident was not simply the "consequence of complex
state-of-the-art technologies." It was not Just a matter that
"sooner or later accidents were bound to happen. "_ NASA knew of
the leaking seal joint early enough for the agency to anticipate
trouble and respond appropriately. The fact that it did not laid
bare the nature of ancillary policy colliding with big science,
political expectations created by the high launch rate, and, most
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\tellingly, institutional conflict within NASA.
Ancillary policy not only affected the choices of the
presidency and Congress on the general compass of the shuttle
program, but it also shaped how the two institutions viewed the
daily operations of the program. For the presidency, its role in
monitoring the shuttle program ended once OMB finalized its
annual budget recommendations. Beyond this, executive attention
to the shuttle program was highly compartmentalized. Presidents
Reagan and Bush appointed advisory groups to look into the space
program. Yet these panels were charged with examining the broad
sweep of the space program or were tangential to the daily
business of the White House or both. There was no central White
House unit that monitored shuttle operations. Even the Office of
Science and Technology Policy was primarily involved at the front
end--in proposing what the program should be, not evaluating the
program once in place. This meant that the day-to-day operations
of the shuttle program was not within White House purview. From
the perspective of the White House, NASA was charged with this
responsibility.
Congressional authorizing committees, although not
especially crucial to funding decisions for NASA, were
responsible for oversight of the agency and the shuttle program.
Yet because many committee members' constituencies benefitted
from jobs through the shuttle program, this oversight was
minimal. A GAO official remarked that "The committees have been
very supportive of the agency. They have gotten too close to the
agency and have been less objective than they should have
been. ''_ The GAO complained that the authorizing committees
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acted as a shield for NASA when presented information on safety
and cost mismanagement. According to one Congressional staffer,
the oversight committees acted as "cheerleaders" rather than
watchdogs. 65 From the perspective of Congress, too, NASA was on
its own.
The Politics of Expectations
These daily operations were most significantly affected by
the expectation of a high launch rate. NASA concentrated on this
expectation as it moved from the development phase to the
operational phase of the shuttle program. With completion of the
shuttle's test fllghts in 1982, NASA began to accelerate the
shuttle launching schedule, calling for an ambitious two flights
per month by 1985. As the Rogers Commission, named by President
Reagan to investigate the _ explosion, observed, "The
greater the annual number of flights, the greater the degree of
routinization and economy . . ."_ This led to, in the
Commission's words, "the unrelenting pressure to meet the demands
of an accelerating flight schedule. "67 _ _ _ _
Yet the Commission concluded that NASA was not adequately
prepared to meet the fast schedule. The schedule caused a number
of unintended consequences which the agency did not adequately
handle, including the compression of training schedules, the lack
of spare parts, and an organizational focus on near-term problems
rather than long-term planning. _ For instance, the Rogers
Commission observed that in order to keep to the schedule
astronauts had less time to train in the flight simulator than
was desirable. Moreover, the two flight simulators available for
training could support no more than twelve to fifteen flights per
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year, well below the twenty-four flights anticipated by the
schedule. _ The increased flight rate also placed great demand
for spare parts. The actual inventory of spare parts was on
target until the second quarter of FY 1985 when demand began to
exceed supply. By FY 1986 when inventories should have been
completed, only 65 percent of the parts (32,000 of 50,000 parts)
were stocked. These spare parts purchases were deferred in order
to meet budget reductions imposed by the Johnson Space Center
shuttle management. To obtain needed parts and to maintain the
flight schedule, NASA officials resorted to the cannibalization
of spares from one orbiter to another. Forty-five out of
approximately 300 parts were cannibalized from other orbiters for
the ill-fated _ flight. _ Thus, the schedule disrupted
the program rather than successfully moving it to an operational
level.
The shuttle schedule revealed a stark clash between politics
and technology. The accelerated flight rate was set to keep
political support for the shuttle program high. There was,
however, little thought about how to physically meet the schedule
without actually endangering the integrity of individual flights.
The Rogers Commission concluded that "The flight rate did not
appear to be based on assessment of available resources and
capabilities and was not reduced to accommodate the capacity of
the work force. "71 The clash between what was expected
politically and what could be accomplished technologically raised
the threat of safety problems. Ironically, because of the clash
there was little incentive to consider safety as a serious
concern either within NASA or in the Congressional oversight
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committees. As Representative Bill Green (R-NY) said, "there was
an assumption of managerial efficiency" with NASA. _ Yet
assumptions about adequate safety were deceiving as senior NASA
officials grappled with the shuttle's flawed seal joint and the
peril it could cause.
A warning had sounded as early as 1977 when one of NASA's
own engineers at Marshall Space Flight Center in Alabama wrote
that the primary O-ring might leak and that the secondary O-ring
might not seal at all because of joint rotation. Two other memos
to senior managers in the Marshall shuttle organization followed,
one in 1979 and the other in 1983. _ In December 1982, the
O-rings were designated a "Criticality i" feature of the Solid
Rocket Booster design, denoting "a failure point--without
back-up--that could cause a loss of life or vehicle if the
component fails. "_ Actual flight data from the_
launch in 1984 confirmed that the primary O-ring was susceptible
to erosion. _ A flight in April 1985 showed erosion of the
secondary O-rlng (meaning that the primary seal had failed).
Also in 1985 Morton Thiokol, chief contractor for the shuttle,
briefed officials at Marshall about cold temperatures weakening
the O-rings. _ Finally, in 1985 Marshall officials informed NASA
headquarters of the joint problem. The House Committee on
Science and Technology investigating the explosion concluded that
"The O-ring erosion history presented . . . at NASA headquarters
in August 1985 was sufficiently detailed to require corrective
action prior to the next flight . . . [Yet] none of the
participants . . . [from] NASA or Thiokol--recommended that the
Shuttle be grounded until the problem with the seals was
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solved. -_
Why then did NASA rush to launch shuttle _?
Technological problems of weak O-rings and leaky Joints were made
worse by problems of institutional conflict within NASA. The
confllct was evident in the management of the shuttle's safety
program which involved a four-level review process to certify the
readiness of all shuttle components. The four-stage process
mirrored the shuttle program's overall organizational scheme, m
Level IV involved contractors who certified the flight readiness
of shuttle parts. Level III took place at the Johnson, Kennedy,
and Marshall centers which verified launch readiness at each
center. Level II, located at the Johnson Space Center, required
certification of flight readiness to the manager of the entire
shuttle program. Level I was at NASA headquarters in Washington,
D.C., which held a "Flight Readiness Review" conference
approximately two weeks before a launch. _ Levels III and IV
were responsible for shuttle hardware; levels I and II were
managerial and administrative.
Although this hierarchy was the primary channel of
communication within the program, it was the key source of
communication failure in preparation for the _ launch in
at least four instances. In 1985, Marshall communicated the seal
joint problem to the top level of the shuttle organization but
bypassed Level II at Johnson. Yet even with this, the full
extent of the seal joint problem was not known at Level I. After
the secondary O-ring failed in April 1985, the Marshall Solid
Rocket Booster Project manager placed launched constraints on
five subsequent shuttle flights, including _ in January
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1986. These constraints denoted that a problem, unless resolved,
could potentially halt the mission. Still on each occasion, the
project manager waived the constraints prior to launch. Neither
the constraints nor their waiver were known to Levels I and II. _
In addition, on the eve of the launch, Marshall officials did not
inform senior management at either Level II or Level I of the
concerns expressed by Morton Thiokol engineers about launching in
freezing temperatures. 81 Finally, and perhaps most incredibly,
no mention was made of the O-ring problem at any level of the
readiness review process for the 1986 Challenger launch. _ It
seemed that bad news travelled neither fast nor up.
NASA's decentralization may have encouraged Marshall shuttle
managers to minimize the problem and contain it within the space
center. Marshall Space Flight Center was well known for its
independence which may have been augmented by its remote location
in northern Alabama. _ "The Marshall guys were not what I would
call cooperative with the Johnson guys," remarked a former NASA
senior official. _ There was also a perception that with Level
II management at the Johnson Space Center, Johnson was superior
to the other two flight centers. "All centers are equal" wrote
one commentator, "butJohnson is more equal" than the others, a5
To counterbalance this, Marshall "had its eye on a large piece of
the space station" and did not want be blamed for something which
would affect shuttle managers' careers.
Competition across the three flight centers also may have
helped promote the idea that the joint weakness could be
redefined as an acceptable risk. Morton Thiokol developed the
rationale of a margin of "safe erosion" or "safe margin of
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erosion" in 1984, first on the primary O-rlng and then later on
the secondary O-ring. 87 Although safe erosion was a seeming
contradiction, Marshall managers subsequently adopted the notion
on flights beginning in April 1984. Lawrence Mulloy, Marshall's
Solid Rocket Booster project manager testified before House
Science Committee hearings:
I think we started down a road where we had a design
deficiency. When we recognized that it had design
deficiency we did not fix it. Then we continued to fly with
it, and rationalized why it was safe, and eventually
concluded and convinced ourselves that it was an acceptable
risk. That was--when we started down the road, we started
down the road to eventually having the inevitable
accident. _
"The irony, of course," Casamayou wrote, "is that, instead of
becoming more alarmed as more flights showed evidence of erosion,
the agency became more confident than ever that its predictions
were sound. "89 In the words of one Rogers' Commission member,
NASA was "playing Russian roulette. "_ As long as the shuttle
returned safely, none of these problems seemed daunting.
"Nothinq Ends Her_"
Within hours after the Challenaer's explosion on January 28,
1986, President Reagan vowed that "we'll continue our quest in
space• There will be more shuttle flights and more shuttle crews
• . . Nothing ends here. "91 The explosion of _ carried
with it two very different messages about the U.S. space program.
It pointed to the vulnerability of the space program which people
both within and outside NASA had not fully considered. But at
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the same time, because it served as a blow to American greatness
in space and technology and because of the overwhelming
outpouring of emotion after the explosion, the incident promoted
the continuation of the shuttle program and even its enhancement.
The problems of O-rings and booster fuel segments were nothing
that excellence and renewed commitment could not cure.
Concerns about the vulnerability of the space program led
the Rogers Commission to recommend changes to promote the overall
safety of the shuttle program and end the pattern of "silent
safety" it saw before the tragedy. 92 NASA implemented $2.4
billion in plans that fixed hardware, lowered flight rates, and
revamped the four-level shuttle management structure by moving
Level II from Johnson to Washington headquarters, thereby
centralizing the program and helping to alleviate inter-center
rivalries. 93 _
Concerns about the future of American greatness in space led
Congress to insist on the building of a new shuttle to replace
_. It approved the transfer of $2.4 billion from the
Department of Defense to NASA to help pay for it. _ In a display
of institutional conflict at several levels, Congress took
control of the situation after the dispute among White House
officials in SIG (Space) about how the new shuttle should be
funded dragged on. _ The shuttle program started anew in
September 1988; the replacement shuttle _l_X_was launched in
January 1992, six years after the disintegration of 9]IKII__9_qg_E.
Because the contractors knew how to build a shuttle, there was no
cost overruns on Endeavour. A 1992 GAO audit reported that of 29
programs initiated between 1977 and 1991 with development costs
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over $200 million only the _ and three other projects
came in under budget. _ A more balanced space transportation
program also began with the addition of a fleet of expendable
launch vehicles. Despite these changes, NASA's own Advisory
Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program concluded in
1990 that the shuttle program had still not emerged from
"developmental status. "97 Ironically, after the shuttle
explosion, people inside and outside NASA agreed that the goal of
cost effectiveness and commercial competitiveness which NASA, the
presidency, and Congress had promoted some twenty years before
ought to be abandon. _ In this is a recognition that shuttle
program was not about space, not nationally directed, and not the
product of a well-defined policy.
Jobs Today, Jobs Tomorrow: The Space Station. 1984-1992
In 1984, as part of its interest in reinvigorating the space
program, the Reagan administration pledged support for the
development of a permanently occupied space station. Echoing the
lofty appeal made by President Kennedy about putting an American
on the Moon, Reagan remarked in his State of the Union message
that "America has always been greatest when we dared to be great.
We can reach for greatness again. We can follow our dreams to
distant stars, living and working in space for peaceful,
economic, and scientific gain. Tonight I am directing NASA to
develop a permanently manned space station and to do it within a
decade. ''W By the end of the year, Congress approved a $150
million down payment for the space station in the FY 1985 NASA
budget. The station, which Reagan dubbed Freedom, would be
launched in segments via the space shuttle beginning in 1996 and
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with permanent occupancy before the end of the century. NASA
finally took its "next logical step" for the space program,
fifteen years after announcing it.
Like the shuttle, the space station bore the stamp of big
science--a grand-scale, long-term technological project. Also
like the shuttle, the station was pursued as ancillary policy.
The space station was of secondary importance to the presidency
and Congress. Despite Reagan's pledge of a reinvlgorated space
program, administration officials did not see the station as
marking the return of the space program as a top national
priority. The station was a secondary interest to most members
of Congress, although it was a central interest of those who felt
their districts would be benefitted by its construction. More
fundamentally, the space station was a product of incrementalism,
both substantively and budgetarily. The space station could be
fashioned as an extension of, if not the logical end point of,
the shuttle program. The space station also was attractive
because it could be built piece by piece: it could be done by
the inch, by the foot, by the yard.
The space station more than the shuttle rested on
double-edged budget incrementalism. As with the shuttle, NASA
used the incrementalism to convince public officials that they
could buy in at a relatively low price, for only a small portion
of the project, and stretch out purchases over a very time frame.
NASA originally estimated the station costs at between $7-5 to $9
billion. As one NASA official observed, "I reached the scream
level at about $9 billion," referring to when he encountered
resistance from politicians. I_ So NASA opted for an $8 billion
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price that would fit under its growth curve. NASA administrator
James Beggs told Congress in 1984, "The space station can be in
place within a decade and for about $8 billion. "I01 The Reagan
administration's initial commitment to the space station of $150
million in FY 1985 was a commitment to spend $8 billion down the
road. The "buy-in" numbers also reflected a split between the
development and operations phases of the program. The $8 billion
was simply for development with no firm cost figures attached to
the operations phase of the program. Edwin Meese, one of the
station's top supporters in the Reagan administration, summed up
the incremental strategy: "Let's get our foot in the water, so
that we have a commitment and then we can worry about the
long-range costs later. "I_ Reports raised questions about the
long-range costs because of obstacles the station would encounter
once operational. A NASA investigation team found that the
station could not be built as designed because a large number of
its parts would start to break down before the station was
complete. In addition, the report concludedthat the station
would require 3,800 work-hours of maintenance annually, an
increase from an original prediction of 2,200-hour, which itself
had upset some members of Congress. I_ But these were not issues
that received much attention in the initial space station
funding.
Congress and the presidency used the incrementalism to tell
NASA that money would be doled out in small allowances. Congress
and OMB could also ask for various design changes to meet the
exigencies of the budget pictures. In NASA's spending bill for
FY 1991, Congress ordered the agency to officially adopt an
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"incremental concept" to phase in each portion of the station in
a discrete and independent fashion. By then costs for the
station between FY 1985 and FY 1991 had reached $5-7 billion (see
Table I). Funding for the station was capped for 90 days until
NASA responded with a formal plan. Im The station's cost through
1999, once $8 billion, was now calculated at $37 billion. Im For
both sides, the space station was Just attractive enough to
survive, but too expensive to fund fully.
Politics of Expectations
While expectations of cost-effectiveness and fast launch
schedules followed the Space Shuttle, the political expectations
moving the space station did not involve these economic issues as
much as they did jobs. The space station was a good domestic
spending project even though it was supposed to be a scientific
endeavor miles above the earth. By 1992, the project spawned an
estimated 75,000 Jobs in 39 states, most in California, Alabama,
Texas, and Maryland. Opponents and supporters of the station saw
its importance for constituency interests. David Obey (D-WI)
stated that "There is no bigger pork item in the domestic budget
than this item." Tom DeLay (R-TX) responded: "Can you deprive
your state and your constituents of this important source of jobs
and revenue. "I_ Barbara Mikulski, the chair of the Senate
Appropriations subcommittee that handled NASA's budget agreed
with DeLay, "I truly believe that in space station Freedom we are
going to generate jobs today and jobs tomorrow--Jobs today in
terms of the actual manufacturing of space station Freedom, but
jobs tomorrow because of what we will learn. "I°7 The public works
expectation was matched by the space station's incrementallsm.
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vThe hardware of the space station could be developed and produced
one piece at a time at various locations across the country.
Ultimately, the public works expectation and the incrementalism
together suggested the dominant role of Congress relative to the
presidency in defining the space station. Although President
Reagan had boldly announced his directive to NASA in 1984, the
president could ultimately direct much less than the Congress on
this space initiative. With the space station, Congress did what
it does best--protect local interests, offer constituents jobs,
and claim credit for both.
To be sure, the space station also became a lightening rod
for criticism regarding the high cost of big government programs
in the midst of tight budgets. William Cohen (R-ME) argued,
"When we stand on this floor and argue day after day about the
size of the budget deficit and then agree to fund programs of
this magnitude, then I say there is no hope we will ever bring
our budget deficit under control. "I_ But the opposition was
never adequately organized. It was difficult to get public or
groups mobilized against the space program (at 1 percent of the
entire budget) as responsible for the deficit. And the
scientific community was split on the relative merits of the
station. I_
Like the Space Shuttle, what was missing from the
Congressional debate on expectations about the space station was
the scientific accomplishments of the project. Thomas Donahue,
Chair of the Space Science Board of the National Academy of
Sciences raised the issue, "If the decision to build a space
station is political and social, we have no problem with that.
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But don't call it a scientific program. "11° He stated further,
"The Board sees no scientific need for this space station during
the next twenty years. "111 The space station became entrenched
because of jobs not science.
Institutional Conflict
Within the Presidency
The lack of clear expectations about the role of the space
station beyond creating jobs was evident in debates within the
White House and Congress. When James Beggs, NASA administrator
proposed the space station to the Reagan administration, there
was little consensus about its merits. Although most members of
the Reagan administration favored a more ambitious space program,
they did not necessarily see a space station as part of that
ambition. Officials in the Office of Management and Budget, in
particular its director David Stockman, argued against the
station's excessive cost. The National Security Council opposed
the idea because the station did not appear to have any military
benefits and, as such, would draw resources away from these
priorities. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger felt funds
for the space station would drain funds for the shuttle which the
Air Force wanted increased. The president's science adviser
counseled against it in favor of less costly u_anned missions. 112
In contrast, William Clark, Reagan's early staff chief and White
House counselor Edwin Meese and his assistant Craig Fuller
favored the station. These viewpoints were reflected in debates
within the Senior Interagency Group for Space, the advisory
committee Reagan had established to look into the matter in 1983.
Reagan allowed the white House group to debate various options
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regarding the station and merely entered the process at its end.
After months of negotiations and disagreements within the group,
Reagan gave the nod to a fully-functional, permanently manned
space station. He also fashioned a compromise between OMB and
NASA on first year funding for the station at the $150 million
level. The plural nature of the presidency and SIG (Space) as a
part of it slowed decision making until the president intervened.
W_thin Conaress
Space station policy also rested on conflicts among the
appropriations committees, authorizing committees, and the full
house. As noted above, the House Science Committee was largely
viewed as irrelevant to making decisions on the space program.
However, in April 1991, the House panel cut for the first time
NASA funding and did so prior to the markup by Appropriations
Subcommittee on VA-HUD-Independent Agencies. The Science
Committee trimmed the FY 1992 NASA budget by nearly $500 million,
although it authorized full funding for the space station. 113 On
May 2, the House passed authorization on $15.3 billion for NASA,
$2.1 billion of which was for the space station. 114 Yet on May
15, the Appropriations subcommittee called for the elimination of
the space station despite the earlier reauthorization bill.
Subcommittee chair Bob Traxler asserted that "We simply can no
longer afford huge new projects with huge price tags while trying
to maintain services that the American people expect to be
provided. "11s On June 6, however, rebuking the subcommittee's
action, the full house voted to continue funding for the space
station by freezing every other space program and cutting public
housing money for the poor. Funds were restored after a lobbying
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campaign by the White House and NASA which circulated among
members a district-by-district breakdown of space station
contracts, employment, and money spent. 116
On the Senate side, there was much less likelihood that
funds would be eliminated. Traxler's counterpart, Barbara
Mikulski (D-MD), whose state housed several NASA facilities,
announced she would fund the station. House and Senate conferees
ultimately agreed, allocating $2.03 billion for the station after
cuts in other NASA projects. 117 Ancillary policy indicated that
the program might be cut, but it was not likely to be abandoned.
¢onc_us_on_ p_litlcs Not Science
Pure science and pure politics are two diametrically
opposite activities. Decisions in science ultimately imply that
there is a proper way to solve a problem. To launch a space
station, certain things must be done and certain other things
must be avoided. These are difficult issues to compromise.
Compromise, however, defines politics. There is no one proper
way to solve a problem. In politics, the solution is defined by
the number of votes and who has the most influence. Politics
overrode science in the U.S. space program during Reagan's and
Bush's terms making coherent policy difficult. Scientific
questions about shuttle payloads and space station platforms were
answered by budget .issues, parochial interests of members of
Congress, and appeals by American presidents to national
greatness.
In 1989, George Bush announced an ambitious Space
Exploration Initiative which would return people to the Moon by
2000, establish a lunar base, and, then, using the space station,
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reach Mars by 2010. Like Ronald Reagan and John Kennedy before
him, Bush called the plan a national priority. Like his two
predecessors he sought a decade time line. Bush drew upon
recommendations of the National Space Commission which in 1986
had outlined a plan for permanent, self-sustaining outposts in
space, including bases on the Moon and Mars and commercial mining
of lunar and Martian soil. 11s Its cost was estimated at $700
billion over two decades.
Congress, however, reacted negatively. In votes for FY 1991
NASA funding, the Moon-Mars proposal was virtually zeroed out
despite lobbying from Vice President Quayle as the head of the
National Space Council. The following year when the Bush
administration resubmitted its request for funding only the House
Science Committee supported the measure. Although Bush lambasted
Congress for not "investing in America's future," members felt
that too much money would be spent on a project with too little
scientific value. 119 "We're essentially not doing Moon-Mars,"
Senator Barbara Mikulski bluntly declared.
In its support of the Moon-Mars project, the Bush
administration appeared to be offering a plan not just about big
science, but about biggest science. Yet it did so with little
attention to politics. It attempted to bring the space program
full circle back to the early 1960s. It was attempting to
recreate space policy as primary policy, which would involve a
bold, expensive, and consensual priority. Yet in the political
climate of the early 1990s, the boldness and expense of the
Moon-Mars plan ensured that it would be anything but consensual.
Prevailing ancillary policy directed the course of the space
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program and dictate the demise of the Moon-Mars plan.
In February 1993, looking for ways to cut the federal budget
and thereby ease the federal deficit, a spokesman for the new
Clinton administration announced that the space station would
face the budget axe. The same day, the president assured space
advocates that he supported the station and would not propose its
elimination. 12° In Clinton's position was an odd compromise
between politics and science. Therewas a continued government
commitment to the space program (science), but the commitment was
limited by tight budgets and other priorities (politlcs).
Ancillary policy continued to direct the politics of space.
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Chapter 6
Presidential Leadership and International _spects
of the Space Progre
by
Robert H. Ferrell
The American space program--so wonderful an enterprise, in
many ways so successful--was dominated at the outset by the
president's concern with international rivalry and world
prestige, and to a large extent international concerns have
remained a powerful shaper of the U.S. civil space program. It
is in this area that the president has traditionally been the key
actor, shaping foreign policy objectives without great
involvement by the legislative branch. If an "imperial
presidency" has ever existed, it has been in the definition and
execution of foreign policy objectives. Foreign policy
considerations have shaped what has obviously been a U.S.
domestic science and engineering program. This clearly seen in
NASA's principal human spaceflight projects from its organization
until the present day--theApollo mission, the Space Shuttle, and
the space station--and in any accounting of NASA's history the
international aspects of these programs must loom large. These
programs consumed the bulk of NASA's budget and for a long time
occupied the energies of most of NASA's employees and contracting
companies. The three major projects lay at the front of
international relations, beginning with the intense rivalry of
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the U.S. and U.S.S.R. over sending a human being to the Moon.
During the years of the Space Shuttle's development, from
the 1970s into the mid-1980s, the competition lessened, for after
the Americans bested their Soviet competitors in the Moon race
the Soviet Union appears not to have participated in any serious
race for a shuttle, preferring expendable rocket boosters for
space tasks. Nonetheless, international considerations did not
lessen. Space shuttle policy was driven conslderably by rivalry
with emerging European interests in science and technology and
consolidation of the continental economy. When it came to
constructing and supplying a space station, the principal
destination for the American shuttle, the U.S. chose to emphasize
cooperation with its allies--the European Space Agency, Canada,
and Japan--in building a permanently occupied and large space
station Freedom. The Soviets opted for small and occaslonally
tended throwaway stations served by expendable spacecraft
ferrying occupants between earth and the station. By the middle
part of the 1980s, however, competition had dropped to a low ebb,
and ceased altogether with the collapse of the U.S.S.R. in 1989.
Interestingly, when budgetary as well as technological troubles
afflicted the Freedo_ space station the prospect arose,
dictu, of cooperating with the Soviet Union's successor
organization, the Commonwealth of Independent States, through use
of its latest Mir station and, in place of increasingly expensive
U.S. shuttle flights, the gigantic rocket named Energlya.
But international competition has not been the sole driving
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force in the U.S. space effort, and presidential leadership of
it. Sometimes the successes of a program turn out to be more
than the founders envisioned, and such is the case with NASA. In
the passage of years into the twenty-first century the
international use of satellites for telephones and for television
and for guidance of ships at sea and for weather observation and
for managing the earth's natural resources has made a large
difference in the shape of world affairs, in bringing nations
together.
International Rivalry
In the beginning was'rivalry, which Americans now understand
much better than they once did, for it is now clear that the
soviet Union took its position on space out of weakness. From
the beginning the Soviets were behind in almost every kind of
technologically complicated armament. It was the Americans who
constructed the first nuclear weapon. When the Soviets exploded
their test device in 1949 it was, as we recently have been told,
a copy of the American bomb, secured through the agency of the
German-born, British-naturallzed Klaus Fuchs. The Americans
managed a hugh hydrogen device in 1952 and miniaturized it in
1954. The Soviets did not detonate a thermonuclear device until
1955. I But Russian weakness always was there, a weakness born of
the very nature of the system with its dictatorlal ways, which
introduced into Soviet science an element of rigidity and lack of
argument, hence imagination. The weakness also resided in the
economic backwardness of the Soviet Union, in this respect a
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third world country, as visitors have so often noticed. For
whatever reason, when the American H-bomb was tested at Bikini
the United States was clearly in the lead, and in subsequent
weapons races the results always were what Herbert York announced
years afterward, a lead time for the U.S. over the U.S.S.R. of
2
between four and six years.
soviet weakness led to the covering up and a denial of
access to most parts of the country that had marked all of the
Stalinist period, and on the American side it produced a series
of efforts to find out what the Soviets were doing. This led
straight into the Sputnik launching, proceeded directly from it
to the launching of the first reconnaissance satellite by the
U.S. early in 1961, and in turn inspiring the Soviets to other
space endeavors. The moves and countermoves did not all fit
together neatly, but the Soviet accomplishments brought the
Americans into a full-scale, open race for the Moon.
Still, what were the Americans to do? Even today, after the
Cold War has passed into history--after the Soviet collapse
should have inspired more calm appraisals of events of the last
two generations--It is not well known among American historians
that for the first fifteen years of the post-World War II era
American intelligence of Soviet missile strength was dangerously
poor. Initially the U.S. used the myriad aerial maps of Russia
made by the Luftwaffe. As a small-fry member of the U.S. Army
Air Forces, I remember a building in northern France full of
German maps, fascinating because of their detail, also because
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rthey had been printed on some sort of oilcloth--they would have
made exciting dinner-table covers. These maps quickly went out of
date, and American intelligence officers interrogated the
millions of German prisoners who poured back into West Germany.
Eventually, the stream of returnees dried up and the next venture
was to overfly Soviet borders photographing obliquely. The
Russians discouraged these enterprises by shooting down a plane
now and then.
This was the background that led President Dwight D.
Eisenhower's administration to welcome the International
Geophysical Year (July 1957-December 1958) in which both the U.S.
and the U.S.S.R. announced they would put up satellites. On the
Soviet side the task promised to be easy, because the Soviets
possessed large-thrust missiles. They were crude missiles,
powered by clusters of small engines. On the American side
matters promised to be more difficult, because by this time the
U.S. had abandoned huge boosters. After miniaturization of the
H-bomb and the Bikini test, they no longer seemed necessary.
This meant that any American satellite would have to be very
small and require miniaturization of a complex sort. President
Eisenhower also required that the American effort be civilian,
not military. The U.S. Army probably had the capacity to send up
a satellite as early as the autumn of 1956, but the president
refused permission for a military launch.
It is unnecessary to go into the well-known American effort
in the mid-1950s to open up the Soviet Union. Walter A.
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McDougall and others have set out the calculations by which
Eisenhower tried to get the Soviets to reveal what he felt was
their weakness but could not be sure. 3 The "open skies" proposal
at the Geneva Summit Conference in 1955 was part of the strategy.
"We knew the Soviets wouldn't accept it," he later said in an
interview, "but we took a look and thought it was a good move. ''4
When it failed the president permitted an extraordinary venture
with 516 large weather balloons carrying gondolas, the latter
containing automatic cameras and radio beacons that allowed
tracking, releasing them in Western Europe to float over the
Soviet Union, to be captured by plane after they neared Japan and
Alaska. 5 When its results were modest he resorted to the U-2
reconnaissance aircraft.
Meanwhile Eisenhower had hoped to send over scientific
satellites during the I.G.Y. that would establish a precedent for
military satellites; after the Russians presumably raised no
objection to scientific satellites the real thing would follow. 6
The Eisenhower administration agonized over how to avoid
violating international law and yet get military satellites over
the Soviet Union. One suggestion was to send them first into
orbit over the friendly politlcal skies above the equator, and
then send them north. The Soviets solved this dilemma by lofting
Sputnik and not even mentioning the legal tangle, later
justifying their action by asserting the right of vertical
freedom of space and, as for the horizontal, claiming that their
satellltes did not fly over countries below but the countries
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themselves rotated under the Sputnik. 7
After the Sputnik crisis a cornucopeia of Cold War
confusions emerged. At the outset there was consternation in the
U.S. that "the Russians are ahead!" People counted engineers, of
which the Soviet Union possessed hundreds of thousands. American
college and university administrators Jumped on the Sputnik
bandwagon, securing the National Defense Education Act, a thinly
disguised piece of legislation that brought all sorts of studies
under federal subscription. I remember my personal confusion one _
day to find that a close friend, a folklorist, had obtained a
series of fellowships for his graduate students under the
N.D.E.A. On the national scene Eisenhower sought to quiet the
uproar, only to find his words lost in the public melee. The
Democratic party mercilously berated the nation's oldest
president, unconcerned that Eisenhower's health was parlous--a
heart attack in 1955 (probably two of them before, in 1949 and
1953), Crohn's Disease in 1956, a stroke in 1957. The most
opportunistic American political leader in many a year, Senator
Lyndon B. Johnson, took the advice of George Reedy and began to
use Sputnik to gain the White House, but he was forestalled for a
short time by another Democratic politician who managed to speak
more convincingly of a "missile gap" and like Johnson made little
effort to find evidence to the contrary, a
All the while Nikita S. Khrushchev was producing one of the
more remarkable international shell games in the history of the
twentieth century. As in the case of Communist China during this
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era, of which critics said that China was weak but Mao was
strong, so with Russia and Khrushchev, although in no sense
either so obviously or so completely. He took his opportunity
out of the series of American intelligence efforts to penetrate
Soviet secrecy, knowing he could get away with a fair-sized bit
of lying. His assertions constantly kept the Americans off
guard. During the Suez Crisis of 1956 the Soviet Union
threatened the Western allies through graduated messages to their
leaders, scaring the weak French government by referring to a
possible deluge of intermediate-range rockets, telling the
wavering British government that only a few warheads could remove
the British Isles, informing the American government with studied
innocence that both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. possessed nuclear
warheads and the means to deliver them. In one of his Kremlin
tirades he avowed that his country possessed mlssiles of such
accuracy they could hit a fly in outer space. With these
pleasantries, which rained down upon the governments of Western
Europe and especially upon Washington from 1956 until his
disappearance from the international and national scene in 1964
(under claim of "adventurism" by his successors), the Soviet
premier did not hesitate to accompany his space bluff by
producing crises in Berlin and Cuba, not to mention stirring up
third-world countries everywhere.
This, then, was the milieu in which after the special
challenge of Sputnik, and of Lunik in 1959 (sending an unmanned
spacecraft straight into the Moon), came the fllght of Yuri
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Gagarln in April 1961, shortly after Kennedy's inauguration and
shortly before the Bay of Pigs affair, which twin humiliations
almost certainly brought the Moon race. The manner in which
Americans accepted Khrushchev's exaggerations--failed to sense
that if the Soviet Union was ahead in some space exploration the
space race as a whole had hardly been decided--was extraordinary,
although of a piece with such previous American effervescences as
the fear of native Americans, the Palmer raids after World War I,
and McCarthyism. This became evident when on February 20, 1962,
John Glenn spent five hours in space. The resultant enthusiasm
of his fellow citizens from Ohio sent him to the Senate, when he
seems likely to remain until the year 2000 or later.
The Race to the Mood
Many books and articles have described the Moon race in all
its particulars and massive achievement. 9 Even now, the
photographs taken by the spacecraft, as men and machines came
ever closer, not to mention the first landing and its subsequent
five missions to the surface, are of absorbing interest. The
books and articles describe how the grand enterprise began in
1958 when landings began to be talked about with the transition
from NASA's predecessor organization, the National Advisory
Committee for Aeronautics, and took a giant step forward with the
Kennedy formal decision in 1961. The race to beat the Russians
to the Moon required eleven years. It consumed the attention of
everyone in NASA--at peak employment 36,000 people in civil
service jobs, 400,000 hired by contractors. The agency delayed
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all other programs, and general space sciences had a modest
budget. I0
At the outset the cost was anyone's guess. Critics were
claiming $100 billion. NASA administrators made no effort to
guess low, and the last director of NACA, who was NASA's first
deputy administrator, Hugh L. Dryden, estimated a cost as high as
$40 billion. Shortly after Gagarin's flight, Robert C. Seamans,
Jr., estimated that it would cost between $20 to $40 billion.
They eventually settled on this figure of $20-40 billion, and to
hold to it they demanded flexibility and adherence to their own
timetable. In congressional hearings they pointed out that each
year of delay would cost $1 billion. In the end the project
suffered a three-year delay, half of it because of the 1967
accident in which three astronauts lost their lives on the
launching pad; the delay cost $3 billion, making a project total
(up to the time of the first Moon landing, excluding the
subsequent five landings) of $23 billion. 11
During the Apollo program there never was any question of
cooperation with the Russians, save occasional talk including a
curious speech by President John F. Kennedy before the United
Nations in September 1963, in which the president remarked to no
one in particular, "Let us do the big things together." It
elicited no response from the other side, save dismissals by a
few Soviet editors who pronounced it "premature."
For different reasons there was no American effort worthy of
the name to bring the western Europeans or Japanese into the
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project. NASA's first administrator, T. Keith Glennan, told the
hardheaded director of NASA's internatlonal relations, Arnold W.
Frutkin, that "International cooperation might, in the end, make
more sense than any other aspect of the program." As Frutkin
remembered, Glennan "said it in just so many words. "12 But in
truth there was not much Frutkin could do with an international
program beyond arranging for tracking stations and otherwise
bringing in foreign technicians and students for American
university training. Apollo had to be an American show; the
technology abroad was not good enough to use and the
international rivalry at its heart required a U.S. demonstration
project. In the only two European countries with serious space
projects, France and Britain, very special conditions obtained.
The French government under President Charles de Gaulle was
trying to exert its own and Europe's independence of the United
States, and it was impossible for Washington to cooperate with
Paris without proliferation and competition, with some of the
so-called "dirty interfacing" (revelations of American
technology) going off in the direction of the Soviet Union. As
for the British, when Sputnik went up they threw in the towel and
canceled their intermediate-range missile project, the Blue
Streak, in hope the U.S. would give them a similar missile, which
they needed to extend the life of their aging V-bombers. When
the Kennedy administration's Defense Department under Robert S.
McNamara canceled the substitute missile program, Prime Minister
Harold Macmillan arranged with his American opposite to obtain
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Polaris missiles for Britain's nuclear submarines. This
diplomacy diverted any British interest in the Apollo project.
For such reasons the Moon race was an Amerlcan affair, and
in a notable debate in the House of Representatives shortly
before the triumph of Apollo the point of view became apparent. _3
Some of the oratory owed to the custom of Congress wherein an
inflation of words sounds good to the folks back home. Some of
it derived from the excesses of the speakers. In this regard
Richard L. Roudebush (R-IN) set the tone. He offered an
amendment to NASA's authorization act in 1969, requiring the
implanting on the surface of the Moon of the American flag and
none other. A similar amendment had disappeared in committee
because it implied that the United States was about to establish
sovereignty, that is, ownership of the Moon. That would have
violated the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. Roudebush altered his
own amendment to show that implanting the flag was "intended as a
symbolic gesture of national pride in achievement and is not to
be construed as a declaration of national appropriation of claim
of sovereignty." The Indiana legislator spoke with Hoosier
eloquence:
Over $23 billion in hard-earned taxpayers' money will have
been spent to carry out this formidable task. In all due
fairness to the American taxpayer, it does not seem too much
to ask that our flag--Old Glory--be left on the lunar
surface as a symbol of U.S. preeminence in space to which
the citizens of this Nation can refer with pride . . .
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SHistory and national pride dictate that our achievements be
duly commemorated. I know of no act more significant nor
symbolic that would memorialize our achievements than the
erection of the "Stars and Stripes" on the surface of the
Moon.
The Soviets, Congressman James G. Fulton (R-PA) pointed out,
"recently sent the coat of arms as well as a picture of Lenin to
the surface of Venus." Congressman James Symington (D-MO)
countered that the president through NASA should direct what
flags or symbols should be placed on the Moon; depositing Russian
symbols on Venus was a bad idea because I do not recall that this
occasioned the general approbation of mankind.
Nor did I realize we were accepting lessons from that
particular source in how to win the hearts and minds of men.
• . . Jefferson wanted us to maintain "a decent respect for
the opinions of mankind." What "respect" does this
graceless edict demonstrate for the opinions of nations
which produced Galileo, Copernicus, Newton, Einstein,
Tsiolkovsky, and other giants in thought and deed? What
star or stripe is tarnished on Old Glory by a simple gesture
honoring the whole history of man, his collective dream, and
his epic persistence without which our own continent might
yet be undiscovered?
Other congressmen pointed out that the flag was already on the
Moon by being painted on the Surveyor spacecraft. Hence another
flag would not hurt anything. Allard Lowenstein (D-NY) thought
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the president should make the patriotic choice.
To all this point-making Roudebush was oblivious. "I feel
compelled," he announced, "to offer-this amendment in view of the
many proposals being put forth which advocate that our spacecraft
carry to the surface of the Moon the United Nations flag, the
flags of other nations, or other emblems or articles symbolic of
international cooperation in space exploration." On a voice vote
the Roudebush amendment carried, with an overwhelming chOrus of
"ayes."
Some years later, perhaps because of the troublesome end of
the Vietnam War, with patriotism worn a bit thin, and as a
contribution to detente, the United States and the Soviet Union
agreed to conduct a joint space flight, known as the Apollo-Soyuz
Test Project, in which a three-manApollo crew docked with a
two-man Soyuz crew. The U.S.S.R. agreed to a few modifications
of the Soyuz spacecraft to permit docking, and conducted a test
flight in 1974. Both countries launched spacecraft on July 15,
1975, the two ships docked on July 17, exchanged visits and joint
experiments, and undocked July 19, with Soyuz returning to earth
two days later, Apollo three days thereafter. Because the
experiment marked the last flight of the Apollo spacecraft, the
androgenous docking adaptor became obsolete at the end of the
mission. 14
In the short term the Apollo project was an American _ _
triumph. In the long term the U.S. had found itself in serious
rivalry with an opponent about which it knew little, and the
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cost, $23 billion, was large and might have made a difference in
President Johnson's "Great Society" program, or helped avoid the
inflation that fueled dissatisfaction with the Vietnam War. On
the American side, and another minus, it is possible to contend
that the Moon race led straight into defeat in Vietnam. When
rivalry with Russia turned technological it combined with other
factors to confuse the U.S. officer corps, making them think that
technology would win any sort of war, such as the conflict in
Vietnam. The Kennedy administration, to be sure, talked a great
deal about winning the hearts and minds of the people, of
counter-insurgency. The generals and colonels often thought in
terms of winning with technology. To return to the space
problem, on the Soviet side Sputnik and its aftermath, the Moon
race of the 1960s, created a technological race that the Soviet
Union could not win. The line from 1957 to the collapse in 1989
is clear.
The large admixture of bluff in Soviet _olicy under
Khrushchev may have delayed the coming of real detente by ten or
twenty years. Khrushchev's bluff with Sputnik was caught by the
first American spy satellite in 1961. The United States
announced the fact, throwing the truth in Khrushchev's face.
Interestingly, the ultimate American technological confrontation
with the Soviets, the Strategic Defense Initiative, was not meant
to be a bluff. President Ronald Reagan was a believer. Yet the
scientific impossibility of the program made it a bluff. In that
sense the Americans borrowed, with enormous success, from the
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lexicon of the Soviets.
International Relations and the Space Shuttle
After Apollo, the great American space triumph in the Cold
War, NASA turned to the second of what proved to be three large
projects, construction of a Space Shuttle, sometimes known as the
Space Transportation System (STS). Given that Apollo was a
project for humans in space, not machines, it was only to be
expected that the shuttle, sponsored by President Richard M.
Nixon in 1972, looked in the same direction. As happened with
Apollo, so with the shuttle: scientists by and large did not
favor it, believing that instrumented packages could do Just as
well, be cheaper, and not run the mortal risk of failure. But
the "man in the Moon" dream captured Americans and Soviets alike,
and after Apollo continued to hold attention, with the result
that the space choices seemed to be the shuttle and after it a
space station, with the possibility of more distant space shots,
and a "grand tour" of the planets a distinctly third choice.
With money tight because of Vietnam and the Great Society
programs, NASA began with the shuttle. Is
NASA's decision for the shuttle defined what was to be the
principal international component of the project, what became
known as Spacelab. From the beginning Spacelab was an
international project. It took its origin out of an
understandable NASA effort to involve West Europeans in a project
that would have a clean interface, not revealing Amerlcan
technology that might pass to the Soviets. This meant a module,
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in a sense a can that would fit within another can, the shuttle.
Among its attractions was that until NASA could obtain
appropriations for a space station the shuttle needed some kind
of purpose apart from transport of satellites. When shuttle
costs inevitably began to escalate it would be clear that rockets
could carry up satellites much more cheaply than the vaunted STS.
NASA needed Spacelab as a primary purpose for STS until the
shuttles could turn themselves into freighters for the space
station. 16
Persuading the Europeans to create a justification for the
shuttle by constructing a "research and applications module" was
fairly easy, for they too needed to gain time for a space project
of their own. With the approaching quincentennial of Columbus it
evidently occurred to Europeans that the shuttle module could be
the precursor of a several-module European space station that
could bear the historic name of Columbus and restore Europe to
the primacy it had lost centuries before after a tricky Genoese
did some fast talking with two simple-mlnded Spanish monarchs.
In the event, one should add, the Columbus scheme never came to
pass, because to pay for it including a proposed European shuttle
known as Hermes (why not Amerigo Vespucci?) would have cost $15
billion--S6 billion for Columbus and $9 billion for Hermes. The
abortive project would truly have required Queen Isabella's crown
jewels.
The Americans for a while had to deal with the predecessor
organizations of what in 1975 became the European Space Agency,
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known as the European Scientific Research Organization, for
spacecraft, and the European Launcher Development Organization,
for launchers. Unfortunately these organizations happened to be
of questionable competence. ELDO, for example, was trying to
build a three-stage booster, each developed in a different
country_ a sure-fire prescription for failure. Coupled with this
disorganization was the European way of doing things. On one
occasion an American member of a team dealing with Italian
scientists at Turin proposed a working lunch of sandwiches. As
he wrote later, the Aeritalla team leader, Professor Valleranl,
reacted first with shock, then dismay, finally disbelief. The
professor noted several times that "it could be done, it would
just take one phone call, was that/9__ll_what we wanted to do?"
Finally the professor exploded with: "Yes, it can be done--but
it's never been doneZ" The visitors accepted plans for a modest
lunch of five courses. 17 But all was well that ended that way.
When ESRO AND ELDO reorganized into ESA, things moved faster, and
Spacelab was duly constructed and scheduled for the American
shuttle.
Despite the awkwardness of cooperation it seemed worth the
effort. Hans Mark, NASA deputy administrator in the early 1980s,
flew over to Europe with the Boeing 747 carrying the test shuttle
and discovered theexcitement of Europeans over what
the American space program was about to do. The 747 pilot
overflew London and received permission from the Heathrow tower
to fly down the Thames at three thousand feet. The result, as
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Mark described it, was
absolutely fascinating. It was Sunday afternoon and many
thousands of people were lining the river watching for the
Enterprise to pass overhead. The crowds were enthusiastic-
-even at that altitude we could see them cheering and
waving. Then, in the course of three minutes, we flew over
the Parliament at Westminster, the Tower, and the famous
observatory at Greenwich.
Nor was that the end, for the landing at Stansted was "completely
overwhelming." People held their hands up making the "V" for
victory sign, and many were in tears. "I cannot explain why this
happened, I can only record it." The _ was the star
attraction at the Paris Air Show. On return it stopped in
Ottawa, the Canadian capital, population three hundred thousand,
and four hundred thousand people turned out to see it. Is
Several years later everyone again had discovered the hugh
costs of venturing into space. The Americans could remember the
$23 billlon-plus cost of Apollo and now found that just to enter
the test phase the shuttle cost $5.15 billion, with only two
shuttles purchased out of a fleet of five, not to mention launch
costs. The Europeans were shocked by the unending requirements
of Spacelab for documentation, _nterfacing, and testing. By 1982
the cost of Spacelab was up from $250 million to $1 billion.
Then came two more shocks for the Europeans. First NASA in
a budget bind canceled a U.S. spacecraft that was part of a two-
spacecraft International Solar Polar Mission to observe both
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poles of the sun. NASA had enlisted the Europeans in the project
and canceled with little more notice than a phone call, with the
Europeans holding the bag. 19 Then NASA officials had airily
given ESA officials the notion that they would bail out the cost
of Spacelab by buying a half-dozen copies, and NASA only bought
one unit at a cost of $128 million.
As if these experiences in international cooperation were
not enough, flight charges on the shuttle turned out to be far
higher than expected, advancing from $10 million to $300 million,
so that ESA could not afford to send up its own module. The U.S.
paid for the first flight, the Germans for others. The Europeans
complained they could not even afford to pay for experiments on
flights. The cost of shuttle flights created an impossible
situation, which NASA officials could not explain away. ESA
accused NASA of bringing all its bureaucratic overhead at Kennedy
Space Center into its charges, which may have been true. "We
tried to explain to them that we had developed the Space Shuttle,
and yet users in the U.S. government paid the same price that was
charged to ESA," wrote Douglas R. Lord. "Somehow this argument
was never accepted by our European friends. "_
Suffice it to say concerning international participation in
the shuttle that only one project proved satisfactory and that
was Canadarm, the $100-million remote-controlled crane carried in
the shuttle, used to manage satellites. It amounted to a deal
with Canada, whereby America's northern neighbor obtained all the
tickets for shuttle flights it wanted. The Canadians were happy,
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and so was NASA, which received a free crane, and the interfaces
were just as clean as those for Spacelab. 21
For the rest, the space shuttle had little to do with
international relations other than carrying international
passengers, which scientifically was no more of an achievement
than, say, the Soviet stunt with Sputnik in 1957, and much less
interesting internationally. In 1983, with the first Spacelab
mission, the shuttle took up a West German, for West Germany had
footed most of the cost of Spacelab. He was followed by
Canadians, assorted Europeans, a Japanese, and a Saudi prince.
_pa_e Station Freedom
The next major project of the American space program, the
space station, was to have more of an international component
that Spacelab, and considerably more financial involvement.
Because of a series of confusions over planning for the space
station it was to raise more questions about cooperation. And
after breakup of the Soviet Union it presented fascinating
possibilities for C.I.S.-American collaboration.
When a new NASA management team took over in 1981,
Administrator James M. Beggs and his deputy Hans Mark, announced
at their confirmation hearings that their top priority was to be
the space station, and from that moment onward it was presumed
that the station would possess a large international component.
The reasoning was necessarily devious. For one thing, there was
a strong streak of international idealism among the American
people; after the public indifference that had plagued
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development of the shuttle, NASA needed all the support it could
muster. And then there was the ever-present money problem. From
the beginning of the shuttle project the space station had been
on "hold" because of the money problem. It was impossible to
propose the station and the shuttle at the same time, because
there was not enough money, so the shuttle came first. That made
the shuttle a little embarrassing, for it needed a place to go.
Spacelab was not enough of a place. The shuttle could not be a
box car for satellites, for a rocket could do that Job much more
cheaply. As soon as possible NASA administrators had to advocate
the space station, get the box car problem out of sight. But
then the money problem raised its ugly head again. In 1981 no
one spoke of the possible cost of the space station because no
one really knew. That was where the international side of the
station came in. If cost was indeterminate but large, it would
be better to spread the cost abroad.
Also, what better way to forestall competitive European and
Asian programs than co-opt them by the device of cooperation with
the American space program?
There was yet another reason for bringing in the foreigners.
As Captain Robert Freitag, an original space station advocate,
who could be counted on to describe the issue with style,
recalled: "We knew that if we found ourselves locking in with
international agreements, it would be awfully hard to say no to
the program. "22
To give them credit, the administrators of NASA were not
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entirely cynical about international participation. During the
1970s they had seen how the primitive technological
accomplishments of Western Europe and Japan had given way to
prowess that was close to the abilities of the world's premier
technological power. Whatever the concern about interfaces that
had marked the shuttle program, they knew that sooner or later
the Europeans and Japanese would catch up. The world was coming
together, whatever nations did to preven£ it. They might as well
embrace international cooperation because they would be forced
into it anyway. And, lastly, they were all adults of the 1940s
and thereafter and knew that the old isolationist days of the
1920s and 1930s were gone forever. The Hitler government in
Germany had been defeated only by an Allied coalition.
Cooperation, once undertaken, had its momentary dangers, for
within the United States the 1980s were the era of Reaganite
conservatism and the administrators had to take care against any
claim of "dirty interfaces." A group known as the Space Station
Technology Steering Committee scheduled a meeting at
Williamsburg, Virginia, in March 1983, where there was to be talk
of "recommended advanced technologies." A pro forma invitation
was issued for foreign participants. NASA higherups withdrew the
invitation, worrying that it might lead to "a massive hemorrhage
of U.S. technology. "_ By mid-1983 it became evident that the
potential of the station for international involvement would not
sell it in Congress, and Beggs and such lieutenants as Kenneth S.
Pedersen and Margaret Finarelli backpedaled on international
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cooperation, not trying to get away from it but not stressing it
as a selling point. To Congress they offered the space station,
by this time christened Freedom, as a modern-day Fourth of
July. _
Another momentary awkwardness was the sudden hostility of
the American military establishment, in the person of Defense
Secretary Caspar M. Weinberger. The secretary said his
department wanted nothing to do with Freedom, which was deeply
embarrassing because the military was being counted on to pay for
many shuttle flights. The good side of this disappointment was
that NASA, which had been courting the military, could now avoid
it and please the West Europeans and Japanese who would find a
strictly civil program more appealing. NASA decided, in Beggs'
words, to ask the president to approve "a completely civil
station." ("Keep in the idea of international participation," he
added, albeit to members of his space station task force.) _
All the while it was necessary to pooh-pooh the refrain of
the large body of scientists who said that everything a space
station could do, a shuttle with a lab module could do better.
Freedom's chief scientist, Robert W. Phillips, avowed this was
not so; he said it, one should add, in 1992, but echoed the
explanations of a decade before. "The plant people can't wait to
do a seed-to-seed experiment," he said. "You can't do that in a
week." Same thing for animals. "Every organism I know has been
changed in space." Not to mention the advantage of forming
materials under conditions where separation in a mixture is no
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longer based on density. "26
Lastly, in making the space station attractive NASA
authorities estimated its cost at an absurdly low figure, $8
billion. The reason, the director of NASA's space station task
force, John Hodge, recalled, was that "I reached the scream level
at about $9 billion. "27 They omitted a few small things, such as
the cost of transporting the station from earth to orbit,
operating it once in orbit, and conducting the experiments with
seeds, rats, and crystals. They put in an impossibly small
reserve for changes, and limited spending for ground support.
They said nothing about a "lifeboat" to get the crew back to
earth if the station became something less than a station. These
things out of the way, Beggs ingeniously announced that the
president could purchase space station Freedom "by the yard,"
buying and sending up a piece, presumably, when the mood inspired
him.
All this set the stage for President Reagan's announcement
of the station. The president decided to support the station
early in December 1983. The decision as to its international
proportions seems not to have been his, except in a formal sense.
In a meeting at the White House on January 18, 1984, with the
president not present, an ad hoc group that included
Administrator Beggs decided to place the space station and its
international participation in the state-of-the-union address
scheduled for exactly one week later. At which point the
president's "speechwriting office," according to John M. Logsdon,
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got An touch with NASA to fit in the appropriate words. On
January 25 the president informed Congress and the nation that
"tonight, I am directing NASA to develop a permanently manned
space station and to do it within the decade." A little later in
the speech he included the international words. On January 25
the president informed Congress and the nation that "tonight, I
am directing NASA to develop a permanently manned space station
and to do it within the decade." A little later in the speech he
included the international words: "We want our friends to help
us meet these challenges and share in their benefits. NASA will
invite other countries to participate so we can strengthen peace,
build prosperity, and expand freedom for all who share our
goals. -28
The White House group of January 18 decided that Beggs would
carry the presidential invitation to the foreign governments, and
the administrator did so, like a global traveling salesman,
aboard a White House plane. An economic summit meeting in London
was in prospect for June 1984, and a group of sub-officials known
as the "summit Sherpas" arranged for their principals to declare
at the meeting that they "agree in principle to cooperate An the
development of an international Space Station, demonstrating that
free nations will continue to use outer space for peaceful
purposes and for the benefit of mankind. "_ The summit leaders
met, and with the key words spoken strolled out of the meeting
room only to encounter, on a table, a model of the proposed space
station. Photographers captured the moment, with President Reagan
336
FI! | I
standing in front of the model, arm extended, explaining the
station, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher standing next to him
looking closely at the model, and Prime Minister Yasuhlro
Nakasone on the other side of the table looking on politely, lips
pursed.
In working out internatlonal cooperation on the space
station over the followlng years the large enterprise was made
much easier by the piecemeal approach Beggs had mentioned to
President Reagan. Whatever the eventual appearance of space
station Freedom, it seemingly was like one of the children's
games of generation or two ago: "it was a celestial Tinkertoy,
its modules and solar panels and other components fitting
together any way the U.S. and the cooperating nations decided."
Because of experience with Spacelab the West Europeans in ESA
chose to contribute a service module. The Canadians because of
experience with the shuttle's Canadarm proposed a bigger arm, a
Mobile Service System.
In the latter 1980s the several projects seemed to be going
along well, admittedly with a few problems, as perhaps one might
have expected. One of the awkwardnesses was money. The European
module rose in cost toward $4.5 billion, the Japanese toward $2
billion. In the European case the opportunity to borrow from
equipment in Spacelab did not seem to make much difference. In
the Japanese it may have been the novelty of everything, the need
to begin at the beginning; whatever the reason, costs escalated.
For the Canadian arm the Ottawa government expected to spend
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about $i billion, ten times the cost of Canadarm. It was to be a
much larger arm, fifty-elght-feet long, with a payload capacity
of 128 tons. Two smaller arms would contain up to nineteen
joints to perform finely detailed tasks that otherwise would have
to be done during a spacewalk by an astronaut. The price might
increase even more because of the awkwardness of using the arm in
the extreme darkness, or brightness, of space, which skewed human
estimates of speeds and distances; experiments by shuttle crews
showed that. This might mean a robotic vision system with a
computerized eye. Moreover, the size of the space station might
require far more repairs than had been estimated, and for this
the station crews would need the arm equipped with all possible
gadgetry. Spacewalks were dangerous because of radiation, the
risk of being stranded, and the possibility of astronauts being
struck by floating debris. _
Over the entire plan for international cooperation lay the
complexities of dealing with four groups of space station
e
participants--Americans, Europeans, Japanese, and Canadians.
Cooperation virtually required a manual, a variant of Robert's
Rules of Order, before any kind of conversation took place. When
any issue arose, there was extreme awkwardness in how to decide.
There were three program coordination committees, U.S.-ESA, U.S.-
Japan, U.S.-Canada. That is, at the outset there had to be three
decisions to approve a joint program plan. Mundane decisions
might be fairly easy. For larger decisions there were so-called
MOUs--memoranda of understanding. Here was more confusion
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because of a double standard of promises. On the American side
an MOU meant only an agreement with NASA. For the international
partners it meant intergovernmental agreements, IGAs, carrying
the force of a treaty. This put the U.S. in the awkward position
(for its international partners) of exchanging simple promises
for ironclad, binding agreements. If NASA decided to go back on
an MOU it could do so, with a bow and scrape and no more; the
other nations would have to renegotiate everything with their
presidents, premiers, and parliaments. 31
This said nothing of possible conflicts among international
crew members operating the future space station. On this subject
the possibilities were incapable of being overlooked, according
to psychiatrist Patricia Santy of NASA's medical sciences
division at the Johnson Space Center in Houston. According to an
IGA of 1988 the U.S. would have criminal jurisdiction about space
station Freedom. But the American government was to consult with
the miscreant's government before proceeding to trial. A
designated space station commander, a career astronaut, not a
scientist, would have final authority in resolving operational
disputes. Hence the need to know about foreign cultures, related
Dr. Santy--how long you are in the shower, how you eat. Because
of the heterogeneity of residents aboard space station Freedom,
NASA in 1991 was drafting a code of conduct. 32
A question arose, incidentally, about press relations aboard
the future space station. Cable News Network approached the
administration of President George Bush about the possibility of
339
a small bureau on space station Freedom. Suppose Reuters also
asked for a bureau?
Co_qress and the Space Station
As if all these complications did not suffice, Congress in
1990 informed NASA of the need to cut $6 billion off the space
station project over the next five years. This was serious. The
cost of the project had risen from $8 billion to $14.5 billion,
and then soared to (including the international contribution) $38
billion. There were two ways to make the cuts required by
Congress, and NASA chose both. One was to stretch out the
program, with "milestones" or points of achievement farther
apart. This meant milestones well beyond the turn of the
century, far beyond President Reagan's milestone of a single
decade after 1984. The other was to reduce the size of the
station, which NASA redefined from a projected 508 feet to 353
feet. This meant cutting it down from nearly the length of the
capitol building in Washington (751 feet) to a mere football
field size. Reduction in size meant fewer shuttle flights to
take up "Tinkertoy" components of the station, six electricity-
producing solar panels instead of eight, perhaps fewer
experiments. It meant fewer people in the crew and less water to
carry up on the shuttle (the water requirement every three months
would now be only nine tons). A smaller station meant less
maintenance--fewer adjustments with the Canadian arm, fewer
spacewalks, fewer chances of being hit in space.
Reducing the size of the station--known felicitously as
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rrephasing, descoping, or restructuring--produced mixed feelings
among the space partners. A distinct point of irritation was
that NASA announced the smaller station without consulting its
partners, an act oddly reminiscent of the International Solar
Polar Mission a decade before. Perhaps this was because the
partners were bound by IGAs and NASA only by MOUs. For the ESA
partners downsizing itself was satisfying. They were having
budget woes, notably the Germans who were trying to swallow East
Germany. "If NASA is going to reduce their space station, I
think we have the right to reduce ours as well," said a German,
forthrightly, speaking of the ESA module, mostly German-financed.
On the Japanese side down-sizing similarly brought approval, if
for a different reason. When a Japanese Space Agency official,
T. Kato, said his team was "moving pretty good," there was a
touch of national pride in his voice. "We didn't change any
lengths. Ours was to be the shortest module. Now is will be the
longest. "33 For Japan, however, stretching out the milestones
was worrisome, because delays would increase costs.
Then in February 1993, came another order to rephase,
descope, and restructure, this time not from Congress but the
incoming administration of President William J. Clinton. NASA
officials moved immediately to the task, with a promptness that
was almost embarrassing, making an observer wonder why NASA
needed even the 353-foot station, downslzed from the 508-foot
station. Administrator Daniel S. Goldln announced that "We stand
at the doorstep of an incredible opportunity." Under the first
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downsizing the space station still would have taken more than a
decade to build. "If we continued with hugh long-term projects,"
he now said, "the technology will always be outdated. Do we want
to be up there with something in the year 2030 that was designed
in the 1980s? "_
But the congressional reduction announced in 1990, what one
wag described as the equivalent of NASA's moving from the Hyatt
Regency to Motel 6, and the Clinton administration's downsizlng
of 1993, came by chance just at the time when the Soviet Union
fell apart and a sudden, altogether unexpected development now
forced itself into the calculations of NASA's plans for space
station Freedom: the Russians, of all people, promised to come
to NASA's assistance in solving some, perhaps a11, of the
station's problems. The C.I.S. nations, heirs to the U.S.S.R.'s
space program espied an opportunity to ease NASA's budget woes.
The easements they proposed were highly embarrassing for they
displayed some of the successes of the Soviet space program and
quickly gained support from America's space allies who, if the
truth were told, had never been enthusiastic for the space
station, even at its very beginning.
C.I.S. promised to get NASA out of all its predicaments.
The space station could be a complete turnaround from the Moon
race of the 1960s. First the C.I.S. nations presented a way out
of the nearly impossible cost of shuttle launchings. Downslzing
the space station meant fewer launches, all to the good, but not
enough to count. Simple maintenance of facilities at Kennedy
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Space Center was so raising launch costs that when Endeavour
fixed a rogue satellite in 1992 that cost $270 million to build
and launch, it would have been cheaper to throw the satellite
away. 35 The defense department had paid for ten shuttle
missions, contrary to the injunction of Caspar Weinberger, but in
1992 they came to an end. The possible C.I.S. solution to
shuttle costs was a twenty-story rocket, Energiya, which first
flew in 1987. One Energlya might cost $500 million, and it was
estimated that four, accompanied by four shuttles to unload the
freighters and assemble the space station (cost of each shuttle
flight: $1 billion), would do the job. _ Total cost would be $6
billion, compared to twenty-two shuttle flights ($22 billion).
This could mean a $16 billion saving. Apart from the saving
there were two other pluses. Energiya would avoid the problem of
space station components being "shuttle compatible," that is,
fitting into a cylinder the size of the shuttle. It would avoid
the distinct possibility of another P=b__llf=ggf_ accident if the
shuttle flew twenty-two flights to loft the station and ten more
to supply the station once up. But then there were minuses.
NASA engineers have spent years making the space station shuttle-
compatible, and to use a heavy-lift vehicle would force redesign
of the station, to assemble and integrate larger pieces on the
ground. Only two Energiyas have been tested. Moreover, Energiya
uses four one-stage Zenit rockets as its own first stage, and in
separate launches Zenits have failed several times. Zenit also
is produced in the Ukraine, and if any trouble occurred between
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Ukraine and Russia (developer of Energlya) the Energiya program
would have to terminate. Using Energiya meant taking station
components to Tyuratam in Kazakhistan. It meant using Russian
ground-launch crews. Would Russian political stability last for
the life of the space station, an estimated thirty years? 37
A second Russian suggestion to NASA was the possibility of
junking space station Freedom and using the Russian Mir station.
The cost of the American space station was driving the Europeans
in that direction, because of the danger (Just like Spacelab) of
no money for experiments in the Columbus module (ESA had retained
the name of Columbus from the once-talked-about ESA space
station). Russian stations admittedly were small, and not built
for thirty years. They were only occasionally, not permanently,
manned. But NASA in opting a second time for a smaller station,
this time under the direction of President Clinton, said that it
would not have a permanent crew. At that juncture why not take
Mir? Innumerable people had lived in the Mir stations, including
a representative of almost every nation in the erstwhile eastern
bloc. The Russians held the space endurance record by a wide
margin, 366 days. ESA announced plans to use Mir to train and
launch astronauts. In 1990 the Japanese Broadcasting System (not
the Japanese government) reportedly paid $12 million to send a
journalist, Toyohiro Akiyama, on a trip to Mir. The logical next
step would be to propose a substitution of Mir for Freedom. _
Another Russian solution to a NASA problem was the Assured
Crew Return Vehicle, or lifeboat. NASA officials said nothing
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about the lifeboat when they proposed the space station. Nor did
they say anything about it when they scaled down the station in
1990, for the scaledown reduced crew size, between shuttle
visits, to four. They could have set the figure at four on
purpose; the Soviet lifeboat, the Soyuz-TM, takes three. NASA
had studied a four-person rescue vehicle but estimates it would
cost $1.6 billion. The Soyuz-TM would cost $30 million, not
counting adaptation costs. Unfortunately to land the Soyuz-TM
requires a land base of at least nineteen square miles, within
certain latitudes. There are no decent sites in the U.S. where
the only areas in range are southern Texas and Florida. But
Australia would be possible. After NASA in 1992 signed a $I
million contract with NPO Energiya, builder of the Soyuz, forty
engineers and managers met in Houston to discuss the lifeboat
issue. Russian participants in working group sessions were
previously involved with Apollo-Soyuz in 1970-75. It was their
first visit to the Johnson Space Center since that time. 39
Commercial Applications and the President
Lastly one turns to the international commercial application
of space. Begun with international competition, U.S.S.R. versus
U.S., the space age began to show complexities far beyond Cold
War competition when the commercial advantages of space
technology attracted the nations in the early Ig60s, even before
the U.S. triumph with the Moon landing. _ NASA in 1962 launched
the first two international satellites: Ariel, with a scientific
payload for the British, and Alouette for the Canadians. That
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same year President Kennedy signed the Communications Satellite
Act, which established the Communications Satellite Corporation
(COMSAT), to cooperate with other countries in producing an
operational system, and to provide services to other countries.
Then in 1963 came the beginning of an almost revolutionary use of
communications satellites: the United States placed the first
such satellite in geostationary orbit at 35,880 kilometers above
the equator. In this orbit a satellite will maintain a fixed
position as compared to a given point on the ground. The
satellite receives slgnals from a ground station, boosts its
power, and almost instantly retransmits the signal to other
ground station or stations. Three properly positioned
geostationary satellites can provide world-wide communication.
One year after the first U.S. communications satellite, the
U.S. internationalized the technology, through the International
Telecommunication Satellite Organization (INTELSAT), "to achieve
a global commercial telecommunications satellite system to
provide, for the benefit of mankind, the most efficient and
economical facilities possible, consistent with the best and most
equitable use of the radio-frequency spectrum and orbital space."
Founded by nineteen nations, it eventually gained well over a
hundred members, and even the Soviet Union in 1991--this after
attempting to create its own system, INTERSPUTNIK. When the
U.S.S.R. gave way to the C.I.S., the successor nations of Russia,
Bealarus, and Ukraine Joined INTELSAT. At the beginning, under
U.S. sponsorship, INTELSAT was very much an American
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organization, with the United States controlling sixty-one
percent of the voting authority and all the technology. U.S.
laws forbade sale of launch technology to Europe, and NASA was
forbidden to provide launch service for satellites competing with
INTELSAT. Understandably these restrictions later were relaxed.
At the present writing, 1993, INTELSAT has fifteen satellites in
orbit and carries roughly two-thirds of the world's overseas
telecommunications traffic including telephone, telegraph, telex,
television, data, and facsimile services. It carries out the
principle in the Outer Space Treaty: "The . . . use of outer
space . . . shall be carried out for the benefit and in the
interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of
economic or scientific development, and shall be the province of
all mankind."
The new network inspired the International Maritime
Satellite Organization (INMARSAT), founded in 1976 for maritime
communications, with sixty-some members by the early 1990s. The
Soviet Union was a founding member of INMARSAT and after creation
of the C.I.S. its membership included Russia, Belarus, and
Ukraine. INMARSAT
seeks to make provision for the space segment necessary for
improving maritime communications and, as practlcable,
aeronautical communications, thereby assisting in improving
communications for distress and safety of life,
communications for air traffic services, the efficiency and
management of ships and aircraft, maritime and aeronautical
public correspondence services and radio-determination
capabilities.
As the above list of purposes shows, INMARSAT from the outset had
the possibility of extending its purview well beyond maritime
communications, and in 1985 amendments to its convention gave it
a mandate of providing global aeronautical communication
services. In 1990 it introduced commercial aeronautical services
for airlines and corporate aircraft that currently include
telephone, facsimile, telex, mail, data, position reporting, and
fleet management, as well as distress and safety communications.
It is also developing land mobile communications. It is also
developing land mobile communications.
The Soviets in 1971 established the first domestic
communications satellite system, enormously helpful because of
their country's great terrltorial expanse, deploying four
satellites in elliptical orbits--better than geostationary
because of long linger times over the northern hemisphere.
C.I.S. continuation and expansion of the several domestic systems
now operating over the former Soviet Union obviously will help
make C.I.S. countries more attractive to foreign investment.
After the Soviet Union established its first domestic
satellite system many other countries followed. Naturally the
next was Canada, again with a great physical expanse, followed by
the U.S., Japan, India, Europe collectlvely (EUTELSAT) and
individually, Indonesia, China, Mexico, Brazil, Australia, and
members of the Arab League (ARABSAT). There also is EUMETSAT,
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the European Organization for Meteorological Satellites,
established to ensure operation of Meteosat, the first European
meteorological satellite, launched by ESA IN 1977. EUMETSAT
usually has two Meteosats in orbit.
In recent years the U.S. has developed navigation systems
that are marvels of space science and make navigation an entirely
new proposition compared to the complicated and hand-held
instruments of the distant past. One system, operated by the
U.S. Navy, is the Navy Navigation Satellite System, which
provides two-dimensional data (latitude and longitude).
Primarily for military users, the system is open to civilian
shipowners. Actually ninety percent of users are civilian. The
other system, not yet fully operational, was used extensively by
U.S. and allied forces in the Persian Gulf War of 1991, and is
called the NAVSTAR Global Positional System, or NAVSTAR GPS. It
will require a total of eighteen satellites, of which four must
be in view at one time, in order to provide three-dimensional
data (latitude, longitude, and altitude), twenty-four hours a
day, anywhere in the world, in all weather conditions. The
system will operate at two levels of accuracy, a "coarse" level
telling users their positions within one hundred meters, and a
"precise" level within sixteen. The department of defense plans
to make the coarse level available to civilian users.
Satellite observance of weather conditions around the globe
has also become commonplace. The predictors of weather in times
past were of course little more thansoothsayers, who if they did
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not engage in divination took measures no more scientific than to
calculate prevailing winds. Now all that has changed. The first
global cloud-cover picture was taken in 1960, and three years
later came automatic transmission of pictures, allowing real-
time readout of local cloud pictures using an inexpensive ground
station: The first spacecraft for the U.S. Weather Service went
up in 1965, a spin-stabilized configuration with two television
cameras, placed in sun-synchronous orbit. In 1970 it became
possible to obtain day and night cloud-cover observations.
Between 1975 and 1991 the U.S. launched twenty-nine weather
observations satellites, not counting such satellites launched
for the Department of Defense.
From these U.S. beginnings the other nations developed their
systems, and the U.S., ESA, and Japan now operate a world-wide
network of high altitude weather satellites that provides weather
information for the rest of the world. Satellite-supplying
participants help each other, as happened in a notable instance
in February 1993. Ordinarily the U.S. maintains two satellites.
One failed in 1989. The survivor, launched in 1987, had an
intended five-year life. Its presumed replacement, the first of
a new generation, was not ready because of schedule delays and
budget overruns. The U.S. borrowed a spare ESA satellite,
Meteosat-3, which moved from a position over the Atlantic coast
of South America to the Pacific side. It was necessary, however,
to delay the move until the U.S. built an $11 million
communications relay station in Wallops, Virginia, for Meteosat-
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3 was controlled by a station in Darmstadt, Germany. 41
A graphic illustration of what weather observation
satellites could do occurred when in 1985 a devastating cyclone
approached Bangladesh. Fortunately the Agency for International
Development had financed and built a satellite weather-alert
system, developed by NASA and operated by the National
Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration, the latter an
agency of the Department of Commerce. In the past twenty years
Bangladesh with nearly one hundred million people had suffered an
estimated 390,000 deaths from twenty-eight cyclones and other
storms. In the cyclone of 1985 the toll was perhaps I0,000, a
great deal less than would have happened without the satellite
system. 42
The Land Remote-Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984
(Landsat Act) promotes commercial distribution of data from
Landsat remote-senslng satellites, of major benefit in managing
the earth's natural resources. The secretary of commerce is
responsible also for this system and contracts with a private
group, Earth Observation Satelllte Company, for marketing
received data.
With the various satellite systems in orbit, finished or
about to be (NAVSTAR OPS is expected to be completed by 1993),
the world has become a far different place. The first
communications satellite for INTELSAT, Early Bird, had a capacity
of 240 telephone circuits or one television channel. Each of the
latest INTELSAT VI satellites can carry 24,000 telephone circuits
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as well as three television channels. By the end of 1980s the
INTELSAT system was being used by more than one hundred and fifty
nations, counting nonmembers, with over 640 earth stations
connected by 2,259 transmission paths. 43 Communications became
"a whole new ball game" a result. Weather observation,
navigation, and earth resources monitoring did so too.
The success especially of INTELSAT irritated the France of
President de Gaulle, and the French took the lead in Western
Europe in challenging American supremacy in communications
satellites. Nations of Western Europe belonging to predecessor
organizations of ESA agreed to a European launcher, Ariane,
eventually handled under contract by a French company,
Arianespace, with the purpose of putting satellites into
geostationary orbit. Ariane made its last test flight in 1981
and was ready for business. With launches from French Guiana,
capable of lifting two satelliltes into orbit, it soon proved its
worth. When President Reagan removed commercial payloads from
the shuttle, Arlane began to vie for American payloads. In
addition it launched scientific loads, such as a spacecraft named
Giotto, which sailed off to Halley's Comet in 1985. It was the
only one of five Halley's Comet probes to enter the nucleus of
the comet, and returned excellent data. The _disaster
in 1986, which destroyed an American shuttle and its entire crew,
canceled the U.S. plan to observe the comet. _
Japan too sought to develop launch vehicles and satellites
beginning in the 1970s, initially by persuading the United States
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to license the technology. Licenses carried limits less advanced
that "state of the art." Japan also could not launch non-
Japanese payloads without permission. Unlike the French, the
Japanese found this arrangement satisfactory, and allowed the
expected first launch date for their commercial rocket to slip
from 1992 to 1993. Meanwhile Japan launched communications and
weather satellites with American-supplied boosters. Japan has
produced small boosters for science satellites. An issue arose
between the two countries over unfair trading practices, namely,
that Japan closed its communications satellite market to U.S.
competition. In 1990, Japan agreed to allow foreign suppliers to
bid for operational satellites, and a contract went to Space
Systems/Loral (formerly Ford Aerospace). India and Israel also
have capaity to enter the commercial satellite market, but thus
far have not made many space launches.
China entered the competition, with its first commercial
launch in 1987 (China launched its first milltary satellite in
1970), taking a materials processing experiment into space for a
French company. The Chinese arranged a similar flight next year
for a German consortium, Intospace. A third was a communications
satellite for Asiasat, Inc., a compnay based in Hong Kong.
Followlng the Tiananmen Square uprising a question arose over
whether to allow Chinese vehicles to launch U.S. satellites. The
Chinese in 1991 launched only a single communications satellite,
designated for geostationary orbit; a failure of the Long March-
3's third-stage rocket left it in the wrong orbit. Meanwhile
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other contretemps were making China's role in commercial launches
difficult. Because the difference between civil and military
rockets is minuscule, the U.S. was sensitive to any export of
Chinese rockets. In 1991, President Bush announced it would be
inappropriate to approve further export licenses for satellite
components launched by China. Technically speaking the exports
covered by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) did not
include satellite components, only rockets--but the Chinese were
proposing to launch aSwedish satellite with U.S. components and
this fact gave the president leverage. When the Chinese agreed
to adhere to the MTCR, the president lifted the sanctions.
Another difficulty with China concerned an agreement signed in
1989 that China would charge prices "on a par" with Western
launch-service providers. The Chinese contracted with the Arab
Satellite Consortium for a $25-million launch, and France
objected because of the low price. ESA'sArianespace later
received the contract. The the perennial human rights
difficulties with China again intervened against Chinese
commercial launches. China had contracts to launch three foreign
satellites in 1992, two for Australia, one for Sweden. But in
the spring of 1991, Indonesia chose an American company,
McDonnell Douglas, to launch its Palapa satellite instead of
selecting the China Great Wall Industry Corporation, probably
because of uncertainty surrounding U.S. export of components for
satellites launched by China.
After the Soviet Union broke up, the C.I.S. nations gave
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evidence of entering the space business, perhaps in an indirect
way. An ingenious proposal came from an Australian company, Cape
York Space Agency, to avoid technology transfer problems by
buying Zenit rockets and sending them up from Cape York,
Australia. This would circumvent the U.S. ban on export to the
Soviet Union/C.I.S. countries of satellites containing U.S.
components. The agency would own the rockets, and an Australian
or American company (perhaps U.S. Space Boosters, Inc., a
division of United Technologies) could put the satellites on the
rockets, so no Russians needed to go near the launch site. U.S.
companies in the commercial launch business--McDonnell Douglas,
General Dynamics, and Martin Marletta--objected to U.S. Space
Boosters' application for a technical assistance agreement from
the state department, claiming it would permit C.I.S. (and
Chinese) launch-service providers to lower prices and undercut
the launch market. The Cape York Space Agency were bankrupt, but
another Australian company, Space Transportation Systems,
attempted to proceed with the idea.
Another scheme to bring in the Russians surfaced in 1991.
The proposal was to sell military satellites, weighing five
hundred pounds, launched six at a time on a single Soviet Tsyklon
booster. The hope was to have the first set of commercial
versions in orbit on a launch in 1993. A twenty-four spacecraft
constellation could be opeerational by 1995. An American support
group appeared, the Consortium of Small Satellite Constructors
and Servie Providers, based in Warwick, New York. By having the
Soviets build and launch the system, the group would avoid U.S.
licensing requirements. It all sounded like suitably capitalist
enterprise. The satellites were designed by NPO Precision
Instruments of Moscow and built by NPOApplied Mechanics of
Krasnoyarsk. 45
And so, in not yet forty years, from 1957 to 1993, the date
of writing, the space age has had its beginnings and passed into
something resembling--one uses the word glngerly--maturity. In
no single aspect of human activity since October 1957, has there
been so many changes, so many accomplishments, as in the science
and technology of space.
Perhaps the most important change has been the marked shift
from U.S.-U.S.S.R. competition to widespread international
cooperation. To be sure, in NASA's statutory statement of 1958 a
mandate appeared for international cooperation: "The Congress
hereby declares that it is the policy of the United States that
activities in space should be devoted to peaceful purposes for
the benefit of all mankind." President Kennedy asked the nations
to "do the big things together." Competition, however, occurred
if only because of the military implications of space science and
because of the unstable nature of American public oplnion--the
latter being certain that "the Russians are aheadl" On their
part the leaders of the Soviet Union did their worst to instill
among Western audiences a belief that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.
were racing for supremacy in space and that the Soviet Union was
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ahead. Throughout the latter 1950s this was the nature of the
space age and such also was its nature into the 1960s when the
Soviets tried to beat the Americans to the Moon and failed only
because they could not produce boosters capable of lifting their
space capsules.
In the mid-1960s competition began to change toward
cooperation, for the Soviet Union's leaders realized that their
space scientists simply could not make the boosters they so
desperately needed, and at about the same time U.S. leadership
with INTELSAT showed the way toward an international cooperation
that would transform communlatlons on land and sea, bringing the
world together in ways that all the heralded revolutions in
communications of the nineteenth century, telegraphs and
telephones and steam navigation, failed to accomplish. It is a
curious but now obvious truth that at the height of the Cold War,
during the Kennedy-Khrushchev confrontation over Cuba and the
Soviet race to obtain equality in intercontinental ballistic
missiles, a race that achieved what Henry A. Kisslnger in 1969
described as sufficiency, a turn of events in space science
pointed to cooperation. Thereafter, with increasing
internationalization of the science and technology and now with
the end of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Union,
international cooperation became ever more evident.
It has been a long passage from the 1950s to the 1990s. Not
all the great feats in space talked about have become possible.
Some may never be possible. But the challenges are there, and
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beckon in ways that older frontiers never did. The national
projects of the past now seem terribly old-fashloned, and
riddance to them. The future of U.S. leadership, and the
president is pointing in this direction, is toward greater
cooperation with other nations in the exploration of space for
the benefit of all humanity.
0
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Notes
i. According to Yuli B. Khariton, aged eighty-eight, a
participant in the Soviet nuclear program from its inception, the
Soviets were well on their way toward making their own A-bomb
when they received the full plans of the American bomb. Stalin
advised using the plans, remarking that "we have to move broadly,
with Russian sweep." In 1951 the Soviets detonated their own
version (New York Times, January 14, 1993). Khariton also
related that Andrei D. Sakharov produced an H-bomb in 1953. All
the evidence is to the contrary, however (William J. Broad,
"soviets Shown to Have Lagged on H-Bomb in 50's," ibid., October
7, 1990). But in offering this assertion Khariton raised an
interesting possibility that, if true, would underline Soviet
nuclear weakness. Just before the Soviet test of the supposed H-
bomb in 1953 (it was an enhanced atomic bomb, wrapped in layers
of the compound lithium deuteride, equal at most to a megaton on
T.N.T.) he says that Stalin asked the physicist who directed the
Soviet nuclear program, Igor V. Kurchatov, whether there was
enough plutonium to build to such bombs, to keep one "in
reserve." Kurchatov replied that there was only enough for one
(implying that in 1949-1953 the Russians had no nuclear weapons).
2. Herbert York, Race to Obllvlon (New York: Putnam, 1970).
3. The leading general account is Walter A. McDougall's ", . ,
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The Heavens _Dd the _arth": A Political History Of the Space Aqe
(New York: Basic Books, 1985).
4. R. Cargill Hall, "Eisenhower, Open Skies, and Freedom of
t!Space, pp. 24-25, as yet unpublished manuscript, NASA Historical
Reference Collection, NASA Headquarters, Washington, DC.
5. Ibid., p. 9.
6. "... the IGY scientific satellite program was clearly
identified as a stalking horse to establish the precedent of
overflight in space for the eventual operation of its military
" the Heavensalternate," (Ibid. , p. 23). Also McDougall, , ,
add the Earth, pp. ii0, 194.
N
" the Heavens and the Earth, p. 258.7. McDougall, , , ,
8. According to Johnson, "That sky had always been so friendly,
and had brought us beautiful stars and moonllght and comfort and
pleasure; all at once it seemed to have some question marks all
over it because of this new development. I guess for the first
time I started to realize that this country of mine might perhaps
not be ahead in everything." John M. Logsdon, ThQ Decision to Go
to the Moon: Project Apollo and the National Interest
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1970), p. 21 For other
Johnsonian statements on the space program, also his power plays,
see Robert A. Divine, "Lyndon B. Johnson and the Politics of
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Space," in Robert A. Divine, ed., The Johnson Years: Vietnam.
the Environment. and Science (Lawrence: University Press of
Kansas, 1987), pp. 218-253. Perhaps his best remark concerned
the Apollo race: "I do not believe that this generation of
Americans is willing to resign itself to going to bed each night
by the light of a Communist moon" (p. 234). Johnson capitalized
on Reedy's advice, and among other efforts worked through Senator
Richard Russell of Georgia to get one of his presidential rivals
in the Democratic party, Senator Stuart Symington of Missouri,
out of the Sputnik investigation. The Democratic lawyer, James
H. Rowe, Jr., also urged Johnson on (p. 220). Johnson did chair
the military preparedness subcommittee hearings. He was not
always present, and perhaps some of his overstatements may be
credited to that fact. He clearly knew more than Kennedy about
the real situation.
9. Logsdon, The Decision to Go to the Moon, recounts the
decision to "go." Charles Murray and Catherine Bly Cox,
The Race to the Moon (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989),
provides an excellent overview of a complex subject. A well-
written account of the efforts to build the Saturn launch vehicle
by yon Braun and his colleagues can be found in Frederick I.
Ordway III and Mitchell R. Sharpe, The Rocket Team (New York:
Crowe11, 1979). NASA officlal histories of the subject include:
Charles D. Benson and William Barnaby Faherty, MoonDort: A
History of APollo Launch Facilities _ Operations (NASA SP-
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4204, 1978); Courtney G. Brooks, James M. Grimwood, and Loyd S.
Swenson, Jr., Chariots for Apollo: A HistorY 9f Manned Lunar
(NASA SP-4205, 1979); Roger E. Bilstein, Staaes to
Saturn: A TechnoloGical History of the ADollo/Saturn Launch
(NASA SP-4206, 1980); Arnold S. Levine, Manaainq NASA in
the Apollo Era (NASA SP-4102, 1982); W. David Compton, Where No
Man Has GoDe Before: A History of Apollo Lunar Exploration
(NASA SP-4214, 1989); and Sylvia D. Fries, NASA
_nqineers and the AGe of Apollo (NASA SP-4104, 1992).
10. "We were eating their lunch, eating their lunch," Robert F.
Freitag oral history, May 16, 1985, by Sylvia D. Kraemer, p. 31,
NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA Headquarters,
Washington, DC.
11. Cost figures are in a letter from Webb to John L. Sloop,
June 14, 1972, Si Info 9, Logsdon case file, NASA Historical
Reference Collection.
12. Arnold W. Frutkin oral history, April 4, 1974, by Eugene M.
Emme and Alex Roland, pp. 28-29, NASA Historical Reference
Collection. "There was just no practical basis for giving any
thought whatever to international cooperation in that program.
would argue that strenuously with anyone who thought that--I
I
mean, given the premises of the Apollo program, it was absurd at
that time to think of international cooperation, and so a very
large segment of the program really went ahead without
international involvement .... It is also a very important
thing to know that throughout the sixties, throughout the entire
term of the sixties, no foreign government, no foreign official,
ever hinted of a desire to enter the manned spaceflight program
anyway, so there was no ready basis to build on." Frutkin oral
history, July 30, 1970, by John M. Logsdon, pp. 17-18, NASA
Historical Reference Collection. See also Frutkin's
International Cooperation in SDace (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, 1965).
13. For the following quotes see Ken Hechler, Toward the Endles_
Frontier: History of the Committee on Science and Technolow7,
1959-79 (Washington, DC: Government Printing office, 1980), pp.
394-395.
14. See Edward Clinton Ezell and Linda Neuman Ezell, The
Partnership: A History of the ADolIo-Sovuz Test Pro_ect
(Washington, DC: NASA SP-4209, 1978).
15. For an excellent survey of the literature see Roger D.
Launius and Aaron K. Gillette, comps., Toward a History _ the
Space Shuttle: An Annotated BiblioqraDhv (Washington, 1992).
This is the first volume in Studies in Aerospace History,
sponsored by the NASA History Office.
16. Howard E. McCurdy, The Space Station Decision: Incremental
Politics and Technoloaical Choice (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins
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University Press, 1990), p. 72. McCurdy's book is an ideal
combination of technical writing and high literary ability. He
has a new book just out, Inside NASA: Hiah Technology and
Organizational Chanae in the American SPace Proaram (Baltimore,
MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993).
17. Douglas R. Lord, Spacelab: An International Success Story
(Washington, DC: National Aeronautics and Space Administration,
1987), p. 222.
18.. McCurdy, The SD_ Station Decision, p. 200.
19. John M. Logsdon, "U.S.-European Cooperation in Space
" _cience, 223 (January 6, 1984),Science: A 25-Year Perspective,
14. See also the amusing explanation in Adam Gruen, "Partners,"
pp. 92-93: "In effect, this left European nations to foot the
bill for completing, storing, or junking their half of the
program." Gruen's chapter is part of a manuscript on the space
station that will take upwhere McCurdy's book stops. Copy in
NASA History Office.
20. Lord, _zP__, P. 274.
21. McCurdy, The Space Station Decision, p. 99.
22. Space News, June 17-23, 1991; McCurdy, The Space Shuttle
Decision, p. 197. For this and subsequent references to aerospace
periodicals, also most newspapers, I am indebted to Lee D.
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Saegesser, archivist of the NASA History Office, who has
systematically searched the periodicals and papers and clipped
and filed anything bearing on NASA.
23. McCurdy, The Sp_@ Shuttle Decision, p. 202.
24. John M. Logsdon, Tgqether in Orbit: The OriGins of
International Participation in Space Station Freedom (Washington,
DC: George Washington University, 1991), pp. 37, 129-130.
25. For the following see McCurdy, The Space Station Decision,
pp. 168-169, 171, 174, 232. McCurdy concludes (pp. 234-235) that
to make the station politically acceptable, and the shuttle
before it, "to preserve flexibility and save money, politicians
managed to avoid a commitment to a long-range space policy for
twenty years." The cost, he writes, to people who had to carry
projects forward, was very high. Use of "incremental strategies"
was especially evident in deciding on the space station.
26. Christian Science Monitor, October 21, 1992.
27. McCurdy, The Sp_ce Station Decision, p. 171.
28. Logsdon, Toqether in Orbit, pp. 48-53. "The issue of
international participation was not separately raised with
President Reagan; his approval came in the form of overall
approval of the speech text" (p. 53). A year later Captain
Freitag offered his own explanation of why the president support
the shuttle: "I think . . . he was a Boy Scout at heart. I think
he had always been interested in space and this was nothing new.
And that the whole shuttle enterprise was thrilling to him, and
that things like that . . . People like Beggs were deeply
influential with him. People like the Congress committee
chairmen. The other thing about it, it was the only good answer.
What other answer was there? . . . assuming you wanted a big
project, assuming you wanted something that had all the virtues
of maintaining NASA as a viable organization, yet serving a
tremendous amount of apparent usefulness, there was no
alternative. You can't build another shuttle this time; a lot of
nickel-and-dime projects are interesting but . . . A mission to
the moon is not going to grab it. There are no science projects
of that magnitude. A telescope is big, but not that big. Mars is
a long ways away. SDI might have been interesting from the
standpoint of the defense side, but not on the civil side. So I
think there is a certain lack of alternatives to it, too." Oral
history, July 12, 1935, by Sylvia K. Kraemer, pp. 19-20, NASA
Historical Reference Collection.
29. Logsdon, ToqQther in Orbit, p. 62.
30. Houston Post, September 28, 1990; _L__J, March 11-17,
1991; New York Times, October 30, 1992; NASA Station Break,
November 1992. A large problem that needs international
regulation is floating debris in space, which could threaten the
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space station. A piece of debris the size of an aspirin tablet
travels at twenty-two thousand miles an hour and packs the punch
of a four-hundred-pound safe moving at sixty miles per hour. More
than three and one-half million man-made objects are whirllng in
orbit. They may force the space station modules to use shields.
The General Accounting office has estimated a thirty-six percent
chance that a piece of debris will strike a critical part of the
station. Redesign to provide shielding could lower risk to
twelve percent. The GAO report called on NASA to halt design
work until it addresses the shield problem. Representative
Barbara Boxer (D-CA), who is against the space station, called
for an investigation (_, June 1-7, 1992). McCurdy, The
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Chapter 7
National Leadership and Presidential Power
by
John M. Logsdon
Many benefits have been claimed for the space program--
scientific discovery, economic growth, technological advancement,
job maintenance, and educational excellence. None of these
benefits mandate the degree of presidential involvement sought
for this endeavor. National leadership does. The primary
determinant of the president's overall attitude toward space has
been the judgement of how useful the program is an instrument for
projecting an image of U.S. global leadership. It is also the
primary motive behind the myth of presidential leadership. If
the president decides to project U.S. leadershlp through space
achievements, space boosters believe, then the program will enjoy
wide-spread political support. Conversely, if that link is not
made, then the program can expect to struggle.
Several presidents have treated the space program as a
demonstration of American leadership: certainly John Kennedy,
probably Lyndon Johnson, and perhaps Ronald Reagan. Even Dwight
Eisenhower and Richard Nixon sought to garner foreign policy
advantages through the space effort in their own modest ways.
Why then has the space program struggled in its quest for
political support? None of these presidents--except perhaps
Kennedy--has thought it necessary for the United States to be
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preeminent in space, despite much rhetoric to the contrary.
Preeminence is defined here as "being clearly leading or
dominant." To date, no U.S. president with the possible
exception of John Kennedy has been willing to allocate the funds
necessary to achieve across-the-board preeminence.
The resulting contradiction has both fed and weakened the
myth of presidential leadership. The rhetoric of national
preeminence has encouraged advocates of space exploration to
believe in presidential power, a consequence of the president's
special advantages in setting the national agenda where the
security of America's international standing is involved. As
Arthur Schlesinger has observed, challenges to American security
in "an increasingly perilous world" have been a primary force
compelling the "concentration of authority in the Presidency. "I
Advocates of space exploration have clearly understood the
politlcal advantages to be gained by treating the program as a
matter of national leadership in the world.
At the same time, no president except Kennedy has attached
to the space program the sort of life-or-death priority that has
characterized other great national imperatives of the twentieth
century such as the Manhattan project that led to the development
of the atomic bomb. Space enthusiasts like to think that
extraterrestrial exploration deserves such a mandate, a view
excited by the crash program to send humans to the Moon. Few
presidents, as this chapter reveals, have defined space
leadership in those terms.
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To begin, it is necessary to try to give a little substance
to the term _ that is at the heart of this analysis.
The quest for leadership has been a central feature of U.S. space
policy from the very beginning. The bill that the Eisenhower
administration sent to Congress in April 1958, which became the
Space Act of 1958, set as a pollcy objective "the preservation of
the role of the United States as a leader in aeronautical and
space science and technology. -2 Eisenhower's objective is
notable in its use of the article "a" as opposed to "the." The
president's bill did not ask Congress for a formal statement of
policy that called for the United States to be the leader in
space science and technology, but rather, _ leader.
Indeed, over the past 35 years, the word leadership has been
pervasive in most discussions and reports dealing with space, to
the point that it almost loses any specific meaning and becomes
only expected rhetoric. In fact, there are many possible meanings
for the term leadership. Some have to do with relative standing
in a competition, identifying who is "ahead" by some measure.
Other definitions describe the absolute character or quality of a
country's efforts; in this case, there can be many leaders. But
beneath the rhetoric is a basic understandlng--that being
perceived by others, and by itself, as being at the forefront of
space capabilities and achievements is in the American national
interest.
The United States has actively sought space leadership when
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the sitting president has made the judgement that such leadership
was an important element of U.S. power. In this context, U.S.
power is defined as the ability to influence events and choices
around the world so that they are congruent with American
interests. It is a little bit unfashionable to talk about power
and its use, and members of the space community do not usually
link space activities to the creation and use of national power.
The desire for power in international relations can be seen,
however, as the fundamental underpinning of the U.S. quest for
space leadership. A brief and selective overview of how various
presidents have assessed the links among the concept of
leadership, the U.S. civilian space program, national power, and
international prestige is instructive in this regard.
Historical Overview
Dwight D. Eisenhower was never totally convinced that being
a leader in space was important to U.S. international interests.
He certainly heard arguments to the contrary, but he used the
power of his presldential office to reign in advocates of an
expensive and aggressive space program. As early as May 1955, he
approved a space pollcy statement, National Security Council
(NSC) 5520, that warned:
considerable prestige and psychological benefits will accrue
to the nation which first is successful in launching a
satellite. The inference of such a demonstration of advanced
technology and its unmistakable relationship to
intercontinental ballistic missile technology might have
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important repercussions on the political determination of
free world countries to resist Communist threats, especially
if the USSR were to be first to establish a satellite. "3
Eisenhower's resistance to the idea that the launch of a
small satellite had any real significance to the relative
military standing of the United States and the Soviet Union has
been well documented by several historians, and the essay in this
volume by Greenstein and Callahan makes the point well. The
phrase "calm conservatism "4 has been used to describe the
president's stance as others pushed for early U.S. entry into a
prestige-orlented space race with the U.S.S.R. 5 Even so,
Eisenhower did approve two post-Sputnik space policy statements
that made the link between space leadership and U.S. global
interests. For example, the first post-Sputnik statement of U.S. _
space policy, NSC 5814/1 of August 1958, noted that "to be strong
and bold in space technology will enhance the prestige of the
United States among the peoples of the world and create added
confidence in U.S. scientific, technological, industrial and
military strength." This statement also called for developing
the space capabilities needed "to establish the United States as
a recognized leader in space. ''6
However, Dwight Eisenhower was not willing to invest U.S.
resources in space primarily on leadership grounds; rather, there
had to be other tangible benefits for a project to be approved.
Eisenhower acknowledged the space race, but was not willing to
pay the price of a clearly leading position in that competition.
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His attitude is perhaps best captured in an excerpt from his
January 1960 space policy statement:
To minimize the psychological advantages which the USSR has
acquired as a result of space accomplishments, select from
amona those current Q_ pro_ected U.S. space activities of
intrinsic military° scientific or technoloalcal val_,
[emphasis added] one or more projects which offer promise of
obtaining a demonstrable effective advantage over the
Soviets and, so far as is consistent with solid achievements
in the over-all space program, stress these projects in
present and future programming. "7
In stark contrast, John F. Kennedy clearly was convinced of
the link between space leadership and core U.S. interests, and
that conviction led to his decision to use his public office to
mobilize national will and resources that produced Project
Apollo. The decision to go to the Moon has been described by
Walter McDougall as an "overdetermined event; "8 certainly the
record on why Kennedy approved Apollo is very clear, and the
quest for leadership was at the center of that decision. Eight
days after the Soviet launch of the first human, Yuri Gagarin,
into orbit, President Kennedy asked Vice President Lyndon B.
Johnson to conduct a survey of where the U.S. stood in space. In
particular, Kennedy asked, "Do we have a chance of beating the
Soviets by putting a laboratory in space, or by a trip around the
moon, or by a rocket to go to the moon and back with a man. Is
there any other space program that promises dramatic results in
_, 377
which we could win? "9
Johnson's reply was equally clear. The vice president
transmitted to the president on May 8 a report penned by NASA
Administrator James Webb and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara
that represented a radical change in policy from that of the
Eisenhower administration. Rather than setting the terms for
competition with the Soviet Union so that projects must have
other elements of "intrinsic merit," the report recognized that
Major successes, such as orbiting a man as the Soviets have
just done, lend national prestige even though the
scientific, commercial or military value of the undertaking
may by ordinary standards be marginal or economically
unjustified . . .
This nation needs to m_@ _ positive decision to Dursue
_pace DroSects aimed at enh_nciDq national m;estiae. I°
What is not as clear is the consistency of Kennedy's view of
the link between space achievement, U.S. leadership, and
international realities. Apollo, for Kennedy, may have been more
a response to the specific political situation in the first
months of his presidency than a symbol of his longterm commitment
to U.S. space leadership. Both in 1962 and 1963, Kennedy called
for major, highly classified reviews of the space program to
determine, among other issues, whether to go ahead with Apollo as
planned.
Then, on September 20, 1963, speaking to the General
Assembly of the United Nations, Kennedy suggested "a joint
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expedition to the moon .... Why, therefore, should man's first
flight to the moon be a matter of national competition? "11 This
was not a casual remark or speech writers' rhetoric; rather, it
was indicative of the serious consideration being given by
Kennedy and his advisers to recasting Apollo as a cooperative
project. Just ten days before he was murdered, Kennedy issued a
National Security Action Memorandum directing NASA Administrator
James Webb to take the "initiative and central responsibility
within the Government for the development of a program of
substantive cooperation with the Soviet Union in the field of
outer space." That program was to include "cooperation in lunar
landing programs. ,,12
If one were to give full credence to John Kennedy's public
rhetoric, he above all U.S. presidents was committed placing the
force of his office behind the goal of U.S. space leadership.
This has led to the so-called Apollo syndrome of NASA, a belief
that a president by his mere announcement of bold space programs
can ensure their welfare. In private, and this was something
most advocates of a strong space program did not know and have
begun to perceive only within the last decade, Kennedy's approach
seems to have been somewhat different as he wrestled with the
reasonableness of what his public rhetoric had set in motion.
remarks the day before he was assassinated, Kennedy said "the
space program stands on its own as a contribution to national
strength .... I think the United States should be a leader . .
• should be
In
second to none. -13 Whether or not John Kennedy fully
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subscribed to this view, history is likely to record him as the
most pro-space president of the twentieth century. Certainly
supporters of space exploration have already assigned him that
distinction.
As senator and vice president, Lyndon Johnson seems to have
been staunch supporter of the space program and a firm believer
in the importance of space leadership to U.S. national interests.
He played a key role in developlng the recommendations that led
to Apollo and in assembling the political coalition in support of
the undertaking. When President Kennedy asked him in 1963 to
identify the benefits that could flow from the space program,
Johnson, in a May 13 response, noted that in addition to whatever
tangible benefits might result:
a much more fundamental issue is at stake--whether a
dimension that can well dominate history for the next few
centuries will be devoted to the social system of freedom or
controlled by the social system of communism .... (O)ur
space program has an overriding urgency that cannot be
calculated solely in terms of industrial, scientific, or
military development. The future of society is at stake. 14
Within a little more than six months, Lyndon Johnson was
president. Robert Dallek's paper in this volume quotes him as
recalling for Walter Cronkite, "I think I spent more time in the
space field . . . up to '63 than I did after I became
President. ''15 While Johnson's views regarding the importance of
space were unlikely to have changed drastically, other concerns-
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-financing the Great Society, urban Unrest, and the draining
conflict in Southeast Asia--dominated his presidency.
Johnson remained committed to finishing Apollo, but much to
the frustration of NASA Administrator James Webb, he was
unwilling to approve new projects that would build on the
capabilities developed during the 1961-1965 space mobilization.
After peaking in 1965, NASA's budget for space began a rapid
downslide that was to continue for the next decade. Lyndon
Johnson may have believed in the importance of space leadership,
but he found himself unable to allocate to the space program the
resources required to sustain that leadership once America
reached the Moon. His support for space is unlikely to be
recorded as one of the highllghts of Lyndon Johnson's years in
the White House. At the same time, his support for Apollo and
his unwillingness to commit to large follow-on projects
reinforced the image of the president as omnipotent. Space
boosters took from this experience a lesson that the president
must be convinced, and in that convincing the political
requirements of support have been met.
By the time Richard Nixon assumed the presidency in January
1969, the NASA budget had been reduced to approximately $4
billion from its $5.2 billion peak. Nixon's space transition
team, headed by Nobelist Charles Townes, told the new president
that a budget at the $4 billion level was "adequate" and that at
that budget level the United States could carry out "an
adequately competitive space effort." The team believed that it
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was not necessary to compete with the Soviet Union "in detail,"
but that "the U.S. effort must be as strong overall as that of
the Soviet Union. "16
President Nixon seems to have taken to heart this less-
than-ringing call to continued space leadership. Like everyone
else, he basked in the glory of the first lunar landing in the
summer of 1969. But when confronted by the bullish
recommendations of the Space Task Group in September 1969, Nixon
remained silent for six months, then announced in March 1970 that
"our approach to space must be bold--but it must also be
balanced .... Space expenditures must take their place within a
rigorous system of national priorities. "17
Reducing the priority and the budget demands of the space
program after the first lunar landing was a conscious decision on
Richard Nixon's part. He was advised that a majority of "the
heart of your constituency" believed that less money should be
spent on space, la After two years of reductions, however, one of
the president's most trusted advisers told him that the cuts were
going too far, and that NASA was being proposed for further
reductions "because it is cuttable, not because it is doing a bad
job or an unnecessary one. "19 Caspar Weinberger, then Deputy
Director of the Office of Management and Budget, couched his
argument against additional cuts in the NASA budget in terms of
the space program's links to the U.S. image in the world:
It would be confirming, in some respects, a belief that I
fear is gaining credence at home and abroad: That our best
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years are behind us, that we are turning inward, reducing
our defense commitments, and voluntarily starting to give up
our super-power status, and our desire to maintain our world
superiority.
America should be able to afford something besides
increased welfare, programs to repair our cities, or
Appalachian relief and the like. _
Nixon, with his intense sense of world affairs, was taken by
Weinberger's argument. At the top of the memo he penned, "I
agree with Cap." NASA's budget slide began to bottom out, and
the president within six months approved development of the Space
Shuttle.
An important change in the way the United States would
pursue space leadership occurred during the Nixon presidency.
With the successful Apollo 11 mission, the United States had
clearly won the space race. Now the United States would seek to
expand its cooperative efforts with both its allies and with the
Soviet Union. George Low recorded Nixon's views after a January,
1972 meeting with him:
The President said that he is most interested in making the
space program a truly international program and that he had
previously expressed that interest• He wanted us to stress
international cooperation and participation for all nations.
• . . he is not only interested in flying foreign
astronauts, but also in other types of meaningful
participation, both in experiments and even in space
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hardware development. 21
By demonstrating the quality of its capabilities within a
cooperative project, the United States could continue as the
leader even as nations began to work together in space. This is
a theme in U.S. space policy that continues to today, albeit with
some rough spots along the way. In adopting this position, space
exploration champions once again believed that the president
could have his way--since that was what was happenlng--and that
Nixon had no interest in space. What was required, again, was
the convincing of the president and with it everything would be
good--as it had been in the heyday of Apollo.
There is little to specifically link Gerald Ford to major
space policy or program decisions. Indeed, in most areas the two
and one-half years of Ford's presidency were marked by continuity
with the policy directions established during the Nixon
administration. Space was no exception. No major decisions on
space came to the White House while Ford was president, and he
took no major initiatives. The NASA budget did begin a gradual
climb upward, and in his last budget Ford approved "new starts"
for both the Galileo mission to Jupiter and the Hubble Space
Telescope. This is the most identifiable mark on space policy
made by the Ford administration, since approving two major space
science programs at the same time had not happened before 1977,
and certainly has not happened since.
The tone of Jimmy Carter's approach to space may have been
set by the advice given in his transition report on NASA, which
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was prepared by an individual named Hick MacNeil. That report
noted with a high degree of skepticism that a major argument in
support of NASA was that "to keep our political and cultural
values in high esteem, we must periodically give a display of
technological virtuosity .... We transfer vigor and Number 1
status in a particular field, to the nation as a whole. Selling
international prestige on this basis panders to people's
insecurities." MacNeil suggested that the Carter administration
"keep separate the sales pitches that involve international
prestige, displays of power, Buck Rogers entertainment. These
play up to our insecurities and offer satisfactions and
diversions that are artificial. "22
While these views may not have had a direct impact on
President Carter's attitude toward space, he certainly did not
embrace the concept that space leadership was important to core
U.S. interests. The White House issued a statement of national
space pollcy in October 1978 that took a quite measured view,
noting that
space activities will be pursued because they can be
uniquely or more efficiently accomplished in space. Our
space policy will become more evolutionary rather than
centering around a single r massive engineering feat.
Pluralistic objectives and needs of our society will set the
course for future space efforts. _
The same statement listed the fourth of nine objectives of
the civilian space program as being to "assure U.S. scientific
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and technological leadership for the security and welfare of the
nation . . .,,24 Like the switch in emphasis from competition to
cooperation under Richard Nixon, this statement appears to mark a
watershed in U.S. space policy. Rather than seeking leadership
through achievement, now the United States would lead in
technology and capability, without committing itself to their
visible use.
An additional clue to Jimmy Carter's attitude toward the
space program can be found in his Rose Garden remarks on the
occasion of the tenth anniversary of the first lunar landing.
After accepting mementos from Nell Armstrong and NASA
Administrator Robert Frosch, the president noted that "we landed
on the Moon because our Nation set a firm goal, and we united
behind that effort." Then he went on to suggest that other
priorities were more important in his view than space
achievement: "Today, we face an equally challenging goal in
fighting for energy security .... We will win energy security
for our Nation in the same way we won the race to the Moon. "2s
These were hardly the words of a president committed to U.S.
leadership in space.
If his rhetoric were taken at face value, Ronald Reagan was
a quite strong supporter of U.S. leadership in space. But, as
noted in Lyn Ragsdale's paper in this volume, space during the
Reagan presidency was not a top priority issue--at least not
before the _ accident. In reality, President Reagan
gave the civilian space program Just enough priority and
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budgetary support to allow it to move forward at a modest pace,
but he certainly did not seize upon it as a major element of his
presidential strategy. Reagan approved a major new initiative,
the space station, and he did use it as a highly visible symbol
of cooperation among the United States and its "friends and
allies. "_ But in this arena the chinks in the armor of the
"imperial presidency" began to be noticable. He could secure
only limited funds for the station from Congress whose members
did not accept it as an Apollo-like undertaking.
The Reagan space transition team was composed primarily of
veterans of the space program; it was led by long-tlme NASA
official George Low. Not surprisingly, particularly in contrast
to the Carter transition document, the team's report was positive
with respect to the values of the space program. The report
noted that "national prestige is how others view us, the global
perception of this country's intellectual, scientific,
technological, and organizational capabilitles. In recent
history, the space program has been the unique positive factor in
this regard. .z7
The first overall statement of space policy by the Reagan
administration was issued on July 4, 1982, as the president
witnessed a landing of the shuttle F_ji_Laat Edwards Air Force
Base. As Ragsdale notes, the event was staged as a patriotic
festival. Second only to strengthening "the security of the
United States" as an articulated policy goal was maintaining
"United States space leadership. "_ Apparently, the goal of
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leadership was to have higher priority under President Reagan
than it had for his predecessor. But precisely what in practice
was meant by the term was not clear.
One clue to the meaning (or lack thereof) of the term
in the thinking of the Reagan administration was its
"National Space Strategy," which the president approved on August
15, 1984. The strategy said that:
- The STS [Space Transportation System] is a critical factor
in maintaining U.S. space leadership.
- The development of a civil Space Station will further the
goals of space leadership . . .
- Major long-range goals for the civil space program are
essential to meeting the national commitment to maintain
United States leadership in space . . .
- The U.S. civil space science program is an essential
element of U.S. leadership in space... .
In other words, by 1984 essentially everything the United
States was doing in space was linked, at least rhetorically, to
the quest for leadership. By 1988, the final Reagan-era
statement of space policy said that "a fundamental objective
guiding United States space activities has been, and continues to
be, space leadership. -_ It is not clear that the term
leadership retained much specific content at this point.
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Possibly a more precise clue to what issues related to space
were most important to Ronald Reagan can be gleaned from the
highly polished NASA sales pitch for the space station that was
presented to the president on December 1, 1983. Given that it
certainly was in NASA's interest to stress those themes most
likely to elicit a positive response from the president, they
chose to highlight, among other things, that a United States
space station would, "implement the overriding theme of your
space policy: United States leadership in space. "31
It is fair to say that the desire for leadership was an
important factor in shaping Ronald Reagan's attitude toward
space, but overall, President Reagan did not place top priority
on a fast-paced U.S. space effort. Efforts to resurrect the
notion of a "space station race" with the Soviet Union were not
notably successful. By the end of his Presidency, Reagan was
talking about space cooperation with our former adversary as well
as with traditional U.S. friends and allles.
Preeminence
Preeminence differs from leadership as a goal of U.S. space
policy. First of a11, no president has uttered the word
preeminence when talking about space, though the term does appear
in several presidentially-approved policy statements. The
closest a president may have come to doing so was in John F.
Kennedy's May 25, 1961, speech announcing the acceleration of the
program that included Apollo. Kennedy said that it was "time for
this nation to take a clearly leading role in space
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achievement. ''3z But as has been suggested above, Kennedy in 1962
and 1963 wavered in his commitment to Apollo and to across-the-
board preeminence in space achievements. In November 1962, James
Webb told Kennedy that "the objective of our national space
program is to become pre-eminent in all important aspects of this
endeavor .... .33 The question at the time was whether to give
overriding priority to Apollo, even if that meant taking funds
away from other space projects. Webb argued against such a move,
and Kennedy did not take it. But that does not necessarily
suggest that Kennedy accepted Webb's premise, given the
president's other actions before and after November 1962.
Certainly no president since John Kennedy has given the
space program the priority and budget required for "a clearly
leading role" in all areas of space achievement. And yet the
term preeminence has crept into the space policy statements of
the past decade. It appeared first in the 1982 space policy
statement, which set as an objective to "preserve the United
States preeminence in critical major space activities to enable
continued exploitation and exploration of space. "_
By the final Reagan space policy statement in 1988, the call
for preeminence had been refined as follows:
Leadership in an increasingly competitive international
environment does not require United States preeminence in
all areas and disciplines of space enterprise. It does
require United States preeminence in key areas of space
activity critical to achieving our national security,
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scientific, technical, economic, and foreign policy goals. 35
Taken literally, this statement says that leadership
requires preeminence, and that such preeminence is an important
goal of U.S. space policy. At least as it applies to the
civilian space program, this comes close to being a ridiculous
statement, given the realities over the past decade of funding
for space overall and particularly for the development of new
capabilities. The United States may declare that "preeminence in
critical areas of space activity" is its goal, but no president
since John Kennedy has taken the actions necessary to achieve
such preeminence. U.S. presidents have been willing at various
times to take steps to pursue leadership of some type, but not
preeminence.
The Future
Has the quest for leadership paid off in terms of benefits
to the American nation? Is space leadership worth continued
pursuit? What, indeed, is the meaning of space leadership in the
1990s, more than thirty years after the United States began its
civilian space program?
Sally Ride did a good job of identifying the benefits of
space leadership in her 1987 report Leadership and America's
Future in Space. She noted that during the period when the
United States "was clearly and unquestionably the leader in space
exploration, . . . the nation reaped all the benefits of pride,
international prestige, scientific advancement, and technological
progress that such leadership provides. "_
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It is interesting that Dr. Ride lists pride as the first
benefit of leadership. Writing almost thirty years ago, one of
the first political scientists to take a hard look at the U.S.
space program, Vernon van Dyke, titled his book Pride and Power:
the Rationale of the _pace Proaram. Probably, both van Dyke and
Ride are correct--that a primary benefit of the perception of
space leadership is internal to the United States. What being a
leader in space says about the United States seems important to
its citizens. Think only about the use of space accomplishments
as national symbols, perhaps only behind the flag and a bald
eagle in importance. And when the United States is not doing
well in space--not being the leader--this country (at least if
media attention is any indicator of public interest) is concerned
and wants the causes of its problems in space to be fixed.
This emphasis on pride in the U.S. leadership position is
not inconsistent with the focus here on space leadership as a
source of U.S. power in the world. Pride in one's country is an
essential base of national power. Nations can seldom exercise
influence over others when they are beset by self-doubt or lack
of confidence.
Certainly the United States "leads" in most space
capabilities related to the projection of military power around
the world, e.g., observation and warning systems, communications
satellites, position-fixing systems, etc. That leadership is an
important element of the recognition that the United States is
today the only global superpower in military terms.
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JBut presidential attitudes toward leadership in national
security space systems is not really the topic in this essay--
though maintaining such leadership is probably even more
important in today's world than it has ever been. The issue here
is whether leadership in civilian space capabilities and
achievements has been a worthwhile goal for this country.
Have U.S. achievements in space over the past 35 years added
measurably (taking that word literally) to U.S. influence in the
world? In the final analysis, it is difficult to think of a way
to identify and measure the independent contribution to U.S.
international prestige of being perceived as a leader in space.
There is no equation linking prestige with influence, power, and
control over events and choices.
Between the time that John Kennedy announced the Apollo goal
and the time that Nell Armstrong stepped onto the surface of the
Moon, the United States had gotten involved in a land war in
Southeast Asia, had endured a series of tense urban riots, and
had suffered through a series of political assassinations. How
does one calculate the difference in U.S. national prestige
overall if Apollo had not been done, compared to that resulting
from the Apollo success, in the context of everything else that
shaped global attitudes toward the United States in the 1960s?
What can be said with some degree of confidence is that the
notion that prestige is an important aspect of national power is
well established among both students and practitioners of
international relations and foreign policy. The desire to
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enhance national prestige has been a consistent and strong
motivation of national leaders and statesmen for a long time.
Reputation is important in dealings among nations, Just as it is
in dealings between individuals or firms. As this essay has
pointed out, several U.S. presidents have stressed the space
program as a means of enhancing the U.S. reputation in the world.
Certainly, those in the space community--and it may be
possible to extend this generalization to many if not most in the
United States--have internalized the expectation that the United
States has been, and will continue to be, a leader in space.
That expectation is clearly expressed in statements of national
space policy. Perhaps the primary benefit of space leadership
can be found within each of us--we fully expect continued
achievement in space to be part of our future. When push comes
to shove we are willing to _ (today's euphemism) our tax
dollars to support a strong U.S. program.
In a very loose sense, the issue of U.S. space leadershlp--
and particularly whether it continues to be worth pursuing--can
be linked to the numerous analyses of America's relative standing
in the world that have been so popular recently. Is America in
decline, as people like Paul Kennedy have suggested, with the
quest for space leadership part of our "imperial overstretch"? 37
Or is the United States Bound to Lead, with space leadership one
of the bases for this country being able, as Joseph Nye suggests
it must, to manaq9 "the geopolitical balance of power inherited
from the past, as well as the emerging interdependence that will
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emerge in the future. "_ This is certainly an issue for later
presidents to consider as they plot the country's future in the
world.
To other sovereign nations, which are both our partners and
our competitors in space and elsewhere, accepting the notion of
the United States managing key areas of global relations is not
very palatable. The foreign policy community around the world
has been much more comfortable with the notion of U.S.
leadership than the space community seems to be. Nonetheless,
U.S. power, responsibly exercised, remains a key to a peaceful
world with a growing quality of life. What the United States
does in space can--and should--be closely linked to the emerging
bases of global power. As a panel of the Bush administration's
Vice President's Space Policy Advisory Board observed in its
January 1993 report, "as part of the United States' continuing
post Cold War leadership, space achievements must be widely
viewed as a key to an improved world future. ."39
This is the concept of leadership that may guide future U.S.
efforts in space--taking the lead in using space to improve life
here on earth. This is a different concept of space leadershlp
than has guided most past presidents, but it is one that will
likely dominate the future.
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Chapter 8
Beyond l_ASA Exoeptionalism
by
Roger D. Launius
and
Howard E. McCurdy
When President John F. Kennedy unveiled the commitment to
undertake Project Apollo on May 25, 1961, in a speech before a
joint session of Congress, he created more than a national space
program to send humans to the Moon. He also created an image of
presidential leadership that persisted long after the actual
voyages ended. That image accentuated the power of the president
to mobilize societal resources by setting specific national
goals.
The image subsequently took on mythical qualities within the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). To the
people associated with the U.S. space program, Kennedy's mandate
stood as the most significant demonstration of the conditions
necessary to prosecute a successful space program. It suggested
to those people that extraterrestrial activities were above
politics. In the years that followed, moreover, it provided an
explanation for the ills afflicting NASA. Those ills were
frequently traced to the lack of clear mandates or presidential
support for endeavors that followed.
People in general subsequently embraced the image of the
401
young president as a means to promote other agendas. Calling for
presidential commitments to conquor a variety of other ills, from
poverty to AIDs, they too advanced the notion that America could
be mobilized to accomplish great goals if only chief executives
would create similar mandates. Kennedy's speech stands as one of
high water marks in the perception of presidential leadership in
the twentieth century, occurring as it did before images of
Vietnam and Watergate tarnished the notion of executive
deference. I
A careful examination of the record of presidential
leadership in space exploration reveals that reality differs
considerably from perceptions. Space policy is not above
politics. Presidential mandates do not guarentee program
success. Chief executives do not protect the civilian space
agency from the partisanship, ideology, and "pork barrel"
politics that affect other discretionary spending programs. A
more realistic view of space policy would abandon the notion of
NASA exceptionalism, as attractive as that notion continues to
be.
The Dilemma of the "Golden Aae"
Billed as a second State of the Union message, President
Kennedy's speech told the Congress that the United States faced
"an extraordinary challenge."
Our strength as well as our convictions have imposed upon
this nation the role of leader in freedom's cause ....
This nation is engaged in a long and exacting test of the
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ifuture of freedom--a test which may well continue for
decades to come.
Kennedy argued that the United States must compete in space "if
we are to win the battle that is going on around the world
between freedom and tyranny." Then he added: "I believe this
Nation should commitment itself to achieving the goal, before
this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning
him safely to earth. No single space project in this period will
be more impressive to mankind, or more important for the long-
range exploration of space; and none will be so difficult or
expensive to accomplish. "2
In announcing the Apollo commitment the president carefully
gauged the mood of the nation. His rhetoric sought to capture
the American imagination and overcome residual concerns regarding
the difficulty and expense of the undertaking. The United States
was locked in a struggle with the Soviet Union to convince
uncommitted nations of the world of the superiority of the U.S.
system at a time when the outcome of the Cold War was hardly
clear. The Soviet system had bested the United States in putting
both the first satellite and the first human in orbit. As John
Logsdon has noted, "by entering the race with such a visible and
dramatic commitment, the United States effectively undercut
Soviet space spectaculars without doing much except announcing
its intention to Join the contest. "3
A unique confluence of political necessity, personal
commitment, scientific talent, economic prosperity, and public
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mood made possible the ready acceptance of the 1961 decision to
carry out an aggressive lunar landing program. Because of the
president's challenge, framed as part of the Cold War contest
between the communist nations and the "free world," NASA
undertook a mobilization comparable, in relative scale, to the
Manhattan Project in World War II and the national program to
deploy an intercontinental ballistic missile system during the
1950s. Accordingly, the space agency's annual budget increased
from $500 million in 1960 to $5.2 billion in 1965 as government
and industry executives mobilized to combat what they considered
a national crisis. Project Apollo, backed by sufficient funding,
was the tangible result of solid national commitment in response
to a perceived threat to U.S. welfare. 4
As part of his speech on "Urgent National Needs" Kennedy
announced twelve specific legislative proposals, of which only
four dealt with space. The disposition of the other eight items
in Kennedy's speech contrasted sharply with the congressional
response to Kennedy's rhetoric on space. Of the other eight
initiatives, Congress approved only four. They failed to enact
the president's Manpower Development and Training program,
refused to provide him with a foreign aid contingency fund, and
voted down his request for a nation-wide system of fallout
shelters to protect the populace "in the event of a large-scale
nuclear attack." The fate of those eight items mirrored
Kennedy's overall legislative success rate in 1961. During his
first year in office, Kennedy submitted 355 specific requests to
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the Congress. He won approval for 172, or slightly less than
half. In historical perspective, that was a fairly low box score
for a modern president in the first year of office. 5
Kennedy worried that the Congress might treat his space
initiatives with similar disrespect. Congressional debate was
perfunctory, however, and NASA found itself literally pressing to
expend the funds committed to it during the early 1960s.
Congress approved all four space initiatives, including the first
steps toward the Moon as Logsdon has noted "almost without a
murmur. "6 Kennedy's speech subsequently took on mythical
qualities as a demonstration of the president's power to set the
national space agenda. With the speech and the events that
preceded it, the president established a national objective,
galvanized public support, enlisted the Congress, and set in
motion the activities that mobilized a nation. The symbolism
offered by Kennedy's decision was applied subsequently to a wide
range of issues, from poverty and housing to health care ("if we
can send a man to the Moon, why can't we ?").
The symbolism has held special appeal for space boosters,
the community of true believers who promote space exploration as
one of the nation's most enduring legacies. To them, the lunar
decision suggested that space exploration deserved special
treatment within the American political system. Like foreign
policy, space exploration seemed to enjoy a higher priority than
domestic endeavors. Space exploration seemed to be above
politics, meaning that it received far-reaching hi-partisan
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support. Congress and the public seemed to defer to the
president, generally acquiescing in the president's choice of
objectives. The decision to go to the Moon suggested that a
president could overcome partisan divisions and lead the nation
to great accomplishments, if only the objective was properly
framed. Many have argued that the subsequent ills of the space
program can be traced to the unwillingness of more recent
presidents to make "Apollo-like" public commitments. 7
The Apollo Program, while an enormous achievement, left a
divided legacy for NASA. The sprint to the Moon transformed NASA
into an agency preoccupied with a single mission. Single issue
agencies--like single issue political parties--have a difficult
time dealing with success. A search for continued meaning always
ensues afterward. Moreover, the results of Apollo, in contrast
to what NASA had wanted, was largely a technological dead end for
the space program. As sometime senior NASA official Hans Mark
observed, "President Kennedy's objective was duly accomplished,
but we paid a price: the Apollo program had no logical legacy. ''s
The "golden age" of Apollo also created for the agency an
expectation that the issuance of a major space goal by the
president would always bring NASA a broad consensus of support
and provide it with resources as well as the license to dispense
them as agency leaders saw fit. Most NASA officials did not
understand at the time how exceptional the Apollo mandate was.
The Apollo decision was an anomaly in the history of the U.S.
space program. 9 NASA officials came to perceive as normal the
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free-flowing funds, ready political support, and relative
autonomy in conducting space activities when such was rarely the
case. I° This was the dilemma of the "golden age" of space
exploration. Program success was predicated upon a set of
conditions that could hardly be repeated.
The Presidential Preroaative in Space Policy
History shows that presidents prevail on more space issues
than they lose. Yet, while presidents prevail on most of the
space initiatives they propose, they are by no means omnipotent.
They face significant opposition to initiatives that succeed and
they occasionally fail. Their success rate on space initiatives
is not much different from the success rate for presidential
initiatives in general. In its annual review of congressional
role call votes, the Congresslonal Quarterly research service
reports that presidents prevail on about 70 percent of the key
votes on which they take a position. 11 The success rate varies
widely from year to year. Roll call votes are not equivalent to
initiatives proposed (since the latter may be decided in
committee), but the box scores suggest that the perception of
presidential success on space issues may be due in part to the
tendency of presidents to prevail on issues of all kinds.
For example, President Dwight D. Eisenhower played a central
role in the decision to create NASA. He later used a
presidential directive to assign NASA responsibility for Project
Mercury (the program to put the first astronauts in space) in the
face of demands to let the military run the program. 12 A
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succession of presidents have also turned back congressional
challenges to Project Apollo, the Space Shuttle program, and the
various iterations of the NASA space station.
Not all of the presidential victories, however, cast the
chief executive in the advantageous role of advocating new ideas
while placing Congress in the stingy position of saying no. In
1970 President Nixon asked Congress to cut NASA's budget to $3.4
billion, a significant reduction from the $5 billion budgets that
NASA had enjoyed during the mid-1960s. Space boosters pulled a
classic end run, convincing members of the House of
Representatives to authorize a $300 million increase in the human
space fllght budget. 13 The president's plan ultimately
prevailed, however, as Senators and conferees later removed most
of the increase.
Presidential prevalence has not come without struggle.
During the 1970s presidents proposed and won approval for a
series of large science projects: the Hubble Space Telescope,
the Pioneer Venus probe, and the Galileo probe to Jupiter. All
three programs faced strong opposition centered in the House
appropriations committee handling NASA affairs. In 1974,
following the recommendation of appropriations subcommittee chair
Edward Boland of Massachusetts, the full House of Representatives
deleted funds for the Hubble Space Telescope. After the Senate
restored the telescope funds, the House of Representatives in
1975 deleted most of the funds for the Pioneer Venus orbiter and
hard lander on the grounds that NASA should not undertake two big
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science projects at once. Again, the Senate restored the funds.
In 1977 the House deleted funds to start the Galileo probe during
the initial consideration of the NASA appropriation bill.
Following conference committee negotiations with the Senate,
Boland asked for and lost a vote of support from the whole House
of Representatives. In a stunning reversal for chairman Boland,
the House voted 131 to 280 to support the president's position in
favor of the probe. 14
Even the sacrosanct Project Mercury received its share of
congressional opposition once Eisenhower approved it. Edward
Boland, then an four-term Congressman, objected to a Republican
effort to add extra funds to the NASA research and development
budget on the grounds that the newly-created space agency had
already received more money than it could wisely spend. The
representatives voted to support the president's position by a
margin of two-to-one.
The notion that presidents can prevail on space policy
simply by making a strong public statement committing the nation
to a specific "big-ticket" goal is not supported by the
historical record. Not even the rhetoric of President Kennedy's
Apollo decision stood up to the pressures of later years. The
events of 1963 bear this out. Two years after Kennedy challenged
the nation to race to the Moon, he undercut his rationale for the
adventure by proposing in a September 1963 speech at the United
Nations that the Soviet Union join the U.S. in completing the
voyage. Representative Thomas Pelly, a Seattle Republican, stood
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up in the well of the House of Representatives three weeks later
and offered an amendment to prohibit the use of government funds
to finance a joint expedition. In spite of Kennedy's insistence
that his U.N. proposal merely carried out the mandate for
international cooperation in NASA's enabling legislation, the
amendment passed. 15
Buoyed by the thought that the United States and Soviet
Union were no longer racing to the Moon, opponents of Project
Apollo moved to cut funds for what one called "a manned junket to
the moon." The House of Representatives began the assault by
removing $600 million from President Kennedy's $5.7 billion NASA
budget request. The administration appealed to the Senate,
arguing that nothing less than $5.4 billion would keep Project
Apollo on schedule. Rather than receiving sympathy, the Kennedy
administration faced new levels of hostility. Arkansas Senator
J. William Fulbright moved to cut I0 percent more from the NASA
appropriation. The president's allies prevailed on that vote,
but failed to sustain a Senate Appropriations Committee
recommendation to add $90 million to the House figure when
Senator William Proxmire successfully moved to strike that
amount. Proxmire's victory of 40 to 39 votes clearly marked an
end to Kennedy's ability to charm the Congress with his visions
of space exploration. 16 President Kennedy's 1961 speech
initiating Project Apollo may have been a special moment, but it
by no means created a form of magic whose rituals guaranteed
future success.
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Since then, as John Logsdon points out in the first chapter
of this book, the president has continued to be the primary
determinant "of the content and pace of the civilian space
program." The president, however, wields that power within a
sophisticated structure of opportunities and constraints. Many
factors tug at the loyalties of people outside of the White
House, of which loyalty to the president is only one. The debate
over the future of the NASA space station between 1991 and 1993
reveals precisely how much of a difference presidential
leadership can make.
In 1991, after having begrudgingly approved six years worth
of development funds for the space station, the House
appropriations subcommittee handling NASA's budget voted to kill
the controversial project. Administration officials appealed the
decision to the whole House. They lobbied hard to have the
larger assembly reverse the committee recommendation, always a
difficult task in a legislative body given to committee
deference. President George H.W. Bush and Vice President Dan
Quayle personally joined the effort, contacting members from key
districts. Heavy lobbying produced a 240-173 space station
resurrection on the House floor. The issue resurfaced again in
1992. This time appropriation s subcommittee chair Bob Traxler of
Michigan forced an up-or-down vote on the space station on the
House floor. Another round of intense lobbying followed, and the
administration position prevailed by a vote of 237 to 181. 17
NASA officials believed that the issue was behind them, but
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redistricting and the 1992 election produced a large class of
freshmen legislators who had never voted for the controversial
project. Skepticism about the cost and value of the space
station enlarged the opposition and threatened the project anew.
Again, the president supported the project. It was a
scaled-down project and a new president (Bill Clinton), but
presidential support nonetheless. Most of the old members of the
House who had voted on the issue through the two previous
challenges did not change their positions. Some did, however.
An analysis of their behavior provides insights into the extent
of presidential influence.
Twelve Republicans who had voted "yes" for the space station
under President Bush voted "nay" under President Clinton. It may
be surmised that they never possessed a great deal of enthusiasm
for the project, but voted for it out of deference to the
president. Once Bush was gone, however, their support
disappeared.
Thirteen Democrats changed their votes in the opposite
direction. They had opposed the space station in 1991 and 1992.
With their own president in the White House, they supported the
project. The most dramatic switch was provided by Louis Stokes,
an Ohio Democrat and the new chairman of the House appropriations
subcommittee handling the bill. In 1991 and 1992, as a majority
member on the House appropriations subcommittee, he had voted to
kill the space station. Motivated in part by a desire to please
President Clinton, Stokes supported the space station in 1993.
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Twelve votes lost and thirteen found produced a net gain of
one vote for presidential leadership. That is not much in a body
with 435 members (plus five delegates who can vote on floor
amendments). The shifts nearly canceled out each other. Given
the fact that the space station survived the 1993 challenge by a
single vote (215 to 216, including the delegates), small shifts
provided space station supporters with all they needed to
prevail. In that sense, presidential leadership made an
important contribution. Is
Taken as a whole, the history of civilian space policy
provides little support for the doctrine of presidential
omnipotence. Presidential leadership does make a difference,
although that difference is marginal. Presidents prevail most,
though not all of the time. Presidential success in space policy
is not remarkably different from presidential success with
Congress on all policy. The notion that presidential leadership
in space somehow provides the chief executive with special
opportunities for success is not supported by the whole record.
The President and the Loss of the Space ExDloratlon Initiative
While presidents have played the dominant role in setting
the national space agenda, leading the nation towardthat agenda
has been a constant struggle. The limits of presidential
leadership in the U.S. space program and the factors that shape
the president's ability to lead have been very real, and made all
the more prescient because of the success of the lunar landing in
1969. The Apollo episode suggested to many people associated
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with the U.S. space program that once a president committed the
nation to a specific objective and placed the power of the
Executive Office behind it, the initiative would move forward.
This belief gained added credibility as subsequent presidents
were able to overcome early opposition to the next two human
space flight initiatives--the Space Shuttle program and the
Freedom Space Station. 19
This view is not hlstorically valid. The most dramatic
exception to the record of presidential preeminence occurred in
July 1989 when President George Bush proposed an ambitious Space
Exploration Initiative (SEI) that would return Americans to the
Moon, establish a lunar base, and, then, using a NASA-built space
station, send human expeditions to the planet Mars. In advancing
SEI, Bush followed the classic script for exercising leadership
in space. He made a Kennedy-like announcement, complete with a
strong personal commitment, proposing the initiative during a
major address commemorating the twentieth anniversary of the
first landing on the Moon delivered from the steps of the
National Air and Space Museum with the Apollo 11 astronauts at
his side. Like Kennedy some thirty years earlier, Bush
subsequently elaborated on his proposal in a speech at a Texas
university. (Kennedy spoke at Rice University; Bush chose Texas
A&M). Having set a specific objective, with added deadlines,
Bush instructed his National Space Council to marshall the power
of the Executive Office behind the proposal.
While Bush had announced, _la Kennedy's Apollo decision, a
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dramatic space exploration project, the similarities between
those two presidential initiatives began and ended with the
public declarations. Whereas broad national support was present
in 1961 for the Apollo decision--support that was continually
nurtured by senior officials at NASA and in other sectors of the
government--a consensus in favor of the Bush program was tenuous
at best and could not be properly maintained during the years
that followed. As a result, unlike Project Apollo, the Space
Exploration Initiative died a quiet death on Capitol Hill. 2°
The public and congressional reaction was lukewarm from the
beginning, especially when budget estimates for the overall
endeavor began flowing in. Representative Leon Panetta
criticized Bush for "talking promises . . • without any regard to
the fiscal consequences. "21 The WashinutonPost observed that
"easy slogans are not going to conquer the high hurdles of
politics. This is not 20 years ago, when the ringing words of a
president could spark a commitment of some 4 percent of the U.S.
budget toward a trip to the moon by a certain date. "_
Representative Bob Traxler and Senator Barbara Mikulski,
chairs of the House and Senate Appropriations subcommittees that
acted on the NASA budget, immediately cut most of the funds that
Bush had requested for starting the initiative. Normally strong
supporters of the civilian space program, they directed NASA to
focus its attention on projects already approved. In the
following year, funding for SEI was virtually zeroed out of the
budget despite lobbying from Vice President Dan Quayle, head of
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the president's National Space Council. Although Bush castigated
Congress for not "investing in America's future," members decided
to spend the funds elsewhere. "We're essentially not doing
Moon-Mars," Mikulski bluntly declared. _ As a result the Space
Exploration Initiative disappeared after receiving consideration
in congressional committee.
The President and Other Space Policy Losses
While the Space Exploration Initiative provides a
spectacular illustration of the limits of presidential leadership
in space, it is not the only example. During the period when
NASA struggled to complete Project Apollo, Congress altered or
terminated three major presidential initiatives. The first of
these was Project Voyager, a presidentially supported soft-
landing mission to Mars. Based on a recommendation from the
National Academy of Sciences, NASA officials formulated and won
presidential approval for $2 billion to launch a pair of
orbiter-landers on one Saturn V on a mission to explore the Red
Planet. Even with the endorsement of the Johnson administration,
Voyager was controversial almost from the start. A few
scientists supported the mission but many opposed it as
technically ambitious, exceptionally risky, and overly expensive.
In the summer of 1967, following conflictlng testimony from
scientists and short of funds for other priorities like the
Vietnam war, Congress denied the money necessary to start up the
project. 24
NASA leaders and their scientific clientele learned, at
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least temporarily, several hard lessons from the Voyager failure.
Most important, they realized that strife within the scientific
community had to be kept internal in order to put forward a
united front against the priorities of other interest groups and
other government leaders. While imposing support from the
scientific community could not guarantee that any initiative
would become a political reality, without it a program could not
be funded. They also learned that while a $750 million program
found little political opposition at any level, a $2 billion
project crossed an ill-defined but very real threshold triggering
intense competition for those dollars. Finally, they learned
that presidential sympathy for a "big science" project was no
guarantee of congressional support. Having learned these
lessons, as well as some more subtle ones, the space science
community regrouped and returned with a trimmed-down Mars lander
program, called Viking, that was funded and provided good
scientific return in the mid-1970s, m
Also during 1967 Congress sharply reduced funds for the
Apollo Applications Program, a series of undertakings designed to
keep the United States in space after the flights to the Moon.
President Lyndon Johnson, under pressure to fund the Vietnam War
and a variety of Great Society programs, submitted a scaled back
NASA budget that contained $454 milllon for Apollo Applications.
At the heart of this initiative was a modest orbital workship,
later named Skylab, that could be tended by astronauts. It would
be, NASA officials hoped, the precursor of a real space station.
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Congress allowed NASA to spend only $300 million, essentially
dismantling the program schedule. NASA later realized some
success with the program in 1973 as three human spaceflight
missions were flown on Skylab. _
Finally, in 1971 Congress cut President Richard M. Nixon's
request to fund a series of spacecraft that would undertake a
"Grand Tour" of the outer planets of the solar system. Nixon's
1971 budget request included $30 million to start up this $1
billion program. Congress appropriated only enough money to
allow NASA to study other alternatives. 27 Over the objections of
NASA Administrator James C. Fletcher, Nixon's staff resubmitted a
much slimmed-down program the following year as a two planet
mission to Jupiter and Saturn called Project Voyager. At the
time, this was viewed as a major political defeat for space ......
scientists, overcome only when NASA technology produced a
spacecraft that far exceeded its design specifications and flew
on to Uranus and Neptune. _
PartisaDshiD and Space
Other forces beyond presidential leadership, of course, work
to affect the overall level of support for space policy.
Ideology is the most important of these. Partisanship and "pork
barrel" politics also play a more limited but nonetheless
significant role. This is because for much of its history, space
has not been a deeply partisan issue. Once in the White House,
both Democrat and Republican presidents have become advocates for
space. Both Democrat and Republican presidents have chosen to
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restrain it. In Congress, space boosters have relied upon allies
within both political parties to fight for new initiatives and
rescue old ones. Opponents as well can be found on both sides of
the aisle. The presence of bipartisan support should not be
taken as a sign that space policy is somehow above politics,
however, or that it enjoys a special immunity from the level of
partisanship that affects other endeavors. In fact, space policy
tends to mirror the ebb and flow of partisan divisions within the
political system at large.
When the space age began with the launching of Sputnik I in
1957, partisan differences emerged. Democrats in Congress seized
upon the space issue, as David Callahan and Fred Greenstein point
out in the second chapter of this book, to underscore "a broader
failure by Eisenhower and other Republican leaders to provide
sound national leadership." Democratic leaders complained about
Eisenhower's "beginner" space program and threatened direct
action if the leaders of the newly created National Aeronautics
and Space Administration did not show "proper imagination and
drive. ,,_
The launch of Sputnik I by the Soviets in 1957 allowed the
opposition party to question Eisenhower's executive abilities as
the Democrats put forth an image of the president as a smiling
incompetent. G. Mennen Williams, the Democratic governor of
Michigan, even released a poem linking Eisenhower's inaction to
his well-known fondness for golf.
Oh little Sputnik, flying high
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With made-in-Moscow beep,
You tell the world it's a Commie sky
and Uncle Sam's asleep.
You say on fairway and on rough
The Kremlin knows it all,
We hope our golfer knows enough
To get us on the ball. _
Democratic Senator and presidential contender Lyndon B.
Johnson used hearings by a subcommittee of the Senate Armed
Services Committee beginning on November 25, 1957, to embarrass
the president and the Republican Party. In 1960 John F. Kennedy
ran for the presidency with Johnson as his running mate in a
campaign that charged the Republican Eisenhower as a "do nothing"
president. Kennedy was especially hard on Eisenhower's record in
international affairs, exposing the so-called "missile gap" with
the Soviet Unionas an example of Eisenhower's inattentiveness (a
charge that later turned out to be false). 31
Republicans returned fire on the Kennedy administration
during the early 1960s. Ex-president Eisenhower questioned the
wisdom of spending more than $20 billion on what he called "a mad
effort to win a stunt race" to the Moon.
Why the great hurry to get to the moon and the planets?
We have already demonstrated that in everything except
the power of our booster rockets we are leading the
world in scientific space exploration. From here on, I
think we should proceed in a orderly, scientific way,
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building one accomplishment on another. _
In a later article titled "Why I Am a Republican," Eisehower
argued that the Moon race "has diverted a disproportionate share
of our brain-power and research facilities from equally
significant problems, including education and automation. "_
Eisenhower's NASA administrator, T. Keith Glennan, provided
substance for the party line. Corresponding with members of the
Eisenhower administration, he expressed misgivings about the
commitment to race the Soviets to the Moon_ _ He told
Eisenhower, then in retirement at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, that
"this is a very bad move .... We are entering into a
competition which will be exceedingly costly and which will take
up an increasingly large share of that small portion of the
nation's budget which might be called controllable. "35
Responding to this party line, Republicans forced Democratic
Party law-makers to defend Project Apollo against other
priorities. In 1963, Representative Louis Wyman moved to cut
$200 million from the NASA research and development budget.
Wyman, a New Hampshire Republican, argued that the U.S. could not
afford a crash program to reach the Moon when defense needs
pressed harder. His motion was defeated in a rare party line
vote on space, with 90 percent of the Democrats supporting
Project Apollo and 89 percent of the Republicans supporting the
change. _
Four years later the space program faced a similar
challenge. Senator William Proxmire moved to cut $361 million
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from NASA's overall authorization. This time a bipartisan
coalition of Republicans and Democrats Joined together to turn
back the assault. Fifty-elght percent of the Democrats and 61
percent of the Republicans present voted to deny Proxmire's
request. 37 This was followed by roll call votes during the 1970s
in which a similar bi-partisan coalition of Democrats and
Republicans voted to start up projects like the Space Shuttle and
Project Galileo. The votes suggested that space policy had
reached a level of political maturity wherein it enjoyed support
from both political parties. This notion is somewhat
disingenuous.
While it is true that space exploration enjoyed bipartisan
support during that period, it would be premature to conclude
from instances such as these that space policy enjoyed a status
above politics. The decline in party line votes over space
policy to a certain degree reflected the decline in party line
votes generally. Between 1961 and 1976 the proportion of party
line votes (in which a majority of Democrats opposed a majority
of Republicans) fell from 50 to 36 percent in the House of
Representatives and from 62 to 37 percent in the Senate. _ This
continued a trend that had been underway for more than I00 years.
Partisanship on Capitol Hill has been in gradual free fall since
the late 1800s, when roughly three out of four votes in the House
of Representatives pitted a majority of one party against the
other. 39 Given the declining importance of partisanship in the
national government overall, it should not be surprising to find
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so few party line votes over space policy in the late 1960s and
1970s.
The tradition of bipartisan support (and opposition)
continued into the 1980s. When President Ronald Reagan proposed
in 1984 that the United States start work on a permanently
occupied space station, for example, he found himself both
supported and opposed by Republicans and Democrats. Congressman
Bill Green, a Republican representative from central Manhattan,
helped lead the opposition to the project on the House
appropriations subcommittee handling the money bill. Senator
Jake Garn, a Utah Republican who flew on the Space Shuttle in
1985, gave the White House fits with his calls for automation on
what NASA had promised would be a fully manned facility. Space
station supporters had to rely upon a coalition of junior members
(both Democrats and Republicans) to move the money bill out of
the House appropriations subcommittee where Bill Green and
subcommittee chair Edward Boland would have happily disapproved
it.
As the space station program encountered further
difficulties, partisan differences reappeared. The project,
troubled by growing costs and missed deadlines, became more
closely associated with the Republican administration that had
nurtured it through various crises. It consequently lost support
among House and Senate Democrats. In 1988 Republican law-makers
mobilized to defeat an effort to remove $400 million from the
NASA budget. House Republicans mobilized 77 percent of their
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members to defeat the motion. The Senate followed in 1991. A
move by Arkansas Democrat Dale Bumpers to gut the space station
program won a ten vote majority (32 to 24) among Senate
Democrats. Republican Senators supported the space station by a
margin of 40 to 3 in order to maintain the program.
By the latter part of the 1980s, partisanship had reemerged
in the politics of space exploration. Five of the six most
important votes that civilian space boosters faced on Capitol
Hill between 1988 and 1992 found a majority of Democrats opposing
a majority of Republicans. In 1993 the space station issue again
came before the Congress, with the key vote taking place in the
House of Representatives. Once again, a majority of Republicans
opposed a majority of the Democrats. The Republicans, moreover,
found themselves in the unusual position of supporting Democratic
president Bill Clinton, whose position in favor of the project
was opposed by three-fifths of the members of his own party.
The revival of partisan differences over space policy
followed a larger trend toward increased partisanship over all
manner of issues. All told, the number of roll call votes in
which party opposed party (a majority of each) rose from 36
percent in 1976 to 64 percent in 1992 on the floor of the House
of Representatives. Senate partisanship increased in a similar
manner. 4° The growth in partisanship was associated with an
increase in the ideological shrillness of American politics. 41
Space policy has not enjoyed a charmed existence, immune
from the residual level of partisanship affecting the national
_J
government as a whole. It has, to be sure, enjoyed a measure of
bipartisan support, especially from the late 1960s through the
1970s. At the same time, party considerations have fundamentally
affected the course of the space program in various ways. Party
affiliation is not a strong predictor of positions on space, but
neither is it irrelevant. Partisan differences over space have
moved through cycles more or less like those cycles affecting
government in general. The idea that presidential leadership
somehow allows the space program to sit on a plateau above
partisan differences is simply not supported by the historical
record.
Political Ideoloav and the Politics of the Space Program
If the issue of space is not special, and if presidential
leadership is of no greater consequence in it than elsewhere,
then what is? What has motivated politicians and other leaders
to either embrace or reject space exploration. Historically, two
major factors have shaped the space policy debate in American
politics: ideology and the pragmatism of the government
contract. Ideological perspectives on the value of a strong
space program have undergone a major shift since the space age
began. Contracting issues (space as a "pork barrel" from which
government funds are distributed) has helped to create support
for the space program in areas of traditional ideological
opposition. 42
From the beginning of the space age in 1957 the ideological
debate over the program has revolved around the expense and
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direction of the enterprise, particularly the emphasis to be
placed on human space flight initiatives as opposed to scientific
objectives. In the 1950s, politically conservative leaders--
many of whom were members of the Republican Party--favored a
modest, scientifically-based space program. The standard bearer
for this conservative approach was President Dwight Eisenhower,
whose preoccupation with the need to conduct survelliance flights
over the Soviet Union shaped much of his attitude toward space. 43
Eisenhower supported an extensive program of reconnaissance
satellites as a means of learning about potentially aggressive
actions by the Soviet Union. The safety from surprise attack
promised by reconnaissance satellites was an especially
attractive feature for Eisenhower and leaders of his generation
because they remembered well the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor
on December 7, 1941, and were committed to never fall for such a
sucker punch again. At a meeting of key scientific advisors on
March 27, 1954, to discuss the use of space for military
purposes, Eisenhower warned that "Modern weapons had made it
easier for a hostile nation with a closed society to plan an
attack in secrecy and thus gain an advantage denied to the nation
with an open society." The earlier use of aircraft overflights
had been compromised in 1960 when the Soviet Union shot down an
American U-2 spy plane piloted by Gary Francis Powers.
Reconnaissance satellites offered a more reliable substitute for
the more dangerous aircraft overflights. Even the U.S.
scientific satellite program for International Geophysical Year
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involvement, Project Vanguard, was viewed in large part by the
Eisenhower administration as a cold war measure. By linking the
first satellite launch to an international scientific effort,
Eisenhower could establish the prlnclple of overflight, namely
that a satellite orbiting over enemy territory did not constitute
a hostile act. Establishing the principle of peaceful overflight
was a key reason behind Eisenhower's desire to move scientific
research in space out of the military and into a clvilian
agency.
Following this logic, conservatives favored a civilian space
program with clear scientific objectives whose expenses were
modest enough to not distract from more important national
security needs. Even the proposed "man in space" program was
viewed in conservative circles not as an exploration program, but
as a means to test the effect of radiation and weightlessness on
human beings who might be called upon to orbit the earth. 45
This conservative approach toward space exploration
dominated U.S. policy making until the Soviet launch of Sputnik 1
on October 4, 1957. Suddenly, Eisenhower awoke to intense
criticism. His critics ballyhooed the illusion of a technology
gap and demanded increased spending for aerospace endeavors,
technlcal education, and new federal agencies. The call for an
aggressive space program by liberal Democrats, in contrast to a
more parsimonious effort by the conservative Republicans led to
the longstanding conclusion that those ideologically conservative
favored a small, diffident space program while those with liberal
t
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perspectives advocated a much more forceful and dynamic effort. _
Indeed, liberal Democrats pushed hard for an aggressive
human space flight program with large federal expenditures
presided over by a huge federal presence (NASA). From the outset
they demanded that sufficient funds be appropriated to ensure
national prestige in the internatlonal arena, something that
conservatives eschewed. T. Keith Glennan, NASA's first
administrator, argued against entering into a "space race" with
the Soviet Union in a letter to his successor, James Webb.
There can be only one real reason for such a "race". That
reason must be "prestige". The present program without such
a "race" but with full intention of accomplishing whatever
needs to be accomplished . . . will produce most of the
significant technology and essentially all of the scientific
knowledge that will be produced under the impetus of the
"race" and at the lower cost in men and money . . .
I don't think we should play the game according to the
rules laid down by our adversary. I do believe that such
prestige is apt to be less than enduring as compared to the
respect and friendship we will gain from foreign aid
programs, well administered over the same six or eight
&z
years.
The liberal wing of the Democratic party pressed to engage
the Soviet Union in such a race, and President Kennedy's decision
to undertake Project Apollo accomplished just that. In 1963, in
an effort that repeated much of the conservative line, Arkansas
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Senator J. William Fulbright moved to strike $519 million from
the NASA budget. _ Republicans and southern Democrats, the
groups among which most conservatives could be found, split
evenly on the issue. Northern Democrats rescued the program.
The northern Democrats voting to rescue the NASA space program
read like a who's who of American liberalism: Kennedy of
Massachusetts, Humphrey and McCarthy of Minnesota, Muskie of
Maine, Magnuson of Washington, and Ribicoff of Connecticut.
By 1967 the ideological divisions had begun to change. A
similar motion by Senator William Proxmire now found northern
Democrats divided on the wisdom of NASA spending, with the more
conservative Republicans and southern Democrats coming to its
rescue. _ The conversion completed itself with the election of
Richard Nixon to the White House in 1969. Shortly after his
inauguration, Nixon received recommendations regarding the future
of the U.S. space program beyond the flights to the Moon. Space
boosters, led by NASA partisans, urged Nixon to continue the
levels of spending attained during the Apollo years. As leader
of the party that had initially opposed the race to the Moon,
Nixon could have wound down the manned space program in favor of
a more conservative program of research. 5° Instead, following a
contentious White House debate, Nixon and his aides decided to
continue a modest space flight program by approving construction
of the NASA Space Shuttle. Caspar W. Weinberger, deputy director
of the president's Office of Management and Budget (OMB),
explained why the White House overcame conservative inhibitions
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in terms that recalled Kennedy's original rationale.
This was the next frontier, and it [the Space Shuttle] was
the one thing that would enable us to achieve a very
substantial direct return from the huge investment in space.
To me, it would have been all right to invest the amount
necessary to go to the moon, simply because of the fact that
it was a terribly important thing for America to do ....
It seemed to me that we could either grasp it [the shuttle
technology], or fall irretrievably behind, and it was
something that therefore we should do. 51
John Erlichman, the president's senior advisor on domestic
affairs, listed a second reason for the president's approval of
the program that appealed to conservative ideals. "He liked
heroes," Erlichman recalled. Nixon viewed the astronauts as
embodiments of traditional American ideals and did not want to be
the president who removed them from the national scene.
He thought it was good for this country to have heroes. The
country didn't have very many heroes. But he had a whole
lot of heroes as a boy, and he was a reader of history. I
think that was part of it, too. He had this kind of
metaphysical thing about national morality, national fiber,
and national ideals, which he would spin out; and . . . he
would sit and just sort of ruminate on these things--drugs
and decline of American moral fiber and all of that, [which]
somehow or another had to be dealt with by the President. s2
Conservative support for the Space Shuttle within the Nixon
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administration was further advanced by the national security
applications of shuttle technology. The Department of Defense
planned to use the shuttle to launch U.S. reconaissance and
communication satellites on short notice. John Erlichman even
thought that the shuttle might be used to capture enemy
satellites. 53 President Nixon was very impressed with the
shuttle's potential for military missions and emphasized this
outlook in support the project. The support of Robert C. Seamans
and the Department of Defense for the national security use of
the shuttle helped to make the program more palatable to
conservatives. _
As conservative support shifted toward the space program,
liberal support shifted away. Minnesota Senator Walter Mondale
introduced an amendment in 1972 to delete all funding for the
Space Shuttle. In 1973, then-Representatlve Ed Koch of New York
complained about space exploration in general. "I Just for the
life of me can't see voting for monies to find out whether or not
there is some microbe on Mars, when in fact I know there are rats
in the Harlem apartments. -55 Even those who supported the space
program expressed misgivings about excessive spending, a
traditionally conservative concern. As Representative George E.
Brown, Jr., Democrat from California, noted in 1992 "that some of
our proudest achievements in the space program have been
accomplished within a stagnant, no growth budget." He applauded
the science programs of the 1970s "when the NASA budget was flat.
It would be wise to review how we set priorities and managed
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programs during this productive time. "_
This see change in ideological attitudes toward space went
considerably beyond the happenstance of presidential control.
drew its strength from the confluence of two broad forces in
American political thought: the changing nature of American
liberalism and the conservative embrace of frontier myth.
Conservative politicians became the bearers of the frontier
mythology increaslngly used to justify the space program as the
Cold War slipped away, while liberals grew increasingly restless
with the exploitation and oppression that the frontier myth
seemed to imply. Space constitutes a "new frontier" for
conservative thinkers in that it allows them to envision the
separation from a stagnant civilization, the struggle against a
harsh environment, and the progress that (in their minds)
inevitably follows.
Richard Nixon referred directly to these images on January
5, 1972, when he approved the Space Shuttle. He stated that the
United States should build the system because it would "help
transform the space frontier of the 1970s into familiar
territory, easily accessible for human endeavor in the 1980s and
'90s." He closed with a quote from Oliver Wendell Holmes about
sailing into the unknown. 57 On January 25, 1984, President
Ronald Reagan made similar references as he directed NASA to
start work on a space station. "Our second great goal," he said,
"is to build on America's pioneer spirit." He characterized
space as "our next frontier" and called the station a means for
It
JAmerica to rekindle the advantages of past frontiering. "Just as
the oceans opened up a new world for clipper ships and Yankee
traders," he promised, "space holds enormous potential for
commerce today. "s8
The linkage of the space program to traditional ideas about
the frontier has been an important ingredient in the overall
effort to build conservative support. The popular conception of
"westering" and the settlement of the American continent by
Europeans from the East has been a powerful metaphor for the
propriety of space exploration and has enjoyed wide usage by
conservative supporters. Its images of territorial discovery,
exploration, colonization, and exploitation represent positive
ideals for these people, if not for others, s9
Liberals have come to view the space program from a quite
different perspective. To the extent that space represents a new
frontier, it conjures up images of commercial exploitation and
the subjugation of oppressed peoples. Implemented through a
large aerospace industry, it appears to create the sort of
governmental-corporate complexes of which llberals are
increasingly wary. Despite the promise that the shuttle like jet
aircraft would make space flight accessable to the "common man,"
space travel remains the province of a favored few, perpetuating
inequalities rather than leveling differences. Space exploration
has remained largely a male frontier, with room for few
minorities. In the eyesof liberals, space perpetuates the
inequities that they have increasingly sought to abolish on
i
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earth. As a consequence, it is not viewed favorably by those
caught up in what political scientist Aaron Wildavsky has
characterized as "the rise of radical egualitarianism. "_ The
advent of this new liberal philosophy coincides with the shift in
ideological positions on the U.S. space program in the late
1960s.
Writing from this new tradition, Western historian Patricia
Nelson Limerick has argued that the frontier myth should not be
employed as a happy metaphor by space boosters but as a
pejorative reflection. The frontier metaphor, she argues,
denotes conquest of place and peoples, exploitation without
environmental concern, wastefulness, political corruption,
executive misbehavior, shoddy construction, brutal labor
relations, and financial inefficiency. Limerick feigned surpise
that no one from NASA had punched the person employing the
frontier analogy "for insulting the organization's honor. It's a
wonder no one--no shuttle pilot, mission coordinator, mechanic,
or technician--said, _Now cut that out--we may have our problems,
but it's nowhere near that bad'. "61
The civilian space program began with moderate to
conservative Republicans embracing a modest undertaking with
scientific objectives. Moderate to liberal Democrats created a
crash program supported by a robust aerospace industry.
Conservatives found it easier to vote for space spending as the
program matured, especially when industrial contracts were
directed toward conservative Strongholds in the South and West.
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Liberals did not. By the 1980s the transformation was complete.
Liberals in both parties found themselves opposing the big space
program, while conservatives (increaslngly concentrated in the
Republican party) had become the bearers of the Kennedy appeal.
The Economic Imperative and Political Leadership in Space
Just as ideology has been important in shaping levels of
support for the space program, so has the influence of
government spending. The location of NASA field centers in ten
different states helps spread support for the space program.
NASA contracts out nearly 90 percent of its budget, further
amplifying the economic impact of its activities. As numerous
space boosters have observed, not one dollar has been spent in
space. All of the money has been spent on the ground.
The location of NASA field centers has followed political
necessity as well as technical requirements. T. Keith Glennan
reported on a meeting that he had in 1959 with Albert Thomas, the
Texas Democrat who chaired NASA's appropriations subcommittee.
Thomas told Glennan that Rice University could provide 1,000
acres of land for a NASA installation south of Houston and urged
Glennan to take it. Glennan hesitated, knowing that NASA
intended to merge its human and satellite programs at the new
Goddard Space Flight Center north of Washington, D.C. NASA had
"other things to do, much more important than building
buildings," he told Thomas. Thomas countered by explaining that
Glennan would not get the money he needed for the Goddard
facility unless he put one in Houston too. Thomas eventually got
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what became the Johnson Space Center and the home of NASA's human
space flight programs.
Government contracts flowed out from NASA field centers both
old and new. Rather than conduct the bulk of their work in-
house, NASA officials contracted out between 80 and 90 percent of
the funds they received. This was a deliberate strategy
undertaken by NASA's first two administrators, Glennan and Webb,
both to build up the capabilities of the American aerospace
industry and to build a broad base of political support for the
infant space program. For Glennan, and his ideologically
sympathetic boss, President Eisenhower, reliance on the private
sector came naturally. Glennan wrote that he came to NASA with
"a firm conviction that our governmental operations were growing
too large, [and] I was determined to avoid excessive additions to
the Federal payroll." As a result he "was convinced that the
major portion of our added funds must be spent with industry,
education and other non-profit institutions." For Webb, the
incredible magnitude of Project Apollo necessitated giving work
to outside resources in order to accomplish the lunar landing
within the decade as had been mandated by President Kennedy. _
By the mid-1960s, with the space program in full gear, NASA
was directing over $4 billion per year to supporting
organizations. More than 375,000 contract employees worked on
NASA programs. Though widely distributed, the largest portion of
funds went to contractors in sunbelt states that were just
emerging economically. California, Louisiana, Alabama, Florida,
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and Texas received the largest shares. _ These states provided
strong support for NASA as the program got underway. In the 1963
effort to cut $519 million from the NASA budget, not a single
Senator from California, Louisiana, Alabama, Florida, or Texas
Supported the move. New York state also ranked high in the
distribution of NASA contracts. Not surprisingly, neither of the
New York senators voted to cut NASA's budget.
In his chapter on the Johnson years, Robert Dallek argues
Lyndon Johnson promoted the idea that space expenditures could be
used to stimulate the economies of the sunbelt states,
particularly in the deep South. In that sense, space spending
fit into Johnson's vision of the social transformation necessary
to achieve his Great Society goals. More significantly, space
contracts helped to soften conservative opposition to government
largess. Tied as it was to Cold War politics and economic
growth, space spending was an easier vote for conservative
politicians to cast than a vote for welfare programs or civil
rights. Fittingly, Johnson once remarked that the space program
lay the groundwork for conservatives to accept Great Society
welfare programs, since it created a precedent for big government
spending. 65
Government contracts played a central role in Nixon's
decision to approve the Space Shuttle program. The U.S.
aerospace industry had been hard hit by the wlnd-down of Project
Apollo and the cancellation of U.S. participation in the effort
to develop a supersonic transport. Another major defeat in the
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government procurement could have meant negative consequences for
Republicans running in the 1972 elections. Nixon was concerned
about "battleground states" and his party's effort to break into
the "solid South." Presidential adviser John Erlichman recalled
that the llst of "battleground states" was quite short but "when
you look at employment numbers [for the aerospace industry], and
you key them to the battleground states, the space program has an
importance out of proportion to its budget." While the Space
Shuttle would not generate many jobs relative to overall
employment, it would help in regions where Nixon's political
fortunes were in doubt. "You must not underemphasize that
employment element," Erlichman said, "in Nixon's decision on the
whole manned space program. "_
As the space station issue moved to center stage, so did the
implications of economic benefit. By 1992 the space station had
created an estimated 75,000 jobs in more than half the U.S.
states as NASA officials demonstrated in maps showing the
distribution of space station spending. 67 Representative David
Obey of Wisconsin, an opponent of the program, complained that
"there is no bigger pork item in the domestic budget than this
item." Speaking in support of continued funding, Texas
Representative Tom DeLay argue d that it is virtually impossible
to "deprive your state and your constituents of this important
source of jobs and revenue." Only two members of the 27-person
Texas congressional delegation voted to discontinue the program.
The space station received similarly strong support from Alabama
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and southern California congressional districts, beneficiaries of
significant space program largess. When the issue reached the
Senate, Barbara Mikulski of Maryland gave it strong support.
Chair of the appropriations subcommittee handling the NASA
budget, she voted with liberals on most issues but not on the
space station. The space station program, she argued would save
jobs in the aerospace industry. "We are going to generate jobs
today and jobs tomorrow," she argued, rebuffing efforts to cut
the program from the federal budget. Mikulski expressed pride in
the work of NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center, located in her
home state, and certainly tracked that Maryland industries had
received close to $18 million in space station contracts. _
As dramatic as the influence of contracting appears, it is
not the primary force motivating congressional behavior in space.
Ideology is the strongest predictor of congressional voting
patterns. Especially in recent years, party affiliation is a
close second. The influence of economic benefit is diluted
considerably by the tendency of conservative law-makers to vote
for the space program regardless of whether or not their
constituents receive a great deal of funds from the NASA. The
tendency to switch is most pronounced among legislative liberals,
for whom economic benefit is a motivating force. _
Conclusion
Presidents exercise leadership in the U.S. space program
within a complex web of ideological, partisan, and economic
constraints. Other nuances too subtle to discuss here have also
moved individual political leaders to support or oppose
presidential initiatives in space. Leadership is not easy, given
these constraints, nor is success assured. The space program
bears more of a relationship to other political issues than its
adherents would like to admit.
Although the opportunities for presidential control are
limited, the president continues to be the person who initiates
the national space agenda. Before an initiative has any chance
of political success, it must be endorsed by the president. The
initiative may be modified substantially by the Congress, but it
will not be considered to any great extent unless the president
proposes it. No one but the president could have effectively
initiated the race to the Moon in 1961, or the Space Shuttle
program in 1972, or the space station and space exploration
initiatives of the 1980s. Leadership had to emanate from the
White House, even if other politlcians disagreed. As such, the
president has been and continues to be the crucial player in the
effort to define the overall space program. Without the
president, no large-scale project could be placed on the national
political agenda.
Once proposed, however, any large space effort has to be
nurtured through the political process. In the area of space
technology, this takes place over many years. That process in
Washington has never been particularly tidy, nor can it ever be
in a pluralistic system. There may be fundamental agreement on
overarching goals, such as the desire to participate in space
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exploration, but specific means for achieving those goals are
constantly reevaluated and altered.
This constant reevaluation gives rise to what some observers
have characterized as "heterogeneous engineering," a situation in
which technology and politics takes place simultaneously. _ The
image of presidential leadership created by Kennedy and Project
Apollo is certainly attractive, but it does not abolish the
general rule. Space policy takes place within a complex web of
institutions and interests that makes NASA no more or less
exceptional than other governmental activities.
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